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THE FALL OF CHRISTIANITY

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FALL OF CHRISTIANITY

A STUDY OF CHRISTIANITY
THE STATE AND WAR

By

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FOREWORD

WORLD-PEACE is by far the greatest problem that confronts the nations to-day. It is humanity's key-problem. All others—social, economic, political and ecclesiastical—are subsidiary to it, because conditioned by it. It is not too much to say that the establishment of world-peace on a sure foundation is the price that must be paid for the continuance of our Western civilization. The statesmen of Europe and America are fully alive not only to the urgent necessity of strengthening the League of Nations, but also to the necessity, no less urgent, of attaining to a measure of disarmament, and thus eliminating the risk of future war.

This Western civilization of ours is called "Christian" civilization. It grew up closely intertwined with and profoundly influenced by the Christian religion. And despite the so-called drift from organized Christianity, our civilization still pays homage at least to the ideals of Christianity, and the Christian Church in its various branches remains a powerful factor in the life of Europe and America.

One of the most poignant tragedies of the dark year 1914 was the powerlessness of organized Christianity to prevent the Great War, and a tragedy even more grievous was the impotence of the Churches to shorten the war, or to influence its course in the slightest degree. That this failure to indicate a Christian solution to the problems of the international relations and to find a way out of the impasse in which the world found itself in the years 1914–18 gravely damaged the prestige of organized Christianity is beyond a doubt. Since then, men have been seeking for the reason of this tragic weakness on the part of Christ's Church and asking whether, in days to come, the Church may be able to stand foursquare in favour of peace against war, international law in place of international anarchy, conciliation in place of enmity, co-operation in place of competition, and justice in place of force. In this book, Professor Heering shows the historical reasons for the Church's weakness in the past, and indicates a way of advance in the future.

One of the most distinguished of Dutch theologians, Dr. Heering has devoted years of patient research and hard thinking to the historical and moral aspects of the problem. This volume

is the fruit of his ripe scholarship on the one hand, and his strong Christian conviction on the other. First published in Dutch in June 1928, it created something of a sensation in political and religious circles in Holland. It focused public opinion on the question of the Christian Church and War, and caused men—within and outside the Churches—to think deeply and earnestly on this question, so vital to our life and well-being. It entered a second edition in May 1929, and has been recently translated into German. The appearance of an English translation will render it available to English-speaking people all over the world.

I am highly honoured at being privileged to introduce my friend Professor Heering to the English-speaking public, and I do so in the confidence that this English edition will supply a felt want and will take rank at once as the standard and authoritative work on the all-compelling subject of Christianity and international relations.

HECTOR MACPHERSON

EDINBURGH
February 1930

INTRODUCTION

It has been no mere whim of mine to write this book, but a necessity from which there was no escape, for I could no longer endure the tacit alliance between Christianity and militarism.

I do not want to speak about the *causes* of war, except the one great cause which inheres in that alliance, nor to write a history-book. I simply want to put forth an earnest plea, on the strength of facts fairly examined and plainly stated, that Christianity and war are opposed irreconcilably, nowadays more than ever. I want to drive a wedge between Christian thought and the theory of war, these two having been forced together in the course of history, and being even now held together artificially. I want to make appeal to the Christian conscience, and the reason that is guided by this conscience, and ask whether it is not high time that Christians and the Church set themselves against the entire way of war.

However many the fields in which Christianity has expanded wholesomely—and I gaze at them reverently, thankful with all my being—in the field of State and war morality, with its Christian sanctions, so dark a history has been played out that I have not shrunk from the pregnant symbolism of my title: *The Fall of Christianity*. It was a fateful change of spirit which took place under Constantine the Great and afterwards: through the alliance, all too close, of Church and State, the consciousness of the opposition of Christianity and war—a consciousness which arose in the early centuries as a result of the Gospel—was lost, and with it a Christian conviction of the greatest value.

A fateful change of spirit. For the worst of it is not that at a certain point men sinned against the Christian standard; the worst of it is that from that point on, the standard was no longer seen, and what was evil was tacitly called good. However many historical and psychological reasons may be advanced to explain this change, the fact remains; primarily it was a fall. That a way taken is the wrong one, however, is seen more clearly at the end than at the beginning. The manner in which the Church, in all Christian lands, was directly involved in the

mutual slaughter of the last war, as the indispensable inspirational factor, demonstrates this fall in the clearest, cruellest way. No greater difference and contradiction is conceivable than that between Christianity and modern war. Anyone who denies this has failed to see clearly the reality of one of these, maybe of both. No severer sentence can be passed on the military Christianity of our day than that which is passed by the Christianity of Christ.

A heavy load of guilt lies on our Christianity, especially on its theology. It has adopted political absolutism and nationalism, and honoured them, far more than the Christian ideal can tolerate. It has made wide allowances for sin and for the expediencies of this world; far wider than the Christian ethic permits. It has supplanted faith in the *new* creation with its own Creation-belief, and has learnt meekly to accept the world which Christ repudiated. In so far as it remained critical of the course of civilization, or became so, it paralysed this critical faculty by an exaggerated otherworldliness, an otherworldliness which regarded the militarizing and corruption of this world with resignation, absorbed in contemplation of the life beyond. Thus theology abetted Christianity in becoming a one-sided concern for individual salvation, and in losing its world-reforming character. So theology has contrived to reconcile the Christian to war, tame his rebelliousness and provide militarism with that spiritual sanction without which it could not last in lands of the Christian confession.

And so the pure and exalted ethic of the Gospel has been hopelessly distorted and confused. If this ethic is to come into its rights, it will, notwithstanding—nay, by virtue of—the faith which bears it, have to hold dogmatics at arm's length for the present, to prevent the latter from paralysing it before it has been able to display its power and aim.

Let me not be misunderstood. I do not presume to cavil at history; God's ways are not our ways. And Harnack is no doubt right in saying that Christianity would have rushed to its destruction had it instantly demanded the full carrying out of its principles in State and society. Sometimes divine wisdom lowers a curtain before men's eyes, so that God's purpose is half concealed, and men cannot clearly see the consequences of their own schemes.

But when the time has come, as now, and God draws aside the curtain, revealing His purpose clearly again, letting men see the sinful character of the sin begun in blindness, *then* it becomes unforgivable to close the eyes, and impossible to call white that which is black. Appeals to history are idle then. We may recognize no norm for our conduct but the moral one. We are not concerned with the cosmic tendencies of history; these we must leave to Providence, whose rôle we may not try to play.

Do not call me haughty. I do not exalt myself above the Church from which I come, the Church I serve and whose guilt I bear. I do not exalt myself above my Christian opponents; I know all too well that we are all sinners before God. But on this one point, after long and sore strife, my eyes are opened; to me this revelation is holy and complete. In its light, which is none other than a further-flung beam from the Gospel, I have tried to give my account of war, its character and its relation to the individual, to society, to State and to justice.

Whether I was competent to undertake this task, and whether I have been successful, I must leave to others to decide. I am neither historian in the strict sense nor exegete, neither political nor juridical philosopher. In these regions I have often had to let myself be instructed by trustworthy guides. But the more the problems become ethical in nature, questions of principle, the more I have felt myself to be on sure ground. It is obvious that my book, which touches on, and must touch on, so many subjects, has its weak spots. But in the main argument, in the contention that a "righteous war", if it were ever possible, is no longer thinkable, and that a Christian nation is forbidden, with a holy prohibition, to take any part again in war, *there* I feel myself strong. The abundant criticism which has been my lot in Holland and which resulted in the first edition of my book being exhausted within a year has only strengthened my conviction. This criticism became weaker and weaker as it drew near the main contention, and against that contention itself it has proved quite powerless.

The best in my book is not mine, but His, who compelled

me to write. Wherefore I dare to hope that it will find a way, both at home and wherever the English and German translations are read abroad, to honour Christ and glorify the Father.

G. J. HEERING

LEYDEN
May 1930

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THE FALL OF CHRISTIANITY

CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY AND WAR

How did primitive Christianity think of war? By primitive Christianity we understand the Christianity of the New Testament and of the first century A.D.

A. The New Testament

1. *Its Ethic*

The New Testament is deeply rooted in the Old. It might therefore be expected that we should first ask what *the Bible* thinks of war. Yet the clear answer to that is that there is amazing diversity of thought. On few subjects does the Bible offer such divergent and irreconcilable views as on war. For the man who relates the question of Christianity and war to the whole Bible, while regarding the Bible as a unity, the whole of which lies on one level, the problem is insoluble. But he for whom the Scriptures are not a static unity, but an organic (for an organism passes through phases of growth), a progressive and ever fuller revelation of God's being and will, *he* will be able to see an ascending line, which finds its goal and zenith in Jesus Christ, whose all-sufficient light has since been blazing in the world, and making plain the way into his Kingdom.

The great sweep upward in the line of revelation comes, as might be expected, between the old dispensation and the new, between the Old and the New Testament. But even the Old Testament shows development of thought. A noteworthy instance is that in which the later writer of Chronicles complains of the famed King David that he has "shed blood abundantly", for which reason he was not allowed to build the Temple (1 Chron. xxii. 8), but this scruple is not felt throughout the older books of Samuel or Kings; there the wars are actually "the wars of the Lord". Dr. de Moor[1] tries to reconcile these contradictory

[1] J. C. de Moor: *Dienstplicht en Geweten*, 4th ed., 1918; van Schild en Pijl; pp. 9–11.

views in a strangely allegorical fashion, and indeed, his whole view of the Bible compels him to do this. "What could this same David have said but that God had taught him wars? For in 2 Samuel xxii. 35, David actually says: 'He teacheth my hands to war.' " Here is an example of the difficulty into which we get, when we can admit no development of thought in the Bible, and must needs therefore place all its utterances on one level. There is an ascent of thought in the Old Testament (over how many centuries the Scriptures run!), and we find peaks there which almost attain to the height of the New Testament.

With regard to the problem of war, two highways of thought run through the Old Testament, the one definitely nationalistic and war-loving, the other reaching away far higher to a temper of spirit that makes way for the Gospel. The first, in olden times the natural way, became the way of Israel's hardening; with the advent of Jesus it came under condemnation and was destroyed. On the other highway Christ himself set his feet.

Along the first way, wherein Yahweh was worshipped exclusively as Israel's tribal god and war-god, we come upon the "holy" wars of Israel with their cruelties, recorded in Joshua vi., vii., x., and xi.; Deborah with her proud and savage victory-song (Judges v.), and Samuel, inciting Saul to merciless revenge (1 Sam. xv., where Saul executes this command from Samuel: "Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass").

Here also are the passionate psalms of revenge, like Psa. lxxiv. 3 and 22; lxxix. 12; lxxxiii. 9 ff.; cxxxvii. 7–9. ("O daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock.") For the most part, the narrowly Jewish nationalistic type of Messianic hope came to life out of this spirit, the zealots of which came again and again into bloody opposition to the power of Rome, until at last, in A.D. 70 and in A.D. 135, they were overthrown for good, and driven from their land.

The spirit that prevails along this way—clearly heard in the passage we have quoted—is in strong opposition to the spirit

of Jesus Christ. Believers in the verbal inspiration of Holy Scripture in all its parts make desperate endeavours, which of course invariably fail, to reconcile these parts of the Old Testament with the Christian Gospel. It is this spirit of primitive barbarism in the Bible which hinders many lovers of Scripture from taking their stand against war in the way that Christians should. Thus Dr. Macpherson is right when he says, "the orthodox view of the Bible as an inspired whole has in the past prevented the Church from giving a whole-hearted pronouncement against war".[1] We would add, this same view is doing it still. In opposition to pacifism, in many religious circles, King David is still continually instanced as a man after God's own heart (1 Sam. xiii. 14), and this, notwithstanding his waging so many wars. We will not deny the noble and pious traits in David's character, but when we read how he waged these "wars of the Lord" (1 Sam. xxvii. 9—"And David smote the land, and saved neither man nor woman alive". 2 Sam. xii. 31—"And he brought forth the people that were therein [i.e. in Rabbah], and put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and made them pass through the brickkiln: and thus did he unto all the cities of the children of Ammon"), every unprejudiced reader surely feels that this is not the voice of God, but the voice of an age still barbaric, with its yet uncouth idea of God and His will.

It is obvious that every Old Testament idea cannot be included in the Gospel. "The brutal dictates of war and State in the Old Testament simply do not arise for the man who has grasped the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount."[2] No wonder the distinguished missionary Stanley Jones, when he tried to preach the spirituality and grandeur of Christianity to Hindus and Mohammedans in India, met with adversaries at every turn who cited the Old Testament (no doubt the passages given above), until he made an end by saying, "I define Christianity as Christ". His opponents asked, "What gives you the right to make such a distinction?" (i.e. in the Scriptures); Dr. Jones answered with good reason that his own Master gave him the right, he himself having said, "Ye have heard it said of old time . . . but I say unto

[1] H. Macpherson: *The Church, the Bible and War*; Edinburgh, 1928, p. 7.
[2] H. Windisch: *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*; Leipzig, 1929, p. 154.

you . . ." Dr. Jones realized then, and taught others to understand, that "Revelation was progressive, culminating in Christ".[1]

Whoever wishes to take the Scriptures in hand and approach the peace problem in the Christian way will have to surrender "the *whole* Bible" theory (we repeat, the problem is otherwise insoluble), and focus on Christ alone and on what, in the Old Testament, points his way.

At the beginning of *this* way—that second highroad through the Old Testament—stands the Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," which, originally understood in the very limited sense of respect for one's fellow-citizen, comes to have an ever deeper and broader significance. Along this second highway moves the other type of Messianic hope, taking over the nobler elements in the nationalistic type and sublimating them, till it reaches its height in Isaiah, who looks into the future and sees the nations flocking up to Jerusalem, there to hear that swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears to pruning-hooks, that a nation shall no more lift up the sword against another nation, and that neither shall learn warfare any more (Isa. ii. 2–4; ix. 1–6; xi. 1–9). So also Psa. xlvi. 8–11 and Zech. ix. 9–10: "Behold, thy king cometh unto thee: he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass . . . And I will cut off the chariot from Ephraim, and the horse from Jerusalem, and the battlebow shall be cut off; and he shall speak peace unto the nations: and his dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the River to the ends of the earth."

In the last centuries of Israel's national life, the vengeful and bellicose type of Messianic hope overwhelmingly gained the upper hand. After the Maccabean revolt, "the land of the Jews remained a volcanic region, even under Roman rule".[2] Some impression of the vengefulness and blood-lust of the fanatically nationalist Jews may be gained from the Book of Enoch. "The men to whom God entrusts leadership in the Messianic war are every bit as cruel and barbaric as the heathen oppressors of the Jews."[3] This "God-serving war-fanaticism" ended in a massacre. "But just before this blinded people played out its

[1] E. Stanley Jones: *The Christ of the Indian Road*; London, 1925, p. 17.
[2] H. Windisch: *Der Messianische Krieg und das Urchristentum*; Tübingen, 1909, p. 7.
[3] ibid., p. 14.

world-historic rôle, a new religious movement had entered upon the stage, which bore within itself rich spiritual treasures essential to the well-being of the world, viz. faith in God and in salvation, together with belief in a hitherto unattained purity and incomparable virtue; a new religious movement, which had cast aside that self-destroying fanaticism of war. After the manifestation of Christ and the outgoing of the first Christian mission, Judaism had nothing more to say to mankind. The lower instincts, which it could not release, drove it to its own destruction. But for Christianity, its world-mission would have failed. Both the rise of Christianity, with its peaceful aim, and the consequent decline of Judaism may be taken as sign-posts of God. Even the superficial observer can see at a glance how at this point the history of mankind was being guided by Reason. The Christian sees in it an indubitable testimony to the sway of God's Providence in the history of the spirit."[1]

This characteristic of the earliest Christianity is due to him who created it, to him who called this movement into being, to him who has fulfilled the highest Messianic hopes of the noblest elements in Israel: the Messiah, Jesus. "The most important characteristic of his Messiahship, speaking negatively, is to be found in his refusal to wage the Messianic war." "He would have ruined his mission if he had encouraged the war-fever. The quickening of conscience which he invoked would have been lost. But he took upon himself the consequences of the decision which, in opposition to the national ideal, he had arrived at. He endured, he suffered, he went to his death. And in spite of the Jews he became the Messiah Triumphant. Without strife of arms—though he too was a fighter—the Galilean had conquered."[2]

Certain sayings in the Gospels have at some time or other led to misunderstanding of the character of Jesus' Messiahship, as if he had actually wanted to establish himself by power of arms; e.g. Matt. x. 34 and Luke xxii. 36–38.

In Matt. x. 34 we read: "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword." The sequel makes it clear, however, that what is meant is the sword of discord in a world which shall be divided for and against

[1] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, p. 92. [2] ibid., pp. 95, 80.

Christ, the sword of hate and persecution which will be directed against the Christians. How could it be intended otherwise, when just before (verse 16) it is said, "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves"? Luke avoids this misunderstanding, by writing "division" in place of "the sword" (xii. 51).

Greater difficulty is presented by Luke xxii. 36, 38, one of the dark passages of the New Testament. Alluding to the hard days that shall come, Jesus warns his disciples: "He that hath no sword, let him sell his cloke, and buy one.[1] And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said, It is enough." "See!" cried the German theologian, Spitta, during the war, "Jesus has summoned his followers to armed defence; *he* was no tender pacifist."[2] But almost all New Testament scholars confess themselves perplexed. Professor Oort, in the Leiden Translation, calls the passage "enigmatical" and in conflict with many other passages in the New Testament. Weiss, in his Commentary, observes: "The martial note in this word is in direct contradiction to many others which definitely forbid resistance [e.g. Matt. v. 39 ff., xxvi. 52 ff.; Rev. xiii. 10; Luke vi. 29 ff.]. It is in direct opposition to the whole spirit of primitive Christianity, and is not to be interpreted by the tone or attitude of the early Church in the age of persecution." Indeed, neither by the attitude of these "tiny minorities", nor by the attitude of Jesus himself before his arrest. What, indeed, would he have done with two swords? How could they have been "enough"? How could Jesus have been a leader in such strife? What sort of armed Messiah would he have been? Questions multiply themselves. Harnack can give no other explanation of this "dark warning" than an allegorical one. He says: "Jesus calls for a warlike readiness to defend the Gospel at all costs. But his disciples understand him in a material sense, and point to the two swords that are in the room. Ironically he interrupts them with the words, 'It is enough'."[3] Windisch rejects the allegory, but regards this text as "foreign matter" ("ein Fremdkörper") in the Gospel, and suggests this escape

[1] R.V. marg.

[2] *Theol. Rundschau*, 18th Year (1915), Vols. 11–12, p. 335, quoted in an article by Windisch: "Jesus und der Krieg."

[3] Adolf Harnack: *Militia Christi*; Tübingen, 1905, pp. 4–5.

from the difficulty: It is a human weakness of Jesus that is recorded here; one which is to be speedily overcome; in the hour of danger "he himself, though only for a moment, thought of resistance". But "he conquered the temptation". Just afterwards (Luke xxii. 51), in Gethsemane, at the arrest, he forbids one of his disciples, who has drawn a sword and struck off an ear of one of the aggressors, to go any further—"Suffer ye thus far"—and heals the wound. At the critical moment he rises above his assailants and defenders alike. "Blameless he stood there, in a world of vengeance, blood-lust and cruelty, the man of love and peace and patience."[1] Matthew records this saying of Jesus still more clearly and impressively: "Put up again thy sword into its place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. xxvi. 52). No, only "war-exegesis", which unhappily has flourished freely, can make war-capital out of the Gospel record.[2]

We referred to Spitta just now. But similar views were held by the French preacher, Giran, who believed that Jesus permitted *one* blow to be struck, in order to give a living example how, in certain circumstances, armed opposition is justified, and even called for! And in saying that they who take the sword shall perish with the sword, the Gospel gloriously vindicated the cause of the Entente; therefore in the end Germany must needs collapse![3]

Whoever brings the spirit of Christ into alliance with force has surely failed to understand him. The only use of force, which the Gospels record of Jesus, is the cleansing of the Temple (Matt. xxi. 12; John ii. 14), where Jesus in holy wrath drives out the merchants and money-changers from the house of prayer, but without anything being said of bloodshed; and even this action, although explicable from the point of view of human nature, and even perhaps from that of the "divine anger" which filled the soul of Jesus, seems yet out of harmony with the rest

[1] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, pp. 50–51.

[2] This "war-exegesis" can even make coin out of the saying of Jesus in Gethsemane, which we have just quoted, and can read in it a Christian justification for the bearing of arms, and for the sword of authority! The early Christians thought otherwise. Cf., e.g., Tertullian later.

[3] *Theol. Rundschau*, 20th Year (1917), Vols. 10–11, in an article by Windisch.

of the New Testament, where the spirit of godly love and suffering patience everywhere takes the place of violence. "For hereunto were ye called"—so runs the First Epistle of Peter (ii. 21–23)—"because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." This is the impression which the Son of Man left behind. It is not mere human love, but love inspired by God, which possesses the greatest spiritual power to endure and conquer all. He who calls Christ's love "weak" has never known it; it is the greatest power the world has ever seen.

It would be the most difficult of tasks to define objectively the nature of the Christian faith. Anyone who has followed the debate since the work of Harnack in 1900, *Das Wesen des Christentums*,[1] and that of Troeltsch in 1903, on the question *Was heisst Wesen des Christentums?* is convinced of that. Many cultural, historical and even linguistic problems must be dealt with first; and in the end the conclusion arrived at depends largely upon one's personal religious convictions. But it is otherwise when we set about finding Christianity first and foremost in the grand record of the New Testament, and at the same time confine ourselves to stating, not the whole Christian faith, but only the Christian ethic. "It is in the region of ethics that the facts which present themselves are most favourable to study, and that they consist in what can most directly challenge us."[2] We shall now therefore consider the ethics of the New Testament. We shall take care not to make any arbitrary choice, but to focus our attention on those utterances which are universally recognized as of primary importance.

The Christian ethic is of course not to be separated from Christian belief; both are one in the power of God, in his Holy Spirit, which they both presuppose. Only he who has believed in and experienced the redemptive love of God which Christ has revealed can truly understand and practise the Christian

[1] E.T., 1905, *What is Christianity?*

[2] Professor J. de Zwaan: *Jezus, Paulus en Rome*; Amsterdam, 1927, pp. 16–19.

ethic; the two together make up the Christian life, an indivisible whole. Thus it is that the lofty and powerful claims of the Gospel ring out as self-evident truths. They are self-evident to the man who is laid hold of by God in Christ, even though—since his salvation is never finished on earth, but is always only "in hope"—he can only live up to them in small measure, and follow Christ only from afar. Self-evident is the Great Commandment which de Zwaan rightly calls "the word that is fundamental, and characteristic of the ethic of Jesus", viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Matt. xxii. 37–39).

The modern consideration, whether one *can* command love, was even less a question for Jesus and for the evangelist than for the Mosaic lawgiver (Deut. vi. 5, and Lev. xix. 18) to whom Jesus appealed. Certainly, Jesus puts more stress upon intention than the ancient lawgiver did, but for him intention and outward act are one.[1] "Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; . . . by their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. vii. 17–20). He declares with emphasis that what matters is the *doing* of his Father's will, the *doing* of his words (Matt. vii. 21 and 24–26). The "Golden Rule" of Matt. vii. 12 also comes to mind: "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them," and the injunction of Jesus at the end of the parable of the Good Samaritan, "Go, and do thou likewise" (Luke x. 37).

The greater number by far of the ethical utterances of the Gospel are to be found in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v.–vii.), but these are in perfect harmony with the ethic which issues straight from the Great Commandment (Matt. xxii. 36–40), and with that of Luke x. (the Good Samaritan) and many other passages. It is therefore absurd to dispose of such an exposition as ours (as so many do when hard-pressed) with a scornful, "Sermon on the Mount Christianity!" This is simply to scorn the will of God as Jesus reveals it in his Gospel, of which the Sermon on the Mount is a vital part.

[1] See Windisch: *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*; especially chap. ii: "Der Sinn der Gebote."

In concrete and vivid precepts, the Sermon on the Mount sets forth the character and conduct of those who really follow Jesus, of those who may really be called God's children, of those who shall submit to the rule of God, of those who shall enter his Kingdom, in short, of true Christians; the pure in heart, the meek, the peacemakers, those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, and are willing to suffer for its sake. They are "the salt of the earth, and the light of the world". And then follow the commandments: "Ye shall keep yourselves from murder, but also from revenge. And in place of an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, resist not that which is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." This "extravagance of expression", says Weiss in his Commentary, must be understood in the same way as that of Matt. xviii. 9: "If thine eye causeth thee to stumble, pluck it out, and cast it from thee." So overwhelming is the conviction of Jesus that no worldly interest can hold good against the single-minded concern for God of the soul that is ripe for His Kingdom, that the strongest expression of it, even an extravagant expression, is not too much. ("For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life?" Matt. xvi. 26.) It is a sign of his ardent and heroic spirit that he expects the utmost from his followers; he expects from them a firmly resolved surrender of the will to the cause of God's Kingdom. And that which impels them to this surrender is ever that love for God and man which God's grace liberates within them. "Jesus does not give detached commands . . . he brings your whole being and doing and suffering under the compulsion of one single principle."[1] "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy, but I say unto you: love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven" (Matt. v. 43–45 and Luke vi. 27–28).

Jesus here alludes to Lev. xix. 18, where love for "your neighbour" is enjoined, and where by "neighbour" one's compatriot is meant. Under the term "enemy", which Jesus puts next, must be understood primarily the racial enemy. But he

[1] de Zwaan, op. cit., p. 29.

means "not only the public foe", as Weiss says, but "more particularly the personal enemy (*'your'* enemy)". Love even your enemy! "This is the highest demand that ever can be made. . . . This love of enemy is not just one virtue among many, but the fairest flower of all human conduct."[1] It is this love of which Paul asserts that it "beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things", this love which "never faileth", and which is greatest of "faith and hope and love" (1 Cor. xiii). It is indeed the greatest, for while faith and hope are scarcely attributes of God, He loves with an eternal love; "God *is* love" (1 John iv. 8). Therefore the children of God can be like the Son only by so loving. "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect." This is a language that sounds out far above human speech, far even above our life, as far as the Cross of Christ rises high above our little sinful forms. But it is speech in the spirit of the Gospel. Anyone who would inquire into the Christian temper of spirit and into the Christian ethic can find his first and clearest answer here—of this there can be no doubt.

According to the Gospels, this spiritual temper was not always understood even by the disciples. Jewish Messianic ideas were in their blood ("Hosanna to the Son of David"); the Messiah must avenge his honour. When the people of a Samaritan village refused him lodging because he was on the way to Jerusalem, the disciples wanted to avenge the honour of Jesus, by calling down fire from heaven at his word. "But he turned and rebuked them." Later MSS. gives his reason thus, "Ye know not what manner of Spirit ye are of; for the Son of man came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them"[2] (Luke ix. 51–56). "And yet in spite of his refusal to use force, in spite of his forbidding resistance, he was a fighter", but a fighter "against the powers of darkness. He only fought to save the life of man. The killing of men was and still is forbidden".[3] So Paul understood his Master: a Christian stands and fights in this world only with the weapons of the Spirit; in an age of persecution he cries out to his fellow-fighters, "Put on the whole armour of God . . . for our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the

[1] Weiss: Commentary, sub loc. cit.
[2] R.V. marg.
[3] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, pp. 90, 54.

principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places. . . . Stand therefore having girded your loins with truth, and having put on the breast-plate of righteousness, and having shod your feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace . . ." (Eph. vi. 10–17). It is as if Paul deliberately borrows a figure from military strife in order to demonstrate that the warfare of Christians is wholly different.

And yet we find in Paul's eschatology (i.e. teaching about the last things) several traces of the War-Messiah, not indeed in his references to the earthly life of Jesus—he can alter nothing of that—but "he makes the War-Lord rise from the dead, before whose wondrous might the enemy powers everywhere fall back, who enters upon world-conflict and concludes with the mighty triumph of universal sway".[1] A mythological final conflict, then, or better, a final conflict in mythological form (see, e.g., 2 Thess. ii. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 24–28). Even in the Gospels we find a similar trace (Matt. xxi. 40 ff.; xxii. 6 ff., in each of which the destroying judgment of "the Lord" or "the King" is spoken of). Yet these eschatological pictures add nothing to nor subtract from the Saviour's earthly life, as the Gospel shows it, or the mode of living which he prescribes.

So also with the Christian apocalyptic, which was built up in the first century on the Jewish model, and largely out of Jewish materials of which the Revelation of St. John is the biblical example. Harnack writes, "The apocalyptic eschatology preserves traces of the warlike Messiah by taking them over to its portrait of Jesus", but "one notices that the warlike element is wholly confined to the apocalyptic eschatology, and does not extend to the figure of Christ outside it".[2] And as the Messiah of apocalypse fights with angels at his side and not with men, this action in no way affects the example which the Christ of the Gospels has left behind. "Heavenly beings and superhuman heavenly powers alone wage war on God's behalf. When men fight, they are doomed to destruction; only the devil lets men fight for him. The fighters whom God blesses cannot be men."[3] The author of Apocalypse is convinced of that.

[1] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, pp. 69, 70. *Militia Christi*, p. 6.
[3] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, p. 76.

John puts it bluntly: "If any man shall kill with the sword, with the sword must he be killed. Here is the patience and the faith of the saints" (Rev. xiii. 10). Among all these pictures of war, in Revelation, appears continually the figure of the Lamb led to the slaughter. "The Jew actually bore the sword in times of dire distress, and tried to wage the Messianic war there and then; he had a land, a holy city and a Temple to defend. But the Christian was taught to watch for his 'Christus Victor'. . . . History shows us that in the first three centuries (the centuries of persecution), the warlike Jesus, *Christus redivivus* of the Apocalypse, never led the Christians to military revolution."[1]

"The Jew had a land, a holy city and a Temple to defend," says Harnack. But he recognizes that the chief reason for the difference between the Jewish and the Christian attitude did not lie here. The chief reason lay in the fact "that the Christian ethic had absolutely ruled out war, for the Christian"[2] and the Jewish ethic did nothing of the sort for the Jew. But the Christian community at Jerusalem had also to defend something in the city besides its country. With the outbreak of the revolt of A.D. 70, however, they left Jerusalem and betook themselves over Jordan. With the next and last revolt against Roman domination (A.D. 132–135), "they changed from onlookers to sufferers. The 'Messiah' Bar Kochba bitterly persecuted the followers of his rival, Jesus, and tried to win them from their allegiance. But the War-chief was put to shame, and the sufferers conquered."[3]

Primitive Christianity makes it plain then. Harnack is fully justified in saying, "It requires no further proof to establish firmly that the Gospel excludes all violence, and has nothing in common with war, nor will permit it."[4]

When the first Christianity, the Christianity which was closest to the Fountain-head, had passed away, the Christians, for reasons which we shall define and examine presently, forsook this way of the Gospel, along which Christ had gone before them, took part in war, and even waged "holy wars"—just like Jews and Mohammedans—in the name of Christ (the wars of Charlemagne to convert the heathen, the Crusades, and many papal wars). But what concerns us here is the question, how

[1] Harnack: *Militia Christi*, pp. 9–10.
[2] ibid., p. 11.
[3] Windisch: *Der Mess. Krieg*, p. 91.
[4] *Militia Christi*, p. 2.

men can give account for themselves when faced with the spirit and utterances of the Gospel. It is well worth the trouble, to study how men have contrived, at any rate to their own satisfaction, to keep on good terms with the Gospel, without renouncing warfare. We shall study the principal attempts.

II. *Attempts to Reconcile the New Testament Ethic with War*

1. The Sermon on the Mount, it is said, must not be taken in an outward sense, but an inward. By "Resist not evil," Augustine says, "what is required is not a bodily action but an inward disposition".[1] To turn the left cheek, when smitten on the right, he says again in one of his letters, cannot be taken literally.[2] Augustine elsewhere qualifies this dangerous line of thought, holding that the personal use of violence, even in self-defence, is illegitimate,[3] but many Christian theologians have followed it up, one way or another, on the one hand pointing to the figurative meaning of the plain words of the Sermon on the Mount, which must be taken "spiritually", (i.e. *cum grano salis*), on the other hand showing that the Sermon comprises only a law for the inner man, an ideal for a higher world of love and peace whither we may fly in spirit, to refresh ourselves, and to be preserved from hate and revenge and needless cruelty.[4]

Thus, we are told, the Sermon on the Mount is intended as the law of God's Kingdom, regarded as a *regnum internum*, as God's realm within us, to be clearly distinguished from the world without, which has other laws.[5] Oh, these theologians! How one contrives to live inwardly in a higher world and outwardly in a lower, without damaging one's inward sincerity and without treason to the inner Kingdom of God, we are not told. This distinction between inward and outward life—a distinction

[1] *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 76.
[2] *Epistle* (138) *to Marcellinus*, II, 12, 13. See Dr. K. H. E. de Jong: *Dienst-weigering bij de oude Christenen*; Leiden, 1905, pp. 52, 53. Harnack calls this work "gründlich und fördernd" (preface to *Militia Christi*).
[3] *de civitate Dei*, I, 19, 20.
[4] Professor Baumgarten, quoted by Windisch: *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915: "Jesus und der Krieg"; p. 339.
[5] Ihmels, quoted by Windisch, as above, pp. 346 and 347 (*note*).

of which the Gospel knows nothing—has done Christianity much harm.

2. Closely related to this is the view[1] that since Christ has freed us from "the Law", the commands of the Sermon on the Mount, which in their radicalism are quite impossible of achievement, cannot be meant as concrete instructions, but only as indications of right intention. And so we get leave to make a distinction between the claims of the Gospel and our behaviour, and can venture to take another course, should these claims come into conflict with earthly duties. This idea, however, becomes more and more untenable nowadays. It is recognized that these commands, though they lay stress on the inward disposition and have not the force of law, were certainly meant as concrete instructions for the followers of Jesus. They had to be obeyed. Their carrying out was counted on. Behind these injunctions, which admit no cleavage between conduct and character, stands the newly sent Ambassador of God, with his, "But I say unto you", meaning "I bid you".[2]

3. Another way of shirking the conclusion that the claims of the Sermon on the Mount are valid has been the explanation that they were inspired by the expectation of the speedy end of the world, that they therefore contain only an ethic for the short time between, an "Interim-ethic", which thus cannot apply to ourselves. But be it remarked, against this "eschatological" explanation that the expectation of the end of the world arose precisely out of these "exaggerated" demands, which the first Christians regarded as the supreme will of God; a world which refused to comply with them *must needs* come to doom.

But the view is to be rejected also on other than these psychological grounds. "The influence of eschatology on the ethics of the Gospel, especially on the Sermon on the Mount," wrote Professor Windisch recently, "is not so great as often even I myself have asserted it to be."[3] And Dr. Cadoux remarks: "To argue that his more general principles . . . were so dependent upon the limitations of his historical outlook that they lose their validity for practical conduct as soon as those limitations are transcended, and must not be allowed to interfere with the

[1] Especially favoured by W. Herrmann and his followers.
[2] *Bergpredigt*, pp. 22 ff., 43 ff., 69 ff. [3] ibid., p. 152.

supposed necessities of modern economics and political life, is virtually to deny that there can be any such thing as a modern Christian ethic, founded on the teaching of Jesus."[1]

4. A fourth solution is that the requirements of the Sermon on the Mount apply not to this present world but to the Kingdom of God which is to come. There, not here, it has been said, the Christian will be able to put these requirements into effect. But how the Kingdom of God can be thought to contain enemies, who must be loved, evil, which must not be resisted, and bodily assailants, remains a riddle indeed. There is no more effective way of disabling the Gospel than first to relegate the fulfilment of Christ's commands to the Kingdom of God, and then to read his saying, "My Kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36), as if he had said, "My Kingdom is not *for* this world"!

No. The demands of the Sermon on the Mount, and their validity for us, in this life on earth, cannot be explained away. The expectation that the end of the world was near may have served to mitigate the hardness of the early Christians striving to comply with those demands, yet that striving remained very hard for them, as it is still hard for us if we are earnestly set on it. And we too know that this world, at least as far as it concerns us, in a short time "passes away". The whole Christian doctrine of life is, in a very real sense, "Interim-ethic".

5. Another familiar plea[2] is that the injunction "Love your enemies" has no reference to nations nor to the public foe. The Gospel is wholly non-political; absolutely individualist. The Sermon on the Mount does not speak of the *polemios*, the foe in time of war, but of the *echthros*, the man who is personally hated, and who personally hates us. The latter we must try to love, the former must be fought. Now really, this proposition too, like that which makes a cleavage between the inner and the outer life, betrays a deficient sense of reality. Is it supposed that we can fight our wartime enemies with feelings of love, since we must not hate them *personally*? As if hate did not

[1] C. J. Cadoux: *The Early Church and the World*; Edinburgh, 1925, p. 13. This comprehensive and well-documented work is of the greatest value for our subject.

[2] Proposed anew by the philologist T. Birt in *Ein Wort der Beruhigung in Kriegszeiten*, dealt with by Windisch: *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 336.

flare up inevitably; as if it were not, in fact, a condition for a fanatical, i.e. a well-conducted, war, and therefore systematically bred with this very object! A deficient sense of reality too, in that it is counted of little or no significance for the moral side of this question, that to fight the national foe one must employ the whole person, and meet persons. Moreover, this distinction between national and private foes has no point of contact with the Gospel. Even linguistically it has none; *echthros* is used in the New Testament and in the Septuagint both for the personal and for the national foe; *polemios* is entirely wanting from the New Testament.[1] We have already heard how Weiss in his Commentary remarks that in Matt. v. 44 "not *only* the public foe" is meant, although the antithesis to Lev. xix. 18 brings that meaning to mind first.

But Windisch still more sharply opposes this one-sided interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. The Jews in their Messianic hope were filled with hate of their oppressors. "When Jesus bade his followers love their enemies, do good to them, pray for them, endure their attacks and persecutions with meekness . . . he stifled every thought of rebellion and national war."[2] However cautious and conciliatory was this New Testament scholar in answering his countrymen, as they wrestled with the war question in wartime, it is no wonder that he could not refrain from explaining: "It must not be overlooked that pacifism, in applying the principles of the Gospel to the national enemy, seems better to agree with the spirit of Jesus."[3]

"Not only the war of aggression but also defensive warfare is ruled out by the Sermon on the Mount. . . . The Gospel condemns war. . . . We have primarily to recognize, however hard it may be at present [1915] to do so, that the waging of war has no place in the moral and spiritual teaching of Jesus. . . . What is stoutly called the 'spirit' of the Sermon is rather its abrogation . . . war-exegesis."[4] The writer of these words, Professor Baumgarten, extricated himself from a difficulty, which was obviously sorely painful for him, by declaring that,

[1] See Windisch: *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 345.
[2] *Der Mess. Krieg*, p. 31.
[3] *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 346.
[4] Quoted by Windisch, who wholeheartedly agrees: *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, pp. 338, 346, 348, 345, 333.

since the national ethic is above that of the individual,[1] war demands a suspension (*moratorium*) of the Sermon on the Mount. We cannot accept this solution, but we respect the honest recognition it contains, that it is hopeless and dishonourable work to try and reconcile the Sermon on the Mount with war. Let the ethic of the Gospel alone, in her perfect integrity. Touch her not with your war-stained hands; reverently let her pass . . . then turn your back on her and wage your war! This position is honest, but not that which would reconcile the two. "Condemnation of all forms of war is the only attitude congenial with the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount."[2]

6. With Luke xxii. 36–38 (the two swords) and Matt. x. 34 ("not peace but a sword") we have already dealt. Here there is no support to be found for the defence of war.

7. Sometimes attention is called to passages like Luke xi. 21–22, where Jesus likens the ascendancy of God over the devil to a strongly armed man who overcomes one less armed and plunders him.[3]

But Jesus borrows his similes from all sorts of worldly things, even from the breaking-in of the thief ("in like manner, in an hour that ye think not, the Son of man cometh", Matt. xxiv. 42–44). There is no approval of house-breaking or burglary here!

8. The prophecy in Matt. xxiv. 6 ff. and in Mark xiii. 7 ff. is pointed out: "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars", etc. It is the familiar apocalyptic picture of the catastrophes which are to precede the coming of the Kingdom of God. Many scholars doubt whether this belongs to the original preaching of Jesus; just afterwards (Matt. xxiv. 36) it is said, "But of that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven, but the Father only", while Luke xvii. 20 declares: "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo, here! or, there! . . ." But even if this were a prophecy of Jesus what right has anyone to conclude therefrom that Jesus has laid upon his disciples the obligation to take part in war? We have already seen that the contrary is true.

[1] For the relations of these two, see Chapter III.
[2] Windisch: *Bergpredigt*, p. 150.
[3] Even Bavinck points to this military parallel: *Het Probleem van den Oorlog*; Kampen, 1914, p. 17.

9. A favourite proof-passage is the answer of Jesus to the Pharisees who asked him if it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar. "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. xxii. 15–21). Augustine, who, with Ambrose and Athanasius, was one of the first Christian theologians to try and harmonize war and the Gospel, thought he had found proof in this text: "For indeed tribute is brought with the very object of giving wages to the soldiers, who are indispensable, just because of the wars."[1] There could be found few capable scholars to-day, however, who would dare accept this interpretation. Jesus refused to enter the snare prepared by the Pharisees, who wanted to force him either to take up a revolutionary position or to get himself disliked by the crowd. He asked them to show him a *denarius*, and pointed out the image of Caesar. "According to ancient conceptions the image and superscription proclaimed the coin to be the personal property of Caesar; consequently he could demand it back at any time. Therefore, says Jesus, it is only right and fair to deliver the coin up again to Caesar, if he requires it. At the same time the words of Jesus show very little interest in this matter."[2] Everyone who reads them gets the same impression. The emphasis falls on the second clause: "Render to God what is God's." To that end Jesus had come, and it was that which men must learn of him. It is very far fetched to make these words serve as a proof that Jesus sanctioned the forces of war, even though these were paid for from the tax. It shows very well how far men must seek when they are determined to find a sanction for war in the teaching of Jesus.

Should this explanation of the text no longer stand, another is always available, viz. that in this answer Jesus recognizes the State and religion as two independent territories; this is confidently asserted, and then, when the inevitable conflict comes, tacitly used to give supreme authority to the State! Whether this is a procedure likely to advance Christian politics may well be doubted. We shall return to this question.

10. The "militarist" theologians find their crowning witness not in the Gospels but in Rom. xiii. 1–7, where Paul, evidently writing at a time when the Emperor Nero still ruled justly, and

[1] *contra Faustum*, XXII, 74. [2] Weiss, sub loc. cit.

Christians could still respect his rule,[1] admonishes his readers to be in subjection to the powers ordained of God. The ruler "is a minister of God to thee, for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain."

"These words of Paul, taken in conjunction with the 'Caesar-saying' in the Gospels, form the basis of the whole body of traditional and conservative Christian thought as to the relations between Church and State, and are continually quoted by later writers when dealing with the question."[2] Paul here anticipates a need which is to become urgent later, when the State openly takes Christianity under its protection, the need to effect an understanding between Christianity and the civil authority, an understanding which is not to come about without concessions on the part of Christianity. Paul already makes a concession, in requiring reverence for an authority—the civil authority—other than that of the Gospel. True, Christians are not admonished to become military servants of the powers-that-be—of course Paul no more thinks of that than do any of the Christians of his day; at this period a Christian would probably not even be permitted to become one—but the right of the authorities to compel obedience, and so to use any needful coercion, for the maintenance of law and order, is expressly yielded here, nay, more, is sanctioned on religious grounds. The authorities may and should maintain justice with a police force. Thus much may be deduced from Rom. xiii, but no more. Of the right to wage war not a word is said. It cannot be deduced directly from this text, yet people try to do it, and in doing it have some notable forerunners, Calvin among others, who ranks opponents in war along with robbers, and so connects them with Rom. xiii. "They must all be regarded exactly as robbers, and be punished as such."[3] True, Ambrose and Augustine had spoken in one breath of evildoers, thieves and barbarians, against whom the Roman State must needs defend itself; for that day, with its inroads of Goths, Vandals and Huns, this classification is easier to

[1] The attitude of Christians towards the Roman State in the first century fluctuated between respect and hate. What they thought about the "ordained powers" in the second, mad period of that same Emperor's rule may be discovered from the Book of Revelation, where (xiii. 3) Nero is betokened as one of the heads of the blaspheming beast.

[2] Cadoux, op. cit., p. 112.

[3] Calvin: *Institutions*, IV, 20, 11.

understand. Nowadays it is no longer permissible to regard "the enemy" in this way, and so to give them the right to see us in the same light, treating us accordingly. We may no longer identify them with criminals. Besides, war activities are to be distinguished from those of justice and the police in these two respects:

(i) That in the latter *law* may be presupposed, while in the former, the impartial judge, who must decide what is right, is wanting, and

(ii) That war activities bear a character wholly different from those of law and the police, and so, from the point of view of ethics, cannot be judged in the same way. We shall have more to say on this point in Chapter IV.

11. Attention is also drawn[1] to the favourable light which the New Testament throws upon soldiers, such as the centuries at Capernaum (Matt. viii. 5–10), at the Cross (Matt. xxvii. 54), and at Caesarea (Acts x.). But to give this evidence its true valuation, it should be borne in mind that the Roman soldiery in Judaea only did police duty. And then, as we have already remarked under point 7, where, as here in Matt. viii., a parallel is drawn between military and spiritual authority and obedience, it must be made clear that the intention of the Gospel is certainly not to value these alike. Further, the plain fact must be remembered that one finds many splendid qualities among soldiers, whatever one thinks of the work they have to do, in just the same way as among other classes of men. Windisch is to the point: "The words of the centurion at Capernaum have only a parabolic meaning. Here again the attitude of Jesus gives no sanction to Militarism."[2] And Harnack takes the three centurions together, and thus judges their significance for discovering the Gospel attitude to their calling: "These stories are not told with a view to glorifying the soldier's profession, or even to make men readier to bear it. In all these cases it is of secondary importance to the narrator that the men were soldiers. It is very true that these stories have since been exploited again and again in the interest of the profession of war."[3]

[1] One can again appeal to the example of Augustine, who names, besides these Roman centurions, "holy David", see Letter 189, to the military governor, Boniface.

[2] *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 343 (*note*).

[3] *Militia Christi*, p. 52.

12. The strongest "proof-text" for military Christianity seems to us to be, beyond question, Luke iii. 14, where John the Baptist, answering the question of the soldiers, "And we, what must we do?" says, "Do violence to no man, neither exact anything wrongfully, and be content with your wages". Next to the answer of Jesus about Caesar's tribute-money, this saying of John is Augustine's chief proof-text. "When the soldiers came to John to be baptized, saying, 'And we, what must we do?' he should have given them another answer: 'Throw your weapons away, give up war-service, wound and kill no one?'"[1] To which the reply can at once be made: It is not Jesus who speaks, but his forerunner, John, still wholly Israelite, of whom Jesus bore witness, "He that is but little in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than he" (Matt. xi. 11). But we will not content ourselves with this objection, since even Jesus nowhere attacks the soldiers' profession, while Peter, after baptizing the centurion at Caesarea, gave him no instructions to lay down his office. These facts, set over against that other equally certain fact, that the Gospel permits no violence, demand a further explanation, which we shall give in Section 13. Be it remarked here, though, how great a requirement it was from the rude fighting-men of that age, not to steal, not to molest anybody needlessly, and to be content with their wages. Would these men, at that time, have been ready to respond to even greater and deeper demands?

13. "The Gospel nowhere attacks the calling of soldier, so it views it as lawful." This *argumentum e silentio* is constantly to be heard. But those who employ it, pay no heed to the following considerations:

(*a*) The Gospel preaches personal relationship between God and men, and between man and man, a relationship which will reach fulfilment in the Kingdom of God which Jesus proclaimed. With temporal and political relationships and their consequences, he did not interfere. He had two good reasons for this, viz.:

(*b*) If, by setting himself against Roman military service, Jesus had come into opposition to imperial Rome, of which Judaea was only a tiny province, he would have been running

[1] *contra Faustum*, XXII, 74, and *Epistles* 138, II, 15; 189, 4, where it is repeated. This is clearly Augustine's strongest argument.

a grave risk, as Harnack has shown, of putting the inflammable Jewish nation into a state of revolt. Then he would at once have been in the position of the revolutionary Messiah. Both these results were to be avoided at all costs, if he wished to do his own mission no injury.

(*c*) The principle reason, however, why Jesus and the oldest Christianity did not concern themselves more with the reformation of society and of the State is to be found in their positive expectancy of the impending end of the world ("the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand"). The first Christians felt themselves to be strangers on the earth, pilgrims passing through a hostile world, which lay "in evil", and which was only to be endured for a short time. They therefore left the world alone with its ways and its failings, withdrew their hearts from it, and watched with patience for the coming Kingdom. People mistakenly put it, especially those on the conservative side, that Jesus deliberately confined himself to his own domain, which was that of religion, as if religion were only a province of life, and had nothing to do with life as a whole! Christianity is not merely personal mysticism, but a power of God transforming mankind and the world. God's transformation of this world, however, would be, according to the primitive Christian hope, speedy and drastic. "The eschatological outlook", Harnack says truly, "thus came to be a quietist and conservative influence; it resulted in Christianity not demanding the realization of its principles in society and State for fear of destruction or failure. Had the first missionaries been told that the world was to go on existing for long long ages yet, and that Christ would not return though centuries pass, they would not have been able, with good conscience, to let the world go on taking the course it *did* take."[1] They let the question of war alone all the more readily in that—

(*d*) The question of military service did not arise for Christians. The Roman State knew no universal military service, and possessed only an army that was very small in comparison with the population, and it was recruited voluntarily. The positive spirit of the Gospel and the Christian renunciation of "this world" together resulted in its becoming obvious to the first

[1] *Militia Christi*, p. 50.

Christian community that "a Christian might not voluntarily become a soldier". "The baptized Christian simply did not become a soldier." And so it was that till about A.D. 170 nothing was heard of the question of military service, a silence rich in meaning, giving reason for "the well-grounded supposition that such a question simply did not arise in the Christian community".[1]

(*e*) Consideration *d* gives us the opportunity of raising questions analogous to the military one. The problem of slavery does not come to the fore in the Gospel, any more than the soldier problem. The Gospel here too accepts the situation as it is; slavery belongs to and is inherent in the nature of "this world", which, however, shall speedily pass away. But at the same time the Gospel *does* give the spirit whereby Christians must live. This spirit reveals itself, e.g. in the words, "One is your teacher, and all ye are brethren. . . . One is your Father, which is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters, for one is your master, even the Christ" (Matt. xxiii. 8–10). Paul thus expresses this truth of Christ: "Ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ. There can be neither Jew nor Greek; there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female: for all ye are one man in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii. 26–28). He also gives expression to the evangelical spirit in his letter to Philemon, making urgent appeal to the latter to receive his runaway slave Onesimus back into favour, and henceforth to treat him as a brother. Yet even Paul utters no word of protest against slavery as such. These, then, are the questions we would propose. May one conclude, from this silence, that the Gospel (Paul included) approves of slavery? Did those Christians, then, who rose up against slavery in the nineteenth century oppose the Gospel? Was their conviction, that their protest derived from the spirit of the Gospel, a mistake? Who would dare to say "Yes" to these questions?[2] If one can decline to accept the *argumentum e silentio* in this

[1] *Militia Christi*, pp. 48, 49, 47.

[2] "While on the one hand it is true that the abolition of slavery is the logical outcome of the working of his spirit in the hearts of men, it is on the other hand clear that Jesus himself never handled the question at all as a matter affecting the conduct of his disciples" (Cadoux, op. cit., p. 51, *note* 2).

respect, by what right can one maintain it in regard to the military question?

The moral truth of the Gospel is as a light that casts its beams further and further around it, and every moment illumines places which hitherto had been dark. And when they are bright, it is as if our eyes were suddenly opened, and we say, amazed, "Is it possible, that we never saw this before!" So it has happened with slavery. So shall it happen with many another injustice long endured. Do not the Gospels speak of the Kingdom of heaven as leaven that permeates all the meal and makes it rise (Matt. xiii. 33), and of "the Spirit of truth" who shall lead us "into all the truth" (John xvi. 13)? This is the mode of our training by God.

Every attempt to reconcile the waging of war with the Gospel seems to be vain. None of the so-called "proofs" can stand the test of criticism. This examination confirms the impression which every unprejudiced reader of the Gospels receives, an impression which Harnack records in those words we have quoted before: "It requires no further proof to establish firmly that the Gospel excludes all violence, and has nothing in common with war, nor will permit it." In complete agreement with this judgment, Cadoux speaks of "the pertinent ethical principles of Jesus", which are, "according to any natural and straightforward exegesis, obviously and flagrantly incompatible with organized bloodshed, and therefore with war", and which "cannot without a lot of unnatural straining and forcing be harmonized with the work of a soldier".[1] "Christianity," adds Harnack, "unlike Mithraism and some other cults, could not become an army-religion; it made too high moral demands for that."[2] The Christian religion had no power of attraction for the soldier: "war sie doch seinem Métier ganz entgegengesetzt". What primitive Christianity did *not* do in regard to slavery, it *did* in regard to military service: it took up a resolutely uncompromising position against it, proving that here the contrast with the Gospel was felt more sharply than in the case of slavery. The Christian Church persisted in this uncompromising attitude until the fourth century, as will now be seen from the testimony of her spiritual directors.

[1] Cadoux, op. cit., p. 55.

[2] *Militia Christi*, pp. 55, 54.

B. The First Christian Centuries (The Early Church Fathers)

Till about A.D. 170 we hear nothing of the military problem in the Christian community. "The baptized Christian did not become a soldier." Harnack, that eminent scholar of the earliest Christianity, counts as the chief causes of offence which the military profession gave to the first Christians:

"1. That it was a war-calling, and Christianity had absolutely renounced war and the shedding of blood.

"2. That in certain circumstances officers had to pass sentence of death, and the private soldier had to carry out whatever was commanded him.

"3. That the soldier's oath of absolute obedience conflicted with absolute obedience to God."

In addition he names the difficulties of Emperor-worship, pagan cults and the conduct of soldiers in peace-time.[1] Professor Cadoux also remarks of this period: "No Christian voluntarily became a soldier after conversion: he would be deterred from doing so, not only by fear of contamination with idolatry, but also by a natural reluctance—and doubtless in many cases by a conscientious objection—to use arms." For although this problem was not at that time very vividly before men's minds, says this writer, they certainly felt "that the teaching of Jesus and Christian ethical teaching generally conflicted diametrically with the normal duties of the soldier".[2]

Two modes of thought are apparent in the works of many of the early Church writers, one Christian and the other Roman (i.e. pagan). In accordance with the one, as Christians they condemn violence, bloodshed and warfare; in accordance with the other, they show an almost religious veneration for the Emperor, his rule and everything associated with it. The transition from one to the other was made possible by their eagerness to win for Christians the favour of the Government (e.g. by proving that Christians were good citizens), and also by their desire to build up and extend the Church quietly, in peace-time, through the Roman legions maintained throughout the world as a police force (the *pax Romana*). Hence, and

[1] *Militia Christi*, p. 46. [2] Cadoux, op. cit., pp. 189, 190.

because the implications of the Gospel in regard to political and social problems remained very imperfectly realized (think, e.g., of the problem of slavery), quite contradictory statements are sometimes to be found in the same Church writers. The ancients were less troubled than we by inconsistencies!

The remarkable thing about that early Christianity, however, is not that Roman traits and attempts at conciliation are to be found in it, still less that with many writers at that time the same silence reigns over the military question as in the New Testament (see above). The remarkable thing is that something happened at that time with regard to this question which did not come to pass with regard to the slavery problem for centuries, viz. there arose a realization of the complete opposition between the Christian ethic and the practice of war, a realization rooted firmly in evangelical principles and finding expression in emphatic condemnation of war. This condemnation is to be found (i) in the writings of leading Christian thinkers, (ii) in official Church Orders,[1] (iii) in the instances of earnest soldiers refusing military service.

The motives behind this condemnation of the soldier's calling and of warfare were thus, (i) aversion from violence and bloodshed, (ii) aversion from pagan cults, and from the Emperor-worship which was obligatory upon men in the army.

Speaking negatively, another factor of importance was the lack of any strong sense of adhesion to the State in which the Christians lived, a lack of national consciousness. In a world which, to their way of thinking, was alien, often hostile, they felt themselves to be already citizens of the Eternal Realm, for which they waited. Celsus, the earliest literary opponent of the Christians, reproached them, about A.D. 178, for being un-Roman, unpatriotic and unwilling to render military service to the Emperor.[2] But, of course, the principal positive ground for this attitude is to be found in the reasons previously given, especially in their aversion to violence and killing. Thus, *Justin Martyr*, the principal apologist of the second century (c. A.D. 150), writes that the Christians seek no earthly realm, but a heavenly,

[1] These Canons (Cadoux, op. cit., pp. 432–433) should be read with his previous explanation in mind.

[2] See Origen: *contra Celsum*, VIII, 68, 73.

and that this will be a realm of peace. The prophecy of Isaiah, that swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, and spears to pruning-hooks, begins to find fulfilment in the mission of Christians. For "we refrain from making war on our enemies", but gladly go to death for Christ's sake. Christians are warriors of a different world, peaceful fighters, but in fidelity to their cause and in readiness to die they excel all others. "For Caesar's soldiers possess nothing which they can lose more precious than their life, while our love goes out to that eternal life which God will give us by his might."[1]

A few decades after Justin, in the same period that Celsus reproached the Christians for being unwilling to render military service, other writers state that Christians were already to be found in the army of Marcus Aurelius. Probably not many yet—witness Celsus' taunt—but some there were. "Christianity had lost by expansion much of its initial fervour and steadfastness, congregations by this time were becoming worldly, and the larger number of Christians were lukewarm and feeble."[2] Perhaps Christians had entered the army even before this. "The repugnance felt by the Church in general towards the soldier's calling may not . . . have led to the result that no Christians were to be found in the army."[3] And there seem to have been some very distinguished Christians who were not averse from this "expansion" of Christianity, note, e.g., the ambiguous attitude of *Clement of Alexandria* (c. A.D. 200), who on the one hand talks of Christ gathering together His soldiers of peace: "with His word and with His blood He gathers the army that sheds no blood"; on the other, merely bids the soldiers, who have become Christians, to obey their officers, and keep themselves from robbery and oppression, citing here the words of John the Baptist to the soldiers: they must just stop where they are.[4] Perhaps Clement has made a virtue of necessity. For "some, perhaps many, left the military calling after they became Christians; but that cannot have been the rule; most of them remained in the army".[5]

[1] *Apology*, I, 11, 39. [2] Harnack: *Militia Christi*, p. 28.
[3] ibid., p. 57.
[4] Harnack quotes (*Militia Christi*, pp. 23, 58) from Clement's *Protreptikos, Stromateis, Paedagogos*.
[5] ibid., pp. 66, 67.

Yet the leading theologians of the day sounded a surer note. Perhaps their Christian conscience had been quickened by the movement *Marcion* had initiated, which had for some time now been making its influence felt, and which was in declared opposition to the Old Testament, because that was warlike and contrary to the Gospel. The Christian writer, Marcion, sought to show by a series of contrasts how different were Jesus Christ and the God of the Jews. The Church rejected Marcion as a heretic; it rightly wanted to retain the Old Testament, for without that the New is not to be understood. But "Marcion undoubtedly grasped the Christian conception of God in its essential purity. . . . It will ever be the glory of the Marcionic Church, which for a long time held its own, that it would rather abandon the Old Testament than sully the likeness of the Father of Jesus Christ by mixing with it features borrowed from a god of war."[1]

It may be asked how it was that the early Christian Church, which discarded Marcion's teaching and retained the Old Testament as Holy Scripture, did not allow itself to be deflected from its pacifist principles, in spite of all the wars recorded in the Old Testament; for no historical sense of development or ascent in man's knowledge of God had yet dawned. A few critical spirits felt obliged to make explanations, as we shall presently hear Origen doing. But by far the greater number did not reflect at all how they should apply the Old Testament past to the Christian present. "They were saved", writes Cadoux, "by the soundness of their own moral intuitions from drawing from these ancient precedents the erroneous conclusions affecting their own conduct, which some modern controversialists are so eager to draw for them. The warlike habits of their ancestors and their own peaceful principles formed two separate realms."[2]

The most notable opponent of Marcion and the greatest theologian of the day, *Origen* (of Alexandria, first half of third century) knew no other way of dealing with the wars of the Old Testament than the allegorical method. Nothing was meant by the wars of Joshua, he said, but the strife against sin and the powers of darkness; it is all a foreshadowing of that great warfare which Christ and the Christians would wage later on. For "if

[1] *Militia Christi*, pp. 25, 26.

[2] Cadoux, op. cit., p. 118.

the terrible wars of which the Old Testament tells were not to be spiritually understood, the apostles would never have handed on the Jewish historical books, for reading in the churches, to the followers of Christ, who came to teach the way of peace".[1] Paul surely taught that Christians may no longer engage in "fleshly" wars; Christian warfare is spiritual. Origen will hear nothing of earthly military service; he regards it as wholly forbidden!

"We [Christians] no longer take up sword against nation, nor do we learn war any more, having become children of peace, for the sake of Jesus who is our leader." "And as we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up war . . . we in this way are much more helpful to the kings than those who go into the field for them. . . . And none fight better for the king than we do. We do not indeed fight under him, although he require it, but we fight on his behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God."[2]

"We do not serve as soldiers under the Emperor, even though he require it." Here is sounded a revolutionary note which in times hostile to Christ has never been wanting from Christianity, least of all in its great heroic periods; thousands of martyrs have sounded it, refusing, on various grounds, to put the will of the State above the will of God. The same revolutionary tone is to be heard in the ancient *Church Orders*: "Persons who possess authority to kill, or soldiers, should not kill at all, even when it is commanded them. . . . Everyone who receives a distinctive leading position, or a magisterial power, and does not clothe himself with the weaponlessness which is becoming to the Gospel, should be separated from the flock. . . . No Christian should go and become a soldier."[3]

In general, the Christian leaders respected the Roman Emperor as far as possible, for the reasons indicated above, and even on the grounds of their heroic indifference to "the world" no more opposed Caesar's government or military power than the Apostolic age had done, although they wanted to have as little as possible

[1] *Homiliae in Jesu Nave*, 15 (opening).
[2] *contra Celsum*, V, 33; VIII, 73.
[3] *Canones Hippolyti*. See Cadoux, pp. 432, 433; Harnack: *Militia Christi*, pp. 72, 73.

to do with it themselves. Thus even Origen speaks of "him who is reigning righteously" and "waging a righteous war", whom the Christians will help by their prayers, although they no more serve under him as soldiers than do the priests who must likewise keep their hands unstained.[1]

But there were others who realized that this position was untenable. The number of Christians in the army had grown till they could be no longer overlooked. The expectancy of the end of the world had lost its grip; the Church was settling down to a long waiting-time. These two circumstances made much more acute the question whether a Christian might be a soldier, and a further result was that the Roman army and its work could no longer escape the criticism of Christianity. This criticism, which was bound to come by the impulse of Gospel principles, at last did come, with all the impetuosity and radicalism of religious passion. The attack was led by *Tertullian* (of Carthage, c. A.D. 200). No Christian writer of ancient times so vigorously opposed militarism as did this eager apologist, who was himself the son of a military officer. He got down to fundamentals.[2] There was no sense, he said, in arguing about the question, how a soldier should conduct himself, what he may do, and what he may not do. "We must first inquire whether military service is proper at all for Christians. What sense is there in discussing the merely accidental, when that on which it rests is to be condemned? Do we believe it lawful for a human oath to be superadded to one divine, and for a man to come under promise to another master after Christ? Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take part in battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain,

[1] *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 73.

[2] Tertullian has been charged (even by Harnack: *Militia Christi* p. 59) with insincerity in this regard, in that he boasts in his *Apology* (chap. 37) that Christians—"men of but yesterday"—are to be found in all the imperial offices, even in the army. Cadoux thinks this reproach unmerited. Tertullian, he says, here merely wishes to point out the growth of Christianity, and enumerates the various places where Christians may be found. Besides, directly afterwards, he declares that Christians are against war, "as according to the teaching the Christians received, it would be their duty to be killed, sooner than to kill" (Cadoux, pp. 423, 428, 429).

and the prison, and the torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs?"[1]

The question Tertullian faces is not just whether a Christian may be a soldier, but even whether a soldier may be allowed within the Christian Church. He answers "No". The soldier who becomes Christian ought to leave the army. "There is no agreement between the divine and the human 'sacramentum' [i.e. oath], the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be due to two lords—God and Caesar." True, Joshua and others in the Old Testament waged war, but we may no longer appeal to them for precedents. "How shall a Christian man wage war, nay, how shall he even be a soldier in peace-time, without the sword, which the Lord had taken away? For although soldiers had come to John [the Baptist], and had received the formula of their rule; although even a centurion [at Capernaum] had believed; the Lord, afterwards, in disarming Peter, ungirded every soldier. No dress is lawful among us, if assigned to any unlawful action."[2] When a soldier is baptized as a Christian, "there must either be an immediate abandonment" of the military profession, "or else the fate must be endured for God which a citizen-faith has been no less ready to accept. For military service does not hold out impunity from sins, or exemption from martyrdom. Nowhere does a Christian change his character. There is one Gospel, and the same Jesus. . . ." Should it be pleaded that the Christian as soldier is in an exceptional position —the command to confess the faith openly, even in the presence of the torturer, is valid for every Christian. "In fact a plea of this sort overturns the entire essence of our [baptismal] sacrament, removing even the obstacle to voluntary sins."[3] When Tertullian hears of a soldier who, having become a Christian, will no longer bow down to the military authority,[4] and who awaits his martyrdom in prison, he exclaims, "One of them, more a soldier

[1] *de Corona*, XI.

[2] *de Idololatria*, XIX. At this time Tertullian was still a loyal Catholic. When he wrote *de Corona* he had gone over to the Christian sect of the Montanists.

[3] *de Corona*, XI.

[4] Harnack (p. 68) raises the possibility of this being for some other reason than Tertullian assumes, but this in no way affects Tertullian's opinions.

of God, more steadfast than the rest of his brethren, who had imagined that they could serve two masters . . . was nobly conspicuous. . . . Being urgently asked for his reasons [i.e. for refusing to wear the soldier's chaplet], he answered, 'I am a Christian'. O soldier! boasting thyself in God. . . . The offender was brought before the prefects; at once he put away the heavy cloak, his disburdening commenced; he loosed from his foot the military shoe, beginning to stand upon holy ground; he gave up the sword, which was not lawful even for the protection of our Lord, from his hand likewise dropped the laurel crown and now, purple-clad with the hope of his own blood, shod with the preparation of the gospel, girt with the sharper word of God, completely equipped in the apostle's armour, and crowned more worthily with the white crown of martyrdom, he awaits in prison the largess of Christ. Thereafter adverse judgments began to be passed upon his conduct—whether they be really Christian judgments I hardly know, for those of the heathen are not different—as if he were headstrong and rash, and too eager to die, because, in being taken to task about a mere matter of dress, he brought trouble on the bearers of the [Christian] Name, he, forsooth, alone brave among so many soldier-brethren, he alone a Christian!"[1]

The great Church Father, *Cyprian*, Bishop of Carthage (died a martyr in 258, and afterwards canonized), who, out of reverence for Tertullian, read daily from the "master's" writings, "as a Christian preacher of course utterly repudiated war" (Harnack), and wrote, "The whole earth is drenched in adversaries' blood, and if a murder is committed privately it is a crime, but if it happens with State authority, courage is the name for it: not the goodness of the cause, but the greatness of the cruelty makes the abominations blameless!" Later on he says that Christians "are not allowed to kill, but they must be ready to be put to death themselves", and further on again, that "it is not permitted the guiltless to put even the guilty to death".[2]

The Christian writer *Lactantius* of *Bithynia* (early fourth century) writes on the Sixth Commandment: "When God prohibits killing, He not only forbids us to commit brigandage, which is not allowed even by the public laws, but He warns

[1] *de Corona*, I. [2] *Epistles*, I, 6; LVI, 4; LVII, 2.

us not to do even those things which are legal among men. And so it will not be lawful for a just man to serve as a soldier —for justice itself is his military service—nor to accuse anyone of a capital offence, because it makes no difference whether thou kill with a sword or with a word, since killing itself is forbidden. And so, in this commandment of God, no exception at all ought to be made to the rule that it is always wrong to kill a man, whom God has wished to be regarded as a sacrosanct creature."[1]

We may take it that at this period those soldiers who became Christian not with lip-service or from superficial motives, but with heart and mind, forsook the army[2] or suffered martyrdom. Fortunately, however, the great sacrifice was not always required of them. Thus the Christian historian *Eusebius* (Bishop of *Caesarea*, beginning of fourth century) tells of an officer named *Seleucus* who had distinguished himself in war and attained high rank, but who after his conversion to Christianity, "by his voluntary confession and after nobly enduring bitter scourging succeeded in getting discharged from military service. As a true soldier of Christ he devoted himself to the care of orphaned children, of lonely widows, and of those who were visited by poverty and sickness; as a bishop he guided their lives. The pains and sorrows of the outcasts he sought to alleviate with fatherly care. At length it was granted him to undergo the martyr's death".[3]

Seleucus, then, suffered martyrdom for his Christianity in general. Yet other Christians, who tried to leave the army as he did, or wanted not to enter the army although, owing to very special circumstances, they were compelled to, were put to death as objectors. This period is filled with accounts of soldiers' martyrdoms, but many of them, says Harnack, bear plain evidence of embellishment. Yet the very fact that these martyrdoms occurred bears witness to the steadfastness of faith in those days. The motives for refusing military service were something like these: "I am a Christian and render war-service

[1] *Lact. Div. Inst.*, VI, xx. 15–17. See Cadoux, p. 583; Harnack, *Militia Christi*, p. 72.

[2] The Church Order called "The Testament of Our Lord" (second half fourth century) agrees with this: "If they wish to be baptized in the Lord, let them cease from military service" (Cadoux, p. 432).

[3] Eusebius: *Mart. Palaest.*, XI, 20–22, *de Seleuco milite* (see Cadoux, pp. 577, 581; Harnack, p. 86).

to my King", and so "it is not seemly that I should do military service to this age [or to this world], to which I have said Farewell"; "I am a soldier of Christ, and may not fight; the weapons of blood are discarded, that the weapons of peace may be girded on".[1] *Paulinus* of *Nola* (c. 400) gives a like reason (besides the usual turning from "this age"): "Whoever does war-service with the sword is a minister of death", for "he is a shedder of blood".[2] Among the most trustworthy accounts Harnack reckons that of the martyrdom, on March 12, 295, of the young *Maximilianus* of *Thebeste* (Numidia).[3] Maximilianus, the son of a veteran, and as such liable for service, refused to don the soldier's uniform, saying, "I cannot serve, for I am a Christian". He was brought before the Proconsul Dion. From the conversation that followed, we extract the following:

DION: Get into the service, or it will cost you your life.
MAXIMILIANUS: I do this age [i.e. "the world"] no war-service, but I do war-service for my God.
DION (*to the attendants*): Give him the badge [i.e. the medallion with the Emperor's effigy, to be worn round the neck].
MAX. *retorts*: I will take no badge from this age. . . . I am a Christian, and can wear no trumpery bit of lead about my neck, now that I already bear the saving sign of my Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the Living God. . . .
DION: In the retinue of our lords, there are Christian soldiers and *they* serve.
MAX.: They know what is fitting for them, but I am a Christian, and I cannot do evil.
DION: What evil do they do who serve?
MAX.: Thou knowest what they do.
DION: Serve, man; else if you will go on refusing, you will assuredly come to a bad end!
MAX.: I shall not perish, but when I shall have forsaken this world, my soul shall live, with Christ my Lord.

Maximilianus was put to death at the age of twenty-one. His father "returned home giving thanks to God that he had been able to bring such a present to the Lord, which he himself was to follow shortly, thanks be to God. Amen." Maximilianus was afterwards canonized by the Church.

[1] De Jong: *Dienst-weigering*, pp. 34, 35, 51, 43. [2] ibid., p. 47.
[3] Harnack: *Militia Christi*, pp. 83, 84 (*note*) and 114–117 where the Latin Acta are quoted in full. See Cadoux, pp. 585 ff.

With this we end the array of Christian testimonies against war and military service, drawn from that age in which Christianity and militarism came into conflict one with the other. We saw that these pacifist testimonies from the third and early fourth centuries issued directly from the conviction of the oldest Christianity, which held itself far aloof from the army, and that that conviction in its turn sprang directly from the spirit of the Gospel, which held violence to be sin, and enjoined love of one's neighbour and respect for the human personality as the image of God, as the object of His love. This spirit was the direct cause of the Christian's aversion to the army; its outstanding characteristic, according to Harnack, was that "Christianity absolutely repudiated war and bloodshed". We have seen that this judgment is thoroughly confirmed by the testimony of Church Fathers and martyrs.

This primary reason for opposing war and military service, as we have already seen, received subsidiary support from a feeling of aversion or indifference to "this world" (or "this age") which was drawing near its end, and so it was not even affected by racial or national consciousness.

In the light of these facts it is the more surprising to hear it announced later on—not least of all in our own day—that "a good Christian is a good soldier". "Defence of one's native land is a Christian duty." "Killing is no sin when the State demands it." "A Christian is in all things subject to the powers-that-be, even when they command him to fight or to take part in the traffic of war." And much more to like effect! Whatever may be the requirements of altered circumstances and changed conceptions—this we shall come to in a moment—one thing is certain. Those who talk in this strain pay no regard either to the original Gospel or to primitive Christianity. These do not support them, as they fondly suppose, but resist them.

C. The Turning-Point

"Altered circumstances and changed conceptions." In regard to the question of Christianity and war, the crucial change began under the Emperor Constantine the Great. When he was converted to Christianity (in 312), and when he exalted this faith

into the State religion (in 324), Christianity began to turn toward the State for support, and became reconciled to war and the soldier's calling.

The state of mind which made this possible was produced, negatively, by the slackening off of the first, ardent life of faith, and positively, by the much-favoured idea of the *militia Christi*, of the Christian warfare, which originally had nothing in common with the practical conduct of war, but was directly opposed to it. The parallel lay in those characteristics of faithful service, courage and readiness to die. Since these qualities were indispensable for Christians during these centuries, it was no wonder that the well-known figure of military service came into prominence, though really as a complete antithesis (Eph. vi., "the panoply of God"), with Christ as the heavenly Commander, inciting His own to the "good fight of faith" and leading them on to victory. Besides Eph. vi., Paul constantly employs military metaphors (1 Thess. v. 8; 2 Cor. vi. 7; Rom. vi. 13 ff., 23; xiii. 12; 1 Tim. i. 18). In 2 Tim. ii. 3, the Christian is for the first time frankly called a "soldier": "Suffer hardship, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ." We have already seen that this warfare must be understood in a purely spiritual sense, and that the Christians felt themselves to be "soldiers of peace". That the life of the Christian is a fighting life, and that only a fighting Christianity can win the world, is the glorious and abiding meaning of this metaphor. The undaunted witnesses and martyrs of the Gospel became primarily regarded as Christ's true soldiers.[1]

Yet Harnack, whose book *Militia Christi* deals chiefly with this topic, remarks not only that this military language became a fashion, but also that "a warlike note, which was morally perilous, assumed dominance in Latin Christianity during the third century".[2] And although, "in spite of this, the holy war in any real sense of the word is not preached before the time of Constantine", in the fourth century, especially after Constantine's conversion, it was otherwise. Paganism had a large share in the reconciling of Christianity and war. "Heathen hordes flocked over into the Christian Church, and quickly allowed themselves to become fanatics for their new faith, and the 'holy war' was speedily proclaimed."[3]

[1] *Militia Christi*, p. 41. [2] ibid., pp. 43, 42. [3] ibid., p. 44.

The conversion of Constantine was partly determined by pagan and opportunist motives. It was during the campaign against his rival Maxentius that he decided to join the cause of Christ, a proof that there were already many Christians serving in the army. "It must have been manifest in the battle who was stronger, Christ or the old gods." Constantine won the battle and so: "Christus victor! The Christians' God had revealed Himself as a god of war and victory."[1] Harnack, who wrote his book in 1905, in the midst of Germany's military greatness, was certainly not at that time a pacifist, and in regard to this reconciliation of Christianity and militarism, in and after the days of Constantine, was able "to marvel at the matchless elasticity and universalism of the Church",[2] yet he felt himself as an historian obliged to say: "The famous conversion of heathendom to Christianity, brought about by the Emperor and the State, was thus effected first of all in the army. Here the public recognition of the Christian faith began."[3] But the character of the *miles Christi* underwent a change; instead of a soldier of peace, he became a soldier of war. "After the winning over of Constantine the barrier between the *milites Christi* and the army was removed. The *milites Christi* put themselves at the disposal of the Emperor. The soldier of Christ became *ipso facto* a soldier of Caesar. And the Church itself, out of gratitude for Constantine's protection and favour, urged these *milites Christi*, since they were serving in the army, to remain there." Nay, the Church went further, and pronounced the older Christian attitude liable to punishment. Although Origen had retorted to his pagan opponents, who insisted on military service: "Your priests do not engage in war; the Deity must be worshipped with clean hands"; although Basil the Great, so late as 374, in treating of those centurions who appear so favourably in the New Testament, declared that though the soldier should not despair of his salvation, it were better that those who had been obliged to kill in war should abstain from Communion for three years, for they were unclean of hand,[4]

[1] *Militia Christi*, pp. 45, 87. [2] ibid., p. vi. [3] ibid., p. 87.
[4] *Homily on St. Gordius* and *Epistle* 188. To like effect, the Canon of Hippolytus (first half fourth century) says: "If he [the Christian who was compelled to be a soldier] has shed blood, he should not take part in the mysteries until he is cleansed." See Cadoux, p. 433.

yet as early as 314, the Council of Arles published its decision that "they who throw away their weapons in time of peace shall be excommunicate".[1]

"This decision", says Harnack,[2] "is to many students of history so astonishing and shocking that they have attempted to give a meaning to 'throw away weapons' which it cannot have."[3] But there is no possibility of mistake. "At Arles the Church not only condemned the constant practice of Christian soldiers hitherto of bidding farewell to the ensign of war, but even put it under the fearful ban of excommunication." Harnack writes with emphasis and continues: "Thus it is proclaimed in the name of the Church that the military authority has gained full support from the new concord between State and Emperor on the one hand, and Christianity and the Church on the other. By this decision the Church completely revised her attitude to the army and war, the attitude that had prevailed until now, at least in theory. The Church had longed to win the Emperor, and now flung herself into his arms." Her reconciliation to the military calling was made all the easier in that the pagan cults were disappearing from the army. True these had not constituted the chief stumbling-block, but they did form an important secondary one (see beginning, Section B). "She even created saints [to say nothing of the warlike archangels] on behalf of the Christian soldiers, and relegated to the monastic orders her old views about war and the military calling."[4]

This radical change in the Christian faith, in regard to so vital a matter as war, we cannot regard as other than a disastrous fall, as a fall into a condition which primitive Christianity would not have hesitated to call a condition of sin. We believe that history justifies our view. Henceforth from this fall into sin we must needs deal with a Christianity degenerate in this respect, a Christianity that is more and more compelled to parade its degeneracy.

Adolf Harnack is too great a Christian thinker and Christian

[1] "De his qui arma projiciunt in pace, placuit abstineri eos a communione." *Canons of Synod of Arles*, 3.
[2] *Militia Christi*, pp. 87–88.
[3] Variant renderings are possible only for the words "in pace". Harnack prefers: "in time of peace between Church and State".
[4] *Militia Christi*, p. 92.

historian to view lightly this firm alliance between Christianity and the military State. His remarks just quoted bring that out. And with a certain sense of relief he concludes his book thus: "But the alliance which Constantine tried to effect, and which for a while seemed to be achieved, did not prove durable. On the foundation of a Christian State the Church tried to win back her independence; relations were strained in new ways, and the old questions about the military calling rose up again in new forms within the Church."[1]

History also shows, however, that the Church (i.e. the Church in a narrower sense, for the history of the sects is another matter) has in no wise succeeded in winning back her independence, least of all in regard to war. One might almost say, this is *vitium originis*! That the association between Church and State in the fourth century began *in the army* and *in war* was of ill omen for its future.

It must not be supposed, however, that after the Council of Arles the mind of Christians changed everywhere, as at a blow. "Historians", says Cadoux, "have not failed to notice, and in some cases to deplore, the immense compromise to which the Church was now committed. But while the greatness and importance of this historic decision are not to be doubted, we must be careful not to imagine that the capitulation was more complete or decisive than was actually the case.[2] Here and there, and especially in the Eastern Church (e.g. Chrysostom and Basil the Great), the old repugnance to the army and the profession of war remained. Even the Canons of the fourth century indicate that. It can even be said that primitive Christianity was never wholly lost. It always emerged again. But henceforth it was always suppressed again by the Church, mostly with the help of temporal power. Public opinion, which was gradually passing over into the official teaching of the Church, opposed it. Upon this public opinion and official teaching the Church Fathers, *Athanasius, Ambrose,* and especially *Augustine,* set their stamp. Athanasius, "the father of orthodoxy" (c. 350), led the succession: "Murder is not permitted, but to kill one's adversary in war is both lawful and praiseworthy."[3] Ambrose (c. 375)

[1] *Militia Christi*, p. 92. [2] Cadoux, op. cit., pp. 589–590.
[3] Athanasius: *Epistle to Ammonius*, quoted by De Jong, op. cit., p. 50.

followed: "And that courage which either protects the homeland against barbarians, in war, or defends the weak at home, or saves one's comrades from brigands, is full of righteousness."[1] This is that same prince of the Church who denied the Emperor Theodosius access to the altar and required his doing penance, because he had suppressed a revolt in Macedonia in far too sanguinary fashion. Ambrose lusted as little after war as did his disciple, the greatest and most influential Church Father of the Middle Ages, Augustine (354–430). The latter wrote: "He who can think of war without feeling sore pain, must have lost all feeling for humanity." And yet Augustine most systematically and effectively defended the right to go to war.

What led Augustine to this position was primarily his feeling of responsibility for the fate of the world, a responsibility of which the first Christians knew nothing, and also, since he closely associated the welfare of the whole world with the health of the Roman State, his desire to support that State, which protected the Church and the cause of justice, in its conflict with the advancing and invading hosts of "barbarians", the Goths and Vandals and later the Huns. In 410 the Goths took Rome; the Roman State, that mighty protector of Christianity, seemed on the brink of ruin. The rôles were changed. The Roman State was no longer the conqueror, but in its turn had become the conquered. Later on the Vandals penetrated to Africa, where Augustine was bishop, at Hippo, and during the siege of that city the bishop died, being seventy-five years old. Psychologically, it is fully comprehensible that even a Christian in such a time and in such circumstances should be reconciled to the arms of Rome. Augustine saw war (just as Calvin and Luther did later) as a police measure against evildoers, as the defence of a peace-loving State against bloodthirsty neighbours. The neighbours must be conquered for their own good. "For he who is bereft of his freedom, because he misused it by doing evil, is conquered in his own best interests; for nothing is really a greater misfortune than the fortune of the oppressor, whereby an unmerited impunity is won. . . ."[2] The Roman soldiers are in the service of justice and peace. "The natural order of transitory things, which is most in conformity with peace, demands that authority

[1] *de Officiis*, I, 27, 129.

[2] *Epistle to Marcellinus*, XIV.

and power to wage war shall be in the hands of the ruler, and in carrying out war-decrees the soldiers really serve the cause of peace and the common good."[1]

This *pax terrena* of Augustine very closely resembles the *pax Romana*, the peace which the Roman legions imposed upon the world, at the will of the Government of Rome. What still more urged him, however, to approve Rome's warfare was the taunt of pagan citizens that the Christians, with their pacifism, were unworthy citizens of the State, collectively to blame for the calamities which had befallen the Roman Empire only under the Christian Emperors. Augustine vigorously defended Christianity against this reproach, both in his letter to Marcellinus and in his *City of God*, lest the reputation of the Church should be endangered. The Christians were good citizens and gave effective aid in righteous, i.e. defensive, warfare.

What is worthy of note in this defence of war, and indeed that which made the defence possible at all, is the optimistic view the great Church Father took of the possibility of conducting war by good means, even by Christian means. "When you arm yourselves for the fight, before all things think of this, that even your bodily strength is a gift from God; by remembering that, you will be protected from using God's gift in opposition to God. . . ." But in what life-and-death struggle, in what war, do men preserve even their humanity, let alone their Christianity? As we shall see later (Chapter III) this unreal point of view remains characteristic of those theologians and philosophers who take war under their protection on ethical grounds, as also the fashion, likewise set by Augustine, of overlooking all the inhumanities of the battlefield, and concentrating the gaze on the good or ill behaviour of soldiers off the battlefield. "Let your way of life be chaste and sober and moderate in all things, etc."[2]

Another reason which led Augustine to take up this standpoint was of a theological nature, viz. his conflict with the sect of the Manichaeans. This sect was of Persian origin, and held even more rigidly than did the early Christians (who found a corrective in their Creation-beliefs and their faith in God's omnipotence) to a dualism between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of

[1] *contra Faustum*, XXII, 75. [2] *Epistle to Boniface*, vi, vii.

darkness, within which latter kingdom of course, as even Tertullian had held, continuous warfare was only to be expected. Against this sect Augustine laid the emphasis on God's universal dominion, within which even wars had their place. In the next chapter we shall return to this.

Augustine must have been very powerfully influenced by the above-mentioned motives. For otherwise one cannot account for the astonishing facts that he (i) could break away at this point so radically from primitive Christianity, (ii) was himself so little aware of his breaking away, (iii) could imagine that the Gospel supported him, or at least did not oppose him (we have already seen how weak his position was in this respect, his chief arguments depending on Luke iii. 14 and Matt. xxii. 21), (iv) could so little appreciate the motives and difficulties of the early Christians. He sounds inconceivably naïve in his writing against the Manichaean, Faustus: "What cause yet is there for finding fault with war? Is it perchance because men perish in it; men who must needs die sometime? It becomes cowards, but not God-fearers, to blame war for this." Of course there are cruelties and the vindictiveness of evil men, as well as extortion and the molestation of peaceful citizens; these have already been forbidden by John the Baptist. But even "good men undertake wars, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, when they find themselves in such a position as regards the conduct of human affairs, that right conduct requires them to act, or to make others act, in this way". John the Baptist knew very well that those who thus rendered military service "were not murderous, but authorized by law, and that the soldiers did not thus avenge themselves, but defended the public safety".[1] In his letter to the Roman Commander, Boniface, who wanted to lay down his command owing to scruples of conscience, Augustine wrote: "Do not think that no one can please God who serves with arms." Well is it with them who can say farewell to the world and live the ascetic life "of higher concerns, with God, yet everyone, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 7), has his own gift from God, one man in this way, and another in that. . . . Others therefore fight against unseen foes by praying for you, and you work for them by fighting against the visible barbarians."[2]

[1] *contra Faustum*, XXII, 74. [2] *Epistle to Boniface*, iv and v.

This is a wholly different conception—nay, rather, a wholly opposite conception—from that which we heard stated by Tertullian and Origen and the other writers of early Christianity. If Augustine's reading of the Gospel is right in this regard, they were all hopelessly in error, and the Christian martyrs, who refused military service, went to their deaths for a delusion. But the Church was committed to this new ethic and banished the old ethic to the cloister. Pope Leo I declared, just after the middle of the fifth century, that "military service may be blameless",[1] and this has remained the official view of the Church.

D. Conclusion

Listening to the testimony of primitive Christianity (i.e. of the Apostolic age and the first Christian centuries), as we have been doing, and then hearing the statements of Augustine and of the Church after the time of Constantine, it is hard to escape two impressions, which combine to form one truth. First, in regard to the condemning of violence and murder, the spirit of the Gospel did not come into its own; second, a Christian principle of immense importance was in grave danger of being lost.

The prime reason for the ousting of this Christian principle (its ousting, i.e., from the mind of the Church and of her leaders) is to be found, we have said, in the Christians' regard for the State. Their attitude had been more or less negative hitherto, wavering between aversion and some slight recognition of the State's justice and usefulness, though for the most part remaining in ascetic, heroic indifference. From the time of Constantine onwards, it became positive. That idea of the State which was pagan in origin, finding itself at home not in Jerusalem but in ancient Rome, came unquestionably into violent opposition to the evangelical, Christian idea. We shall see that this was to some extent inevitable. It may well be asked, however, whether this conflict had of necessity to issue in the thrusting aside of that Christian idea, which is irreconcilable with the waging of war. This is a very comprehensive question, and we shall need to consider it more closely. But once more we emphatically

[1] *Epistle* 167; *Answer* 14.

reject the proposition that this Christian value is based upon a mere opinion of early Christianity determined by the time and by imperfect judgment, with a view to circumstances which have meantime passed away.

This proposition is to be found, incidentally, in Windisch's essay, which we have quoted so often, *Jesus und der Krieg*. There he writes, "The critic must concede to the objector to military service that *his* exegesis is more accurate [than that of his opponent]. He cannot defend himself against Tolstoyan practice by any dogmatic exegesis, but only by insight into the historically determined character of the Gospel."[1] Later on Windisch says, more particularly, "The Gospel condemned the military calling. But in the face of the Gospel we must recognize the fact that the Gospel only imperfectly noted the development of 'this world', which has gone on in an unbroken line, with the good and evil that adhered to it, quite otherwise than was expected. This deflection of world-history from the hopes Jesus had has brought about contingencies in no way provided for by the Gospel."[2]

This same proposition is very emphatically advanced by Dr. J. C. Wissing, in his otherwise valuable thesis: *Het Begrip van het Koninkrijk Gods*.[3] This book first of all brings clearly to light the pacifism of primitive Christianity,[4] in order to prove directly after, that modern Christians cannot take up this position, since they no longer believe in the impending end of the world, but, on the other hand, feel their responsibility for the State and for society. From this last undeniable truth the writer immediately concludes that a Christian is justified in doing military service for the State, when the latter engages in righteous war.[5]

This conclusion would be sound if belief in the impending end of the world were the only ground for primitive Christianity's repudiation of armed force and warfare. Yet we have seen that this was neither the only nor the chief motive; it was only incidental and negative, i.e. it did not affect in any way the

[1] *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 288. [2] ibid., 1916, p. 349.
[3] *Het Begrip van het Koninkrijk Gods*, with special reference to the religious Socialists in Switzerland. Utrecht, 1927.
[4] e.g., on p. 128. [5] pp. 191–199, especially 196.

primary and positive motive, aversion from bloodshed, which resulted from "love of neighbour" (including even the "enemy"), and from reverence for man as God's image and object of His love. This motive has lost nothing of its force, nor ever can. On the contrary, in an age when war has become so much more ruthless and cynical, it has gained in force. Moreover, though State and society, nation and homeland have attained a positive, and even religious, value for us, whatever the age and circumstances in which one lives, it is impossible to dispel from a Christian mind the conviction that a Christian belongs primarily, not to the world, nor to the State, nor to his earthly homeland, but to the Kingdom of God, of which he must already be a citizen even here, to the eternal Homeland, where his eternal destiny awaits him.

True, recognition of the long duration of this world and the feeling of responsibility for State and society which has grown up with it raise a problem for Christian thought unknown to the first Christians, one with which the Gospel did not reckon, a problem which makes it all the harder for us to live the Christian life; Windisch and Wissing are right in that. But with the warning remark that a secondary Christianity solves such problems more light-heartedly than primary Christianity would be able to do, we say emphatically, this problem is not solved by the mere statement that we have a different conception of history and live in changed circumstances. The problem is only set out, not solved, by such a statement.

Professor Windisch knows that well. We have already heard how he later acknowledged that "the influence of eschatology on the ethics of the Gospel are not so great as often even I have asserted it to be". He recognized that we are not yet relieved of the strain of this problem, and that this is part of the strenuousness of the modern Christian life. But it is the present writer's opinion that he eases this strain prematurely when he insists that the divergence of history from the Gospel and primitive Christian hope "has brought to light moral laws for which no sanction can be found in the Gospel",[1] and afterwards adds: "Jesus has nothing to do with force, army or war—but only a part of our morality is rooted in the Gospel"; never-

[1] *Theol. Rundschau*, 1915, p. 349.

theless it is to be desired "that this part should be extended more and more even in this world".[1]

We are in hearty concord with this wish, and greatly respect the frank acknowledgment of this able New Testament scholar, that the morality of war, whatever its purpose, and however waged, "has nothing to do" with the spirit of the Gospel. But we cannot concur with him in recognizing the authority of two so divergent moralities, a Christian and another, whatever the source of this latter may be. We shall attend further to this dual morality—fruit of Lutheran soil—but meantime say at once that for us "the Christian faith" means Christ, the Way, the Truth and the Life, and His Gospel,the all-sufficient Word. There is therefore, in our judgment, only one morality, that of the character which results from contact with Christ, and with the spirit of His Gospel. Just as far as this character or tendency exists in personal or social life, it is right to talk of morality—no more, no less. There is derived morality, applied morality, diluted morality, confused morality, yet for the Christian there is only one moral standard, given by God. "All humanity is one," Max Huber truly says, "and it is of the utmost importance for the Christian to recognize that all expressions of life are measured by the one Righteousness, and are subject to the one Truth."[2]

By this we do not mean to aver that this morality is in fact capable of fulfilment in this world, always, in all circumstances and in every respect. This is unfortunately not so. One of the great and so far insuperable difficulties is the problem involved in the relationship of Christianity and State. This is the subject of the next chapter. Meantime, be it remembered that part of

[1] *Theol. Rundschau*, 1916, p. 293. In his latest book, *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt* (1929), Windisch practically abandons this position. "A rigid distinction between personal morality on the one hand and social and political morality on the other is unacceptable for us" (p. 153). Although he demands freedom from the concrete prescriptions of the original Gospel, since we recognize the necessity of law, modern civilization and State, with which the original Gospel was not concerned, but to which we ascribe ethical value (p. 147): yet he admits that we must take care to give expression, even in these spheres, to the intention of the Gospel commands (p. 148). We may criticize the Sermon on the Mount, but after all the last word rests with *it*.

[2] Professor Dr. Max Huber: *Internationale politiek en Evangelie*; Utrecht, 1924, p. 13.

the difficulty, sorrow and tragedy of the Christian life is that even where Christian conviction exists, personal conduct, especially of a social nature, and in a still greater measure collective conduct, cannot always be thoroughly Christian, and so cannot always be thoroughly moral. And yet the divine commandment abides unchanged. We cannot escape compromise and guilt. The one thing we *can* do is to see to it that in the compromise Christian principles are preserved as fully as possible, none sacrificed that we might save, so that our iniquity be not greater than man's life needs must bear; so that we may dare to ask forgiveness for our sin.

CHAPTER II

CHRISTIANITY AND STATE

1. *The Early Christian and the Catholic Syntheses*

WITH the concord of Church and State in the fourth century, the situation changed for Christians in a good many respects. For the first time they possessed a land that was not strange or hostile to them, and that might be very dear to them—a homeland. For the first time there was a friendly State, maintaining the order needful for the tranquil building up of the Church. And the eyes of the Christians were opened to the potentialities of a well-ordered State for the development of justice and culture. Of course, a growing and lasting church organization could not long remain outside the broad framework within which the whole life of the community went on, i.e. apart from the State and constitution. Somehow or other the two powers *had* to come to terms. Two things are certain:

1. No religion can endure long without organization, i.e. without some form of Church. When Christians realized that the world was not going to pass away so speedily, and that they must therefore adapt themselves to the world, church organization became a vital necessity. In general Christianity owes immeasurably to the Church.

2. No ordered social life is possible in this world unless justice is maintained; the forces of greed, passion and shortsightedness make it necessary. Even Christianity can only build its house of love and mercy upon the broad basis of law. Therefore it is of the greatest concern for Christianity that law shall be maintained, although Christianity itself is greater than law.

So, in the fourth century, Christianity turned to the State. And the State, which could do nothing without the good-will of its citizens, turned to the Church. In certain regards, Constantine's conversion to Christianity happened at the right time. But the relationship between Christianity and State became a complex problem from then on, down to the present day.

It looked so simple at first: the Christian Church protected by the State, and the State given spiritual powers by the Church. But we have already seen, in the altered view of war, what heavy

toll Christianity had to pay at once. Two wholly distinct authorities, moving in wholly diverse spheres, were brought together to lead a common life thereafter. The differences may be summarized as follows:

(*a*) Christianity is essentially otherworldly, directed towards the eternal, the Kingdom of God. It is dualistic by nature, with a dualism limited only by the creative activity and omnipotence of God. Early Christianity saw the Kingdom over against the world, which lay in evil, but which was passing away. So it held aloof from worldly powers and temporal aims such as the State and its ends. But when an understanding was reached, after the conflict, other difficulties came all the more prominently to light.

(*b*) Christianity is a universal religion and knows no national preference; the State exclusively serves the interests of its own people.

(*c*) Christianity, as the life of the spirit, breathes in freedom; the State, as the legal organization, cannot exist without issuing commands, and using force.

(*d*) By bringing to the fore the relation between God and the human soul, Christianity ascribed to man an absolute value and independence of all that is of the earth. Under its influence (see also Section 2), the ancient conception of the State, which appeared clad in the authority of national religion, and regarded men merely as so many subjects, was bound to fall into decay. The Roman emperors clearly recognized, during the time of persecution, that the Christians felt themselves to be more than mere subjects, and that this overplus was their real life. All these factors gave to the "Christian State" a much more complex character, a much more difficult existence, and a much harder task than belonged to the pagan State.

There was now incumbent upon Christian theology the duty of merging, one in the other, the diverse mental spheres of Christianity and State. In this difficult matter, for which the Gospel offers no solution, Church doctrine took the direction indicated by Paul: Obey the highest powers, for they are ordained of God. "If thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he [i.e. the ruler] beareth not the sword in vain: for he is a minister of God, an avenger of wrath to him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must

needs be in subjection, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience sake." (Rom. xiii. 1–5. We have seen how this judgment of the higher powers came to be reversed in the time of persecution.) Paul gave the direction, but the way was paved by Stoic philosophy, with its distinction between perfect morality, native to man in the Golden Age, and the subsequent moral law necessarily hardened because of the decline of humanity. In the Golden Age absolute natural law held sway, in the present evil times only a very limited natural law. Christian theology interwove this Stoic idea with the Old Testament story of Paradise and the Fall; the high moral standard which the Gospel preaches cannot be realized in our fallen world, it was argued; it can only be practised in the relationships of individuals. It must be left, along with the rest of the Gospel, to the preaching of the Church. God ordained a harder law for this fallen world, viz. State authority, and State decrees, ordaining this partly as punishment for sin, partly as a means for fighting sin: *poena et remedium peccati*. The doctrine of the divinely ordained Government, which must be obeyed because its authority came from God, was well adapted to the idea of relative natural law. It was admitted, however, that the obedience enjoined has just one limit: when the powers-that-be command what God forbids. Then the Apostolic saying takes effect: "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts v. 29).[1]

It was *Augustine* (354–430), he whose mind has so dominated Christian theology, who first defined the relations between Christianity and the State, in his great work, *de civitate Dei*, even as it was he who took military service under his protection. This book was written under the stress of the devastating incursions of the Goths and Vandals. The position and utility of the State, which maintains law and protects Christianity, had to be recognized. Also, Augustine, as we have seen, was impelled to write, because of his fight against the dualism of the Manichaeans, who set the god of this world over against the Father of Jesus Christ, a fight which drove him to a more rigid monism

[1] See Ernst Troeltsch in his standard work, which is without equal, and from which we shall quote more than once in this chapter: *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*; Tübingen, 1912, pp. 157–168. See also J. Wendland: *Sozialethik*; Tübingen, 1916, pp. 199–201.

than early Christianity had known. The great theologian insisted on God's universal sovereignty and providence. But for God's will, the Roman Empire had not weathered the storms of so many centuries. "This one God, therefore, that neither stays from judging, nor favouring of mankind, when His pleasure was, and whilst it was His pleasure, let Rome have sovereignty."[1] "So likewise does He with the times and ends of war, be it His pleasure justly to correct or mercifully to pity mankind, ending them sooner or later, as He wills."[2] Wars may be waged by the command of God. He who engages in these wars does not break the Sixth Commandment.[3] Even if lust for earthly domination and glory was the goal of Roman rule, this very desire restrained other greater mischief.[4] And by the devoted service of the Romans to the State, God intended "that the citizens of heaven [the city of God] in their pilgrimages upon earth, might observe those examples with a sober diligence, and thence gather how great care, love and respect ought to be carried to the heavenly country for life eternal, if those men had such a dear affection for their earthly country, for glory so temporal".[5] Happy the State that is governed by Christian emperors. God gives them even earthly prosperity, as Constantine's experience plainly shows, he being victorious in all his wars and reigning long.[6] Even the earthly State aims at peace, and the heavenly State, as much of it as is here on earth, i.e. the Church, uses this peace, as it relies on the law and order which the earthly State maintains. Thus in these earthly things there is concord between the two States.[7]

Yet in reading through this work of Augustine's, one is struck by the fact that this great Father, although he trod the new way, had not broken living association with the old dualistic Christianity. This dualism between Christianity and State expresses itself all through, first of all in the great design itself, of giving a history of the different courses of the two States, the *civitas Dei* and the *civitas terrena*, the heavenly and earthly communities; but then also throughout the account of the origin and rise of the latter, in which its gloomy aspect is

[1] *de civitate Dei*, V, 21 (Healey's translation). [2] ibid., V, 22.
[3] ibid., I, 20. [4] ibid., V, 12, 13. [5] ibid., V, 16.
[6] ibid., V, 24, 25. [7] ibid., XIX, 17.

again and again revealed. The first founder of a city was Cain the fratricide. So also Romulus, who was to become a fratricide, founded Rome, but in partnership with Remus, whom he murdered afterwards.[1] The one thing that can give worth to the earthly city is justice. "Set justice aside, then, and what are kingdoms but fair thievish purchases? . . . Excellent was that pirate's answer to the great Macedonian Alexander, who had taken him; the king asking him how he durst molest the seas so: 'How darest *thou* molest the whole world? But because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; thou doing it with a great navy, art called an emperor.'"[2] Earthly kingdoms seek power and glory, and as God sends them these earthly treasures, they have their rewards, even as the man who does good for human glory.[3] Besides, if the gods are worshipped in order that with their help men may gain dominion—"this is the property of the earthly city, to worship one, or many gods, for victory and terrestrial peace, never for charitable instruction, but all for lust of sovereignty".[4] According to Cicero the true State is founded on law. But law is only to be found where justice dwells, i.e. the will to give everyone his due. But if the State has no such will, in regard to the one true God, and denies *Him*, no less than men, *His* dues, justice cannot reign in that State, and therefore law cannot exist there. Thus even Cicero's State was not a true one.[5]

In sharp contrast to that State, and in the full light of the glory of God, Augustine puts the Kingdom of heaven, the City of God, which he practically identifies in his later chapters with the Church in the twofold form in which it is to be found on earth and in heaven.[6] Harnack remarks [7] that by this contrast Augustine "awakened, far beyond his express intention, the belief that the empirical Catholic Church *sans phrase* was the Kingdom of heaven, and the sovereign State the kingdom of the devil".

Anyone who knows the history of the so-called "Christian States" with their imperialist wars, and of the theocracy of the Catholic Church, is well aware that Augustine here expressed and aroused ideas of far-reaching significance.

[1] *de civitate Dei*, XV, 5. [2] ibid., IV, 4. [3] ibid., V, 15.
[4] ibid., XV, 7. [5] ibid., XIX, 21. [6] ibid., XX, 9.
[7] *Dogmengeschichte*, 2te Ausg., III, p. 137.

This wavering and ambiguous conception of Augustine, although never dying out, could not for ever satisfy the demands of Catholic theology, which always sought after systematic unity. Such unity was achieved by *Thomas Aquinas* (thirteenth century). If Augustine sought the origin of the State in the Fall, in that sin which clung to the *civitas terrena* as if innate, Thomas tried to dispose of this sinful quality, in large measure, by proving the State to be the indispensable and natural foundation of the Kingdom of grace, the Church. Even without a Fall, it would have been necessary to the harmonious ordering of the earthly life, only sin had called forth resistance to such an ordering of life. In sin the State found, not indeed its origin, but the necessity for its existence. Thomas laid great stress on the fact, which Augustine had not explicitly denied, that the State exists in the Providence of God. With the help of Aristotelean evolutionary philosophy, Thomas built up human life into an architechtonic whole, with ranks and orders, each having a purpose of its own, yet each at the same time serving as approach to a higher. The highest order, completing and dominating all, is the order of grace, the Church. By thus disclosing the purpose of the Divine Architect, Thomas himself became the architect of the Church's doctrine and theocracy, which retained a conservative and patriarchal character, tending to consolidate existing social classes and to build the community on the principle of patronage. Thus the State came to have a well-defined place and function in the vast organism of Christian social life, in the *corpus christianum*, and so a positive value which it had not possessed in the ancient Church. Yet the aim of the State was purely utilitarian, expressing itself in formal legal codes, so that conflicts with the Christian idea, though ruled out in theory, were actually by no means impossible. Also, nationalism had not yet been awakened. And capitalism still lay in swathing-bands!

By this conception of the State, the tension between Christianity and State which early Christianity had felt so severely was gradually relieved, although it was renewed from time to time, not least of all at the time of the Lutheran reformation. The strife of the Middle Ages was not so much a conflict between the idea of the State and Christian theory as it was a struggle for supremacy between State and Church,

i.e. between Emperor and Pope. Both for the medieval Catholic Church, and for the reformers, the State and Church, social, cultural and religious life formed a unity of thought, an organization regarded as Christian, a *corpus christianum*. At first the State was the stronger ally, and so leader. In actual fact the Church was a part of the State; she had to find sufficient guarantee of the Christian character of the whole in the Christian intention of the Emperor. And so it remained in the Greek Orthodox Church, where the ruler was head of the Church right on till the fall of the Tsarist régime. In the West the Church gradually developed much greater power, and eventually realized, if only for a time, the theocratic ideal of a ruling Church set forth by Pope Gregory VII.

But meantime the Church had become a priestly institution of law and coercion. In place of the "Christian" emperor, there now ruled a worldly Pope, having at his command, when necessary, the worldly sword. The Waldenses, who, among their other evangelical "heresies", repudiated external force, were very nearly extirpated by this ecclesiastic autocracy. The Church had "conquered" the world, but in the same measure, the world had penetrated the Church, and therefore Christianity; the crusader, who wrought such terrible havoc in the Holy Land, is a remarkable instance of that; but it must not be denied that in many ways Christian thought had great influence over customs and morals. By her mediatorial efforts and by the "peace of God" (a truce for a definite number of days), which she sometimes succeeded in imposing on belligerents, the Church has often served the cause of peace.

Of course pious Christians who lived in close fellowship with the Christ of the Gospels (in so far as He had not been subjected to the sacramental Christ), and who therefore had the keenest Christian consciences, continued to feel the contrast and tension between earthly citizenship and citizenship of the Kingdom of God, between worldly Christian and inwardly Christian lives. For many the strain was unbearable. So the Catholic Church permitted these to withdraw from the world, that they might try to live out pure Christian truth in the cloister, and there give themselves wholly up to God. By this recognition of a dual Christian standard, a perfect order and an imperfect one, the

Catholic Church tried—and it was a very notable attempt—to save both State Christianity and the evangelical ideal. This was *her* solution of the difficulty, which far from concealing the conflict, only made it more plainly visible.

2. *The Lutheran Synthesis. Luther and War*

It is obvious, however, that Protestantism has never been at peace with this divided, twofold Christian standard. Every true Christian, according to Reformation conceptions, is a spiritual being, whose place is in the world. Above all, Luther very rigorously insisted on the inwardness of the life of faith and the pure spirituality of the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, as the true life for *every* Christian. When he was compelled to come to some understanding with the State, to which his Reformation movement was so much indebted for protection, he snatched at the medieval idea of the *corpus christianum*, but explained that this body consisted of two domains (*Regimente*), a spiritual and a worldly; the one, wherein Christ sanctified hearts through the Holy Spirit; the other, "put under the sword", wherein by the ordinance of God evil men (who formed the great majority: "among a thousand scarce a single Christian") were kept in restraint, and order and outward peace were maintained; the one, wherein free will had its place, the other, wherein there were laws, and, if need be, coercion.[1] In opposition to the Roman Church, Luther vigorously maintained the independence of the first domain. In opposition to the excesses of the more excited section of the Anabaptists, who wanted to live in the freedom of the Gospel, but were not fit for it, he pointed significantly to the stern character of the second. "Therefore one must zealously distinguish these two domains, and preserve both; the one, which sanctifies; the other, which makes for outward peace and restrains evil works; neither is sufficient in this world, without the other."[2]

These two domains possess each a different régime, and different function, and therefore each demands a different morality: a personal morality, based on the Sermon on the

[1] *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, 1523. Luthers Werke; Weimar ed., XI, p. 251.
[2] ibid., p. 252.

Mount, and a State morality. Only the former is wholly Christian. The latter, which Luther regarded as relatively Christian, he derived from that Stoic natural law which he found in the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament. Thus this "Law of the Lord" came to have a great significance for Protestantism. Along with the maintenance of this morality went the maintenance of law, with which the Old Testament sternness could not dispense. As is well known, at the time of the peasants' revolt, Luther used the most forcible language in urging the princes to severity. Luther had a ready ear for the mercifulness of the Gospel ethic, and in his first years as reformer often pointed in a Tolstoyan direction; it cannot have come easy to him to allow and even enjoin these rigorous measures of severity.

But now, how can the Christian, who belongs to both these domains and has to live in both, contrive to practise a dual morality? Luther's answer is: As a Christian, in his personal life and personal relations, he must abide by the first order, the order of grace; as a Christian citizen, in his outward calling, to the second, the order of creation. Here the antitheses are not divided between two distinct classes of people, as under the Catholic régime, but "brought together, into a dual way of life for every individual; the compromise is shifted to more deeply inward ground".[1] Luther sought scriptural authority for this dualistic way of life in Rom. xiii. 1–5 (subjection to the powers ordained of God, who as God's ministers employ the sword for purposes of punishment), and in Matt. xxii. 21, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's", from which last text Luther drew his famous but, we think, erroneous conclusion—a conclusion certainly not demanded by the Gospel—that the entire outward life of the Christian is in submission to the sovereign and to *his* conception of God's will. He set forth this view in his *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit und wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei* (1523), quoted above, and of this work he himself testified: "I could almost make it my boast that since the time of the Apostles the temporal sword and the secular authorities have never been so clearly defined and so highly extolled, as by me; this even my enemies

[1] Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 505.

must recognize."[1] "In spirit Christians are subject to none but Christ alone, but with life and goods they are nevertheless subject to the secular authority, and obliged to be obedient to it."[2]

This view has become the dominant one in the Protestant world, in spite of the dissent of Calvinism (see below). Really it can hardly be called a solution, for man is *one* personality, and possesses *one* spiritual life, which is not exclusive of his outward life; rather, his inmost being is often deeply affected by his outward life. "The Protestant way out of the strain of a dual morality, personal and official," rightly observes Troeltsch,[3] "is not a solution but a reformulation of the problem."

"Consequently, the war question, as well, Luther only solves in appearance. The soldier is the servant of the Government, which rules by divine Providence, itself ordained of God, and which lends him its sword, so to speak, in order that its dictates may be fulfilled. Moreover, Luther, following in the wake of Augustine, actually sees warfare as a means to punish evil-doers, and as a work of peace."[4] Like Augustine, Luther cited the wars of Joshua, the Judges and the pious King David, and quoted John the Baptist, who merely warned the soldiers not to do violence off the battlefield, but said nothing about warfare itself or the military calling. We have seen, in Chapter I, how we should regard these passages. Luther even pointed to Jesus' answer to Pilate: "My Kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight", and concluded from it that Jesus had no quarrel with war itself, provided it were waged by the sovereign for just motives.[5] We have seen, however, that it is illicit to draw these and similar conclusions from facts to which Jesus refers simply as facts. One cannot employ the Gospel in justification of war, save by distorting it.

Luther's view of this problem should be studied primarily in the writing we have already quoted, *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können*, which he wrote in 1526, while still under the influence of the peasants' revolt of the previous year.

[1] *Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können*. Luthers Werke; Weimar ed., XIX, p. 625. [2] ibid., p. 629.
[3] op. cit., p. 509. [4] *Ob Kriegsleute*, pp. 625, 628. [5] ibid., p. 627.

With his scorn of the mob, the stupid and sinful populace, and with his reverence for the Government, notwithstanding his doughtiness at speaking truth to princes and Governments, Luther was led by that civil war to advocate more vigorously even than before the sternest measures for maintaining authority. Owing to these happenings within his own land, he saw war chiefly in the form of rebellion, wherein none had the right to engage. Let the subject obey his prince, the prince obey the Emperor, the Emperor obey God. So it was all the easier for Luther to regard the soldier as a servant of justice and peace. His office is not sinful, but, if practised aright, "a godly office", as are those of the judge and the executioner.[1] The function of war is like that of the surgeon: the leg is removed to save the body, and a man must not stare his eyes out at the amputated leg. "A small misfortune that prevents a great one."[2] As the hand of the surgeon is guided by medical wisdom, so is the hand of the soldier by the wisdom of God, which directs the Government. Advancing along this line of thought, Luther came to express himself in a way which sounds strange indeed to ears that have ever heard the word of the Gospel: "The hand which bears such a sword [i.e. the sword of Government] is as such no longer man's hand, but God's, and not man it is, but God, who hangs, breaks on the wheel, beheads, strangles and wages war."[3]

Thus Luther reassured the Christian soldiers' disquieted consciences. They *were* disquieted consciences, and no wonder. For had not Luther abolished the difference between spiritual and worldly Christians, and declared all Christians spiritual? Could the "spiritual", then, take part in the bloody work of war? It might be answered that faith alone justifies, and not works; but *can* a man who does *this* work, *can* a military man remain justified? Certainly, declared Luther. "For a soldier shall bear with him such conviction of conscience that he is obliged to do, and *must* do, this work, that he may be sure he serves God, and can say: 'It is not I that smites, thrusts and kills, but God and my prince, whose servants are my hand and life.' . . . So let every man be undaunted, admitting no thought other than that his fist is God's fist, his spear God's spear, and let him cry aloud

[1] *Ob Kriegsleute*, pp. 624, 656. [2] ibid., p. 626. [3] ibid., p. 626.

with heart and voice, 'For God and Kaiser'."[1] Before God he must be submissive and humble, but "before men, wherever they uphold any injustice, must he be brave, free and proud, and thus with pride and with confident heart smite them down".[2] And then Luther puts on the lips of the soldier about to enter the fight a prayer expressing confidence in the rightness of the work he is going to do, and in the blood of Jesus Christ, which alone redeems and sanctifies, a prayer ending with the words, "By this I endure, in this I live and die, for this I strive and accomplish all things. Gracious God and Father protect and strengthen in me this faith, through thine own Spirit; Amen." "Then if you wish to add 'Our Father' and the Creed [the Twelve Articles], do so, and let that suffice. Then commit your body and soul into His hands. And then draw thy sword and strike, in God's name."[3]

This injunction to pray "Our Father" before that work begins wherein all Christian values of which the Lord's Prayer speaks are stricken down, that work for which there is nothing to do but ask forgiveness, plainly shows how even a great reformer like Luther—no reformer in this respect—was involved in the Fall of Christianity. And we shall not be far from the mark if we try to find within Lutheranism the origin of a phenomenon which would have seemed strange and unbelievable to Christians of the first centuries, but which became familiar, especially in orthodox Protestant circles, and even to-day comes to light in so many ways, the phenomenon of the armed Christian bully.

It is hard to say which gives greater cause for amazement, the loyal determination with which Luther dispelled the uncertainties of the Christian heart or the *naïveté*—for in worldly affairs Luther was often naïve—with which he imagined a Christian disposition possible in the midst of war. He was astonished that there were soldiers who took their admonishment and comfort before the battle not from God but from their sweethearts! If two trustworthy men had not told him, he wrote, "I should not have believed it". He recognized with indignation that "a great many of the soldiers are the devil's property, and some are full of him", but he did not ask himself whence this came to be, nor if it had any connection with their work, which

[1] *Ob Kriegsleute*, pp. 656, 658. [2] ibid., p. 651. [3] ibid., p. 661.

seldom leaves a man as it finds him. And as he bade the soldiers say "Our Father" ere they set out to "thrust and hew", their commander might well hope they would rid themselves of the thoughts and intention of that exalted prayer as speedily as might be; else it would fare but ill with the work he expected from them.

Indeed, quite apart from the question whether war may be called "a small misfortune that prevents a greater one" (to-day we have rather different ideas about that), and apart also from the question whether "the enemy" may be identified with "the evildoer"—which question we answered in Chapter I[1]—Troeltsch puts it rightly when he says in regard to Luther's handling of the military question: "The Protestant way out of the strain of a dual morality, personal and official, is not a solution but a reformulation of the problem." This "solution", especially in regard to the question of war, is nothing but a compromise between State and Christianity, a compromise whereby the State has the upper hand to a remarkable degree, however much this strange victory may try to disguise itself in ideas which are Christian really or apparently.

No wonder the Christian conscience, which could not forget the primitive Christian ideal, rose up in opposition to this compromise. Even Luther could not forget that ideal. From time to time he came into conflict with sharp-witted but unchristian politicians and lawyers (*Ein Jurist ein schlechter Christ*), with reckless rulers and tyrants. In his work on the military calling he launched out against those who went too far in their use of power, and knew no pity. Sometimes there were threats of this compromise between Christianity and State breaking down. For many supporters of the Reformation it *did* break down completely. Then "there broke out deep hatred of the world, the flesh and the devil, hope made ready for the day that was to be, and Christianity really looked like life under the Cross and hope of future blessedness".[2] In this way we must understand the first Baptist movement, which appealed to the youthful Luther, likewise those other sects which arose both before and after, and which, according to Troeltsch's well-documented argument, form that complement of ecclesiasticism which is

[1] pp. 38 f.

[2] Troeltsch, op. cit., pp. 505–506.

essential to the setting forth of a full historic Christianity. It was a remarkable interplay of forces: in opposition to the Anabaptists (for the reformers were not content to oppose only the violent excesses to which a section of the Baptists presently came), Luther and Zwingli sought ever closer alliance with State authority and power, while it was to this very *rapprochement* of "Gospel" and "world" that the Baptists came into ever fiercer opposition.

Luther's full and submissive deference to the authority of the State rested partly on a recognition of necessity, for the State was the necessary means between ideal and practical, partly on gratitude, for the State was the indispensable supporter of the Reformation and protector of the Lutheran Church; but, at the same time, it found justification in his faith in the "Christian State", the rulers of which, appointed by Providence, promoted and championed Christianity out of love and free will. The justice of God would lay by the heels the Government that failed to do so. Upon this faith Luther built up his theocratic ideal, for no virile religion can dispense with such an ideal. But weaker foundation that ideal has never had. "One cannot but recognize", says Troeltsch, with truth, "the hyper-idealist, not to say utopian—Christian utopian—character of this ideal of the State."[1]

In this utopian faith the Lutheran Church has continued, and German statesmen, from Frederick the Great until Bismarck and after, have not refrained from appealing strongly to this faith for the attainment of their imperialistic aims. The subject must just hold his peace. In so far as he, with his "dull underling's mind",[2] can judge the conduct of Government, he has this plain rule to follow: When in doubt, obey. "Love believeth all things" and "thinketh no evil". But if he is absolutely certain that its conduct of affairs goes clean against the will of God, that the Government, for instance, is waging an unjust war, then he must needs follow his conscience, and, like the Apostles, obey God rather than men; suffer punishment rather than behave contrary to conscience.[3] At this one point (the point of issue at Worms), the Protestant "liberty of the Christian" triumphed over the ethic of an almost unbounded State authority.

[1] op. cit., p. 567.
[2] "beshränkte Untertanenverstand."
[3] *Ob Kriegsleute*, pp. 656, 657.

3. *The Calvinist Synthesis. Calvin and War*

Calvinism was largely grounded in Luther's reformation, so that it used many of the same arguments, even in regard to this question of the State and war. Calvinism, however, came armed into the world. It was straightway forced to hold its own in strife and opposition. Whether because of this, or whether because of the legal disposition and development of its founder, probably owing to both these factors and others as well—Calvinism avoided the dualistic character of Lutheran ethics, avoided, that is, the discrepancy between personal and public morality. Calvin, more positively than Luther, saw God's Word in Scripture as a whole, without distinction, and this Word, when it related to human conduct in any way, was primarily a commandment. Calvinism was as legalist as the Baptist movement. The difference lay in this alone, that the Baptists found the Law in the Sermon on the Mount, the Calvinists in the Ten Commandments. Calvinism knows nothing of the distinction between the morality of free intent and fettered morality. This gave strength to Calvinism, but made it less inward. For Calvin God's love is primarily the love of the Sovereign who by his omnipotence elects some, even as by the same omnipotence He reprobates others. And the love of man is before all else the will to give God the glory that is His due by keeping His commandments. Thus Calvinism keeps much closer than Lutheranism to the Old Testament, in the commandments of which it sees not a relatively Christian ethic, but one fully Christian. Troeltsch has a strong partiality for Calvinism, having seen it in its modern form mainly through the eyes of Abraham Kuyper, at the time of the latter's Stone Lectures, and thus in too modern, too democratic and too idealistic a guise; yet he writes: "Nothing in the Calvinist ethic stands out in contrast to Lutheranism so characteristically as the lack of need to justify in the face of social and political morality the thoroughgoing love-ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, and to reconcile the two. In the whole of his [i.e. Calvin's] correspondence, which treats of innumerable moral situations, there is not a glimmer of world-hating personal morality or of difference from official morality, which has just to be accepted as it is."[1]

[1] op. cit., p. 646.

Thus, Calvin was able to see the *corpus christianum*, which for him too embraced the entire social life, as an undivided whole, as a single "domain".[1] Church and State were to work together in one loyal alliance for a common end. His theocracy was less evangelical but more realistic than Luther's, his Church better equipped for her fight in the world. And in that fight the State was to be the ally, or, if need be, the attendant of the Church. For Calvin the State was not merely a means of punishment and an antidote for sin, but also, and especially, a good and holy ordinance of God, a valuable instrument for maintaining His glory in the world. The Augustinian conception of the State as bound up with sin, which Luther had adopted in his first period, was foreign to Calvin. The latter trod in Thomas's wake, with this difference, that for him the State took on a higher function and co-operated with the Church to the glory of God. The "Christian State" in a full sense only began with Calvin. The origin of his theocratic ideal must be sought in the Old Testament. "Above all, he appeals over and over again to the Old Testament, with which the Sermon on the Mount, in view of the unity of the Bible, cannot be in conflict, to the reforms and politics of the pious Kings of Israel, to the Decalogue and the late Jewish moral code, to David and the Psalms."[2] God's glory is involved in this alliance of Church and State. And everything that can minister to that glory is not only permitted but required, and does not need the expedient of a so-called "official morality" to justify it.

Calvinism has thus solved the problem of Christianity and State morality by bringing the State and its instruments of power[3] under a "Christian" law, basing this law mainly on the Old Testament, and putting the New Testament motive of love in the background.

Even the doctrine of election, however Pauline it might be, takes Calvinism into the midst of Old Testament ways of thought. The object of God's love is not mankind but a little elect race, the "little flock", "like a drop of oil floating on the ocean of the peoples' life", "a little number like a chosen and plucked

[1] *Regiment.* [2] Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 637.
[3] Calvin deals with these in his *Institutions*, chap. iv, under the heading, "On the outward means of salvation".

flower". The mass of men is the *massa perditionis*, lost. In man himself Calvin saw only a creature wholly depraved because of the Fall, deserving of condemnation, no thing of worth, but only of worthlessness. Election alone gave him worth. Neo-Calvinists like Kuyper and Bavinck have often been greatly embarrassed by Calvin's severity, and have tried to mitigate and humanize the doctrine of reprobation by a new exposition of the doctrine of "universal grace", but that severity has done its work and does it still, e.g. by its conception of humanity. "Wherefore my teaching abides sure and unharmed," wrote Calvin in his *Institutions*, "to wit, that God hates the reprobate, and that with good reason, because they, devoid of His Spirit, can produce nothing but the very stuff and substance of damnation." "Mockeries and blasphemies" are the contentions of those who say God is the Father of all men. Certainly, the providential hand of God is over all the earth, but God is as little Father of the reprobate as He is Father "of swine and dogs".[1] It thus becomes explicable how Calvin could have had Servetus burnt without mercy, and how his disciple, Beza, could write a book on the execution of heretics. "His action against Servetus was an action of his age," says the *Monument expiatoire* at Geneva. This is only true in part. In part, too, it was the result of the Old Testament and Calvinist belittling of the individual man and his life.

After what has been said, it will be obvious that Calvin found no difficulty in giving war a place in the Christian world, even though he called its relationship to the Sixth Commandment a "great and weighty problem". For him the inner difficulty, which Luther had to overcome at first, existed not at all, or only in slight measure. Perhaps we should ascribe it to an early scruple of his, that the language which most vigorously defends war is only to be found in the later editions of his *Institutions*. But then he went a step further than Luther. Whilst the latter only justified the defensive war,[2] Calvin deemed even that war good which served to effect public vengeance.[3] Even here is the

[1] *Institutions*, III, 22, 6–7; 24, 17.
[2] "Denn das will ich für allen Dingen zuvor gesagt haben: Wer Krieg anfehet, der ist unrecht" (*Ob Kreigsleute*, p. 645).
[3] *Institutions*, IV, 20, 11.

familiar difficulty: Who began it? The objection of the Baptists that the New Testament nowhere teaches that war is permitted to Christians, he answered by saying that Christ's Kingdom is spiritual, that he did not come to give another form to civil government, that the causes which former ages found for waging war remained, that "in this respect Christ altered nothing whatever by his coming"; and this argument he too illustrated, along with Augustine and Luther, by quoting John the Baptist. Besides, he found it easy to sanction war because he too saw it wholly as a police measure and a means to order, and so he too imagined he found a proof-passage for the justice of war in Rom. xiii. 4. Just as Augustine spake of "the barbarians" and Luther of "evildoers", so Calvin called the enemy "armed robbers", who must be "punished as such". This conception of war as a police measure, comprehensible in Augustine's day, because of the inroads of Goths and Vandals, though not valid, was no longer seemly in Reformation days, and in the course of the succeeding centuries its inadequacy was to come more and more clearly to the light.

In other respects Calvin viewed war exactly as did Luther, to whom indeed he was very greatly indebted. War is a concern of the State, which may employ it in its own worldly interests, provided only that the aim is just, and that moral discipline is maintained. Religious interests, however, must be protected without violence, by trust in God, suffering and patience. But State and Church were so closely associated for Calvin, he being both theologian and statesman, that he himself was driven in the direction of armed intervention. While Luther did not suffer the Protestant princes of Germany to defend their faith with the sword against the Emperor, Calvin held that the Catholic enemy must be fought with his own weapons. Accordingly his follower Beza affirmed the rightness of religious warfare, and that on biblical, historical and dogmatic grounds. That is, provided one goes the legalistic way! With only the Old Testament in hand it is not difficult to make such an affirmation. This view has been of tremendous importance, and not only in regard to the behaviour of Calvinists in the various lands; the Reformed (i.e. Calvinist) model eventually became the pattern for Lutherans too—in the Thirty Years War. Cromwell's famous experiment

was a late example of this Protestant policy. It seemed as if the Sermon on the Mount and Matt. xxvi. 52 were forgotten; no, rather, had never been written.

It is not for us to belittle the significance of Calvin or the great religious worth of Calvinism, to which we ourselves are so indebted, nor will we forget that those were times of strain and stress. Also, the fact that manners were coarse and ideas stern is some excuse. But in these days it should certainly be demonstrated clearly that that feature of Calvinism, whereby it so easily took up the war idea into itself and gave it a Christian stamp, is contrary to the Gospel.

4. *Christian Humanism. Erasmus and War*

In these days, if we would hear the authentic note of primitive Christianity on war we must go to the Christian humanists. Their ethic was nourished on Stoic philosophy as much as on the Gospel. Christianity and Stoic philosophy found points of contact not only in the sphere of social ethics, as we have seen, but also in their valuation of mankind. The conception of man as the "image of God" which Christianity took over from Genesis, and the Gospel vision of man as the object of God's seeking and saving love (Luke xv. 1–10, "joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth"), united with the Stoic ideas of the inner kinship of God and man. Paul gave some impulse to this tendency, in his speech to the Areopagus, by referring to a line of the poet Aratus, whose same words are also to be found in a hymn to Zeus by the famous Stoic Cleanthes: "For we are also his offspring" (Acts xvii. 28). The doctrines of the eternal element in man, whereby he seeks after God, and of the high worth of human personality ("What shall a man be profited, if he gain the whole world, and forfeit his soul?" Matt. xvi. 26) form the cement of the bond. Christianity undoubtedly has an infinitely greater religious depth than Stoicism, which knows nothing, for instance, of "conversion" and "grace", but in their conception of the worth of personality, and the consequent ethic of reverence, love and compassion towards one's fellow-men, they converge. When the noble Stoic philosopher, Seneca, in attacking the gladiatorial sports, which he characterizes as *nefas* (sin), writes

the splendid words, *homo sacra res homini* (let man be sacred to his fellow-man),[1] and when the Christian Father, Lactantius, with reference to the Sixth Commandment, expresses his conviction, "It is always sin [*nefas*] to kill a man; God has willed that he shall be an inviolable being,"[2] their words breathe one and the selfsame spirit. From this spirit arises that idea of humanity which means so much to a Christian humanist like *Erasmus*.

Erasmus cannot get away from the inhumanity of war; still less can he get away from the fact that Christians practise this thing. This man who has spent so much time and pains and acumen on the study of the New Testament cannot understand why Christian leaders have not made earnest protest. His indictments against war run through many of his works, but the deepest and bitterest complaint is to be found in his *Querela Pacis*, his "necessary Christian lament for peace". He vigorously attacks the bishops who become war-lords ("How come the bishop's staff and the sword to agree?"), and the theologians and preachers who "preach war with the selfsame lips with which they proclaim Jesus Christ the Peacemaker". "Do you herald with one trumpet God and Devil? Do ye urge the simple folk to smite and slay, the folk that are expectant to hear the blessed Gospel from your lips?" In this world of priests and theologians "things have come to such a pretty pass that it is regarded as immoral and unchristian for a man to open his mouth against war, and to exalt and praise that only which is praised, exalted and extolled by the mouth of our Lord Jesus Christ". Erasmus regards it as sacrilege for the warrior to stitch the Cross on to his standard. "The Cross is the banner and standard of Him who has overcome and triumphed not by fighting and slaying, but by His own bitter death." "With the Cross do ye deprive of life your brother, whose life was rescued by the Cross?" It is an enigma and a horror to Erasmus, how those who wage war dare pray "Our Father". Does not everyone know what war is, and what goes on in its name?

"O you cruel, shameless lips; how dare ye call Him your Father whilst ye rob your brother of life?

"Hallowed be Thy name: how can the name of God be more dishonoured than by war?

[1] *Epistles* 95, 33.

[2] *Divin. Instit.*, VI, 20, 17.

"Thy Kingdom come: will ye pray thus while ye scruple at nought and shrink from no bloodshed, however great?

"Thy will be done; on earth as in heaven: God desires peace, and ye make war.

"Ye pray your common Father for daily bread, and meantime ye burn all your brother's rye and corn, and would rather destroy all that comes into your hands than that any of it be left for your brother's good.

"How shamefully will ye say: Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us, while ye desire nothing else but to set out with all speed and slay and do mischief, just as others do to you!

"Ye pray that ye may not come into danger or temptation, and ye lead your brother into every sort of danger and temptation.

"Ye pray that ye may be delivered from evil, and you do your brother the very worst and inflict on him the greatest ills."

Ye Christians, cries Erasmus, ye anathematize the Turks, as godless, sacrificing to the devil, but ye, when ye attempt each other's life, do just the same. For "the devil knows no offering more pleasing than when one Christian slays another".

The spirit of this great Christian humanist, Erasmus, has had great influence on both Catholics and Protestants, especially on the Dutch Remonstrants. But the Old Testament and the orthodox exegesis of the New Testament stand in the way of almost all ecclesiastical writers when they deal with the right to wage war. Even such a man as Grotius, who was so deeply imbued with the spirit of Erasmus, follows the conventional ecclesiastical way in his classic work, *De jure belli ac pacis*:[1] the Old Testament speaks of righteous wars, that are countenanced, not opposed, by the prophets, therefore there *are* righteous wars; Jesus went about with soldiers, and John the Baptist did not bid the soldiers give up war-service, therefore they approved the military calling and war-service: Romans xiii gives the Government the right to punish evildoers, and therefore to wage war . . . etc.[2] We saw in Chapter I that this argument

[1] Bk. III, chap. 25: "Violence is bestial and appears so most of all in war; wherefore it must be restrained, so that we may not lose the art of being men, mimicking too much the wild beasts' ways."

[2] ibid., Bk. I, chap. 2, 5–8.

is not tenable. Nevertheless it has thrust on one side Erasmus's true judgment regarding the ethic of the Gospel, the judgment of primitive Christianity.

But it is also due to the influence of Erasmus that that Christian humanitarianism arose which has grown so strong during the last hundred years, whereby, in ever-broadening circles, war is felt to be an intolerable barbarity. That influence has already contributed to the civilizing of morals. Huizinga writes in his delightful character-study of Erasmus, in which the latter's portrait is painted in all its lights and shadows, "Never has this spirit so easily taken hold as in the land which gave birth to Erasmus. Above all, the ruling classes have been taught by him repugnance to religious strife and unnecessary violence." That "in the Republic of the Seven Provinces the horror of the execution of witches and sorcerers ceased more than a century earlier than in any other land . . . was not due to the Reformed clergy. They shared the popular belief, which demanded persecutions. It was due to the magistrates, whose enlightenment, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, no longer permitted these things. The spirit that here speaks is the spirit of Erasmus. People of culture have good cause to hold the name of Erasmus in honour, if only because he was the earnest preacher of that universal gentleness of which the world still has such sore need."[1]

In this well-merited praise I had rather written "Christian love" in place of "universal gentleness". Erasmus recognized only one real Christian faith, that faith in the merciful God which is "working through love" (Gal. v. 6). For it was that which brought him to oppose war and its methods. But with this milder phraseology, Huizinga unwittingly calls attention to a deficiency which we, and even this writer, cannot help noticing in the character of Erasmus; a lack of the heroic. Perhaps this is due to his having no strong feeling of being laid hold of by God. Perhaps in his Christian humanism, the humanism received the emphasis rather than the Christianity, to which the stress rightly belongs. Be this as it may, the great Calvinists were his superior in holy daring, in faith's heroism. May modern Christianity preserve this heritage from Calvin, or better, renew

[1] J. Huizinga: *Erasmus*; Haarlem, 1924, pp. 264, 265.

that which has fallen away. But if modern Christianity will fulfil the task which our age ever more urgently demands of it, it will not be able to deny the real humanity which finds its holy vindication in the Gospel, and which, be it hoped, will be identified more and more with "the humanity of the age to come, the eternal, the divine, coming to its glory through suffering, the humanity of the man Jesus Christ".[1] Roessingh, who quotes this saying, employs the paradox "the humanity of God". Yet however high this divine humanity may attain in the being of God, it must all the more find its sequel in reverence for man as the bearer of a holy mystery: his destiny to be a child of God. No man, be he ever so faithful, is a full man without that reverence. And no one can be a full Christian without being a full man. So Roessingh, again, puts it, using the words of Vinet: "Soyons hommes, afin de pouvoir devenir chrétiens."[2]

5. *Christian Imperialism and Pacifism; Cromwell and Fox, Quakers and Mennonites*

The theocracy, towards which every virile religion strives and must strive, took the form for Calvin of the "Christian State". This conception holds innumerable difficulties and contradictions, like the problem of "Christianity and the State", but even more pointedly. Calvinism found a remarkable solution for them in an Old Testament idea: the elect people.

In Israel it was indeed the nation, subject to the Law of the Lord, which was the bearer of the theocratic ideal. This theocracy also contained the idea of the "Lord's *elect* People", that sometime would raise its standard among the heathen, and be supreme over them. Calvinism took over this idea of election more definitely than did any other school of Christian thought, but at first, in accordance with the true character of Christianity, only applied it to the individual man and to the fellowship of those who were converted, i.e. to the Christian congregation. But presently this Calvinistic belief resumed the Jewish form: the race was the object of election. And then the peril, latent in this belief, came to light more plainly. Belief in personal election (i.e. "choosing out") is of itself of deep religious significance, provided that the

[1] Chantepie de la Saussaye, sen.
[2] Roessingh: *Verzamelde Werken*; Arnhem, 1927, Pt. III, p. 45.

stress does not fall upon "out". It is not I who have found God and chosen Him, but He who has found and chosen me. It is a faith that makes for gratitude and encourages in the fight of life. Yet in imperfect man it appears all too often in the familiar but unpleasant form of pride, which is all the more unpleasant as it is accompanied by limited vision and failure to recognize and respect the qualities of others. It is still more unpleasant and perilous when it makes itself master of a nation, especially when that is a powerful nation, and so given to violence.

It was *Cromwell*, the Calvinistic Puritan and Independent, who breathed life into the English *imperium*, with this faith of his, and who laid a religious foundation for the imperialism, which arose in Britain and, by imitation, elsewhere.[1] Cromwell's imperialism began with his own person; God had elected *him* to carry out His plans for England, and subsequently for the world; and it ended with the Protestant imperialist world-mission to which he committed his people. The Jewish theocratic idea of the Kingdom of God on earth, applied by Augustine to the Church in his "City of God", Cromwell once again associated with the race; *his* race. If righteousness and peace are the characteristics of the realm of God on earth, the elect British nation had the task of establishing righteousness and peace over the whole world, but to that end it must dominate the whole world. A great fleet was the first requisite; Cromwell spent more than half the national revenue upon it. Naturally this endeavour must go hand in hand with increasing colonization, so bringing additional power and dominion, both of which were essential to the ideal. With what ways of violence colonization proceeded here and elsewhere, everybody knows, but here, as in the Civil War, with the Old Testament severity of Calvinism, Cromwell justified "the means, which are needful to the end". Everybody knows his saying: "Trust in God, and keep your powder dry." He knew what our Jan Pieterzoon Coen knew, that "trade cannot exist without war, nor war without trade". We must needs admit many cruelties, if we are to be empowered to effect righteousness and peace. After all, is not that righteousness already beginning,

[1] See Karl Völker: *Die religiöse Wurzel des englischen Imperialismus*; Munich, 1924.

with the "Word of God" which men are preaching in subject territories?

Even so eminent and broadminded a thinker as Carlyle, admirer of Cromwell, was imbued with the spirit of this Christian imperialism.[1] In him too the Calvinistic trait is to be seen. The enterprise of the elect succeed, and this success is in itself a proof of election. This same train of thought, associated in the same way with God's providential direction of history, is likewise to be found in our Dutch Calvinism, i.e. the doctrine "Might is right", with a religious colouring. This faith finds a ready ear among those whose interests lie in the colonies, who, however, unless they themselves happen to be Calvinists, are in the habit of pointing to the benefits of civilization brought into the colonies rather than to the religious mission. The bystander gets the impression of hypocrisy. During the war it was said in Germany: "The Englishman speaks of Christ, and thinks of cotton." Yet, Völker, who discusses this, adds the remark that "it is not necessarily hypocrisy, it is boundless self-assertion combined with the conviction of one's own world-mission from God". In Völker, who steeped himself in it, this imperialist Christianity has already gained a proselyte. He ends with the words, "Our German nation also must be impressed with this conviction, if it will again rise to the height of its destiny". We answer, should this happen, we know what to expect; more than anything else this nationalism and imperialism, fed by religion, was the cause of the Great War. The event proved what should have been plain from the start (national election), viz. that this religious nationalism has little or nothing to do with the Gospel.

To return to Cromwell and the Puritans. This Puritanism, which had begun as a spiritual crusade for holiness, threatened to lose its spirituality and holiness precisely through those wars at home and abroad, which Cromwell waged as a warrior-hero of Jehovah. But about this time a spiritual genius appeared whose whole attitude was opposed to the unevangelical worldly and brutal character which Christianity had assumed all over the world: *George Fox*. "It happened at this time", said the famous preacher Spurgeon,[2] "that the Puritan movement began

[1] See, for example, *Past and Present*, I, 2; III, 10; and elsewhere.
[2] Quoted by Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, p. 911.

to lose its life-blood; the Independents, the Baptists and other sects which had for some time led a life of remarkably robust spirituality, were busy becoming worldly and straining after empty political glorification. They got the opportunity to grasp the worldly sword, and they made good use of the opportunity; and from that moment onwards many of them lost that spiritual quality which had been their outstanding merit. The danger threatened that the evangelical sects would passively fall into line with the State Church again. At that moment God sent into the world George Fox. He faced the Christian world and said to it: No, this ye shall not do. Ye shall not be conformed to the world. Ye shall not enter into an unholy alliance with the State; there shall be in your midst a spiritual people, who shall make their protest, that the Kingdom of Christ is not of this world, and that religion does not consist of forms and ceremonies, but is a concern of the inner man, the work of God's Spirit in the heart." Troeltsch adds the remark: "Here is expressed the whole difference between this spiritual movement and the Calvinist war-theories of the Baptists Hussites and Huguenots in regard to the foundation of the Kingdom of Christ. This same difference comes out in a remark of Barclay's: 'The Christian purpose of Cromwell's soldiers at the beginning of our Civil War could not be called in question, but it may very well be questioned whether it was improved by the fighting. However, they saw enough of war to become apt disciples of Fox, and many of them became preachers of the Gospel of the peace of God's good will towards men.' "[1]

Troeltsch here includes the Baptists among war-minded Christians. He is of course thinking of the Anabaptists of Munster. But a number of the Baptists united under *Menno Simons* in a Christian movement radically pacifist. Just as the Waldenses and the Moravian brethren had done in their own time, so the *Mennonites* of the sixteenth century resolutely refused war-service. In the course of the following centuries, this Christian anti-militarism relaxed among the Dutch Mennonites (the "Doopsgezinden") so that from this quarter there was no resistance worth mentioning when compulsory military service was introduced into the Netherlands. The Russian Mennonites and those

[1] Troeltsch: op. cit., p. 911.

who emigrated to America held fast more faithfully to their principles, and have therefore had to suffer much, especially in Russia. In the last ten years the old principle has been revived even among the Dutch "Doopsgezinden" and the "Union of Mennonites against Military Service",[1] gains steadily in influence. Associated with the Mennonites is the Sect of the Nazarenes, many members of which are suffering rigorous imprisonment in present-day Jugo-Slavia because their faith does not permit them to render war-service.

But the Quaker community has had by far the greatest significance for the Christian pacifism of modern times. The *Quakers*, followers of Fox, including those who settled under William Penn in America and there had so large a share in the abolition of slavery, they it is principally, but aided by Baptists, Methodists and Unitarians, who have to a large measure purged the Calvinism of Anglo-Saxon lands of its warlike Old Testament character, and have substituted pietist and humanitarian motives. The international character which has been native to Calvinism from the beginning on, has here combined successfully with the humanitarian form of Christianity. Consequently in Anglo-Saxon lands during recent centuries, democratic and pacifist tendencies have become much more strongly marked among Christians and the Churches than has been the case in Holland, for example, not to speak of German lands, where the cleavage between such tendencies and the Protestant Church is even wider than in the Netherlands. Not that the peace movement among the Anglo-Saxons is so strong, but in contrast to Dutch and German pacifism it receives more support than opposition from Christians and the Church.

The Quaker fellowship which has avoided the ecclesiastical type of Christianity from fear of the static, formalistic character of the Church, proved in the last war that it has not lost its anti-war ideals. Belief in the need for a defensive war and especially in a sort of crusade against German militarism, in order to end war for good, may have brought many Quakers to render military service, yet most remained faithful to their principles. "We are profoundly convinced", the Society of Friends declared after the war, in a Manifesto "to the Christian Churches

[1] "Doopsgezinde arbeidsgroep tegen den Krijgsdienst."

in all lands", "that peace can only be attained by refusing to take any part in war, for the simple and wholly sufficient reason that war by its whole nature is in opposition to the message and spirit of the life and death of Jesus Christ. . . . The idea of peace which comes from the depths of Christianity demands the most determined repudiation of war, unambiguously and without compromise. . . . What greater tidings of joy and reconstruction would it be possible to bring present-day humanity than the assurance that all who bear the name of Christ in every land had solemnly resolved not to participate henceforth in any war or in any war-preparation? . . . Shall the torch of spiritual heroism be borne aloft again by the Church of the living Christ or must leadership in the sternest repudiation of war slip from our grasp and be taken up by others, who are inspired by a braver and truer spirit?" It may be rejoined that we have not got as far as this; we must have some regard for present-day conditions. The Quaker is ready for this answer and rejects it. "The Quaker acts for the unborn fellowship whose sacred privileges depend upon him": so it is put in one of the Friends' programmes.[1] "We believe that the only way the Kingdom of God can ever come is to have a nucleus of people who practise it here in this very difficult present world, who have faith enough in it to make a venture and experiment of trying it. . . ."[2]

This practice they did exhibit in the surging of the war which churned up almost the whole Christian basis of life, like so much loose sand. Thousands refused war-service, some joined the Red Cross, some refused even that as indirectly supporting the war, and these were thrown into prison. 5,596 British subjects, mostly Quakers, suffered imprisonment (many for two or three years) for their principles, some even underwent ill treatment. "The sinfulness of war", wrote one of them from prison, "has become so horribly plain to us that we are going to breast the flood, and will not enter the quiet waters of alternative service [i.e. ambulance work, etc.]". Their suffering was the greatest incentive to the spirit of sacrifice in others. Those Friends who were not liable to military service, both men and women members of the community, made it their special care to look after the stranded "enemy". They founded shelters for Germans who were in

[1] *Friends and War*; 1920, reprint 1927; p. 15. [2] ibid., p. 14.

England, unable to return home and exposed to the hostilities of the war-psychosis, and they gave them food, work and diversion. "Whoever has need of help", they wrote in one of their appeals, "is our neighbour, even in this time of war." 6,800 German families, ruined by the war, were cared for in London and neighbouring towns by about two hundred Friends. As early as 1914, the Friends went, at the invitation of the French Government, to the devastated areas of France, as they had done in 1870, and there rendered splendid service in relief-work, with their modern-equipped and well-trained organization. In 1916 they journeyed to starving Russia with food and clothing; several of them died of cholera and typhus there. And hardly had the wholesale slaughter ended, in 1918, when the Friends made ready to alleviate distress in the conquered lands, doing a work which lasted many years, which, indeed, is not yet ended, here and there.[1] The Dominican Father Franziscus Stratmann, who records the many services of the Friends in his *Weltkirche und Weltfriede*, adds in devout thanksgiving: "So much love, so much goodness, so much practical Christianity becomes available, when out of love to Christ we refuse to give our powers to the destructive work of war, and put them at the service of life instead."[2]

6. *Lack of a Modern Christian Sociology*

The conservatism, militarism and monarchism of orthodoxy.— "For the unborn fellowship whose sacred privileges depend upon us," says the Quaker programme. Indeed, one sometimes has no choice but to work either for the existing form of society against that of the future, or for the future against the existing form. For the man who has a vision of God's coming day, there cannot be a moment's doubt how the choice should fall. But it is just that man, if, too, he has any scholarship, who is most painfully aware of the lack of a Christian sociology (including,

[1] See Elizabeth Fox Howard on the work of Quakers during the war. (Friends' Council for International Service.)

[2] F. Stratmann, O.P.: *Weltkirche und Weltfriede*; Munich, 1925. [This work will be cited frequently in succeeding chapters, and as far as possible references given will be to the abridged translation, *Church and War*; London, 1929. See pp. 145 ff.—Translator].

of course, a doctrine of the State), an acknowledged Christian ethic which, while giving more room and opportunity to Christian principle, looks out toward a still more Christian future. The ineffectiveness of Christianity is to be explained, very largely, by the absence of a sociology effective for our times.

The Catholic Church once had an effective sociology, and claims to have one still. Yet it is simply her adaptability which enables her to remain conservative in conservative countries, and makes her democratic in lands that are democratic. She goes with the tendencies of the time, but the driving power is not hers. She lets society freely follow its own economic laws, only trying in motherly fashion to play some part as conciliator. Although an international Church, she shows no disapproval of the nationalistic State and its ways, and seems to have no influence left over international relations. The remarkable friendship of the Pope with the pagan Roman dictator of Italy whose God is the State, and whose worship is law and might and war, and the obviously complete impotence of the Vicar of Christ over his national congregations, whose members, nay whose "shepherds" even bayoneted each other in the war—these things tell us more than enough. And not us alone. Catholics themselves admit it. In his *Church and War*, Father Stratmann agrees with Max Scheler that it is not right to speak of "a bankruptcy" of Christianity in the Great War, because that would only be true if Christianity had been the preponderating and leading force in Europe". But it is very plain "that Christianity no longer leads, but has had to surrender its rôle of leader to other, hostile powers".[1] That the Christian Church, even the most powerful and most international, the Catholic Church, possesses no effective social and political doctrine is both the result and the further cause of this decline in leadership. Where there is no consciousness of the material implications of the Christian faith and ethic, these latter can exercise but little influence.

The Lutheran Church has never had this influence over State and the forms of society to any marked degree. Its dependence on the ruling prince, its utopian belief in his relation to Providence and in the Christian character of the *corpus christianum*

[1] See *Church and War*, p. xii, and for full quotation, *Weltkirche*, p.21.

in which the one half, the State, would do its duty under the preaching of the Gospel, these things crippled and weakened it from the beginning. Its social ethic, which derived mainly from family relationships, and bore a feudal, patriarchal character, like that of the Catholic Middle Ages, all too soon became unsuited to the newer age, with its growing mercantile and industrial enterprises. It fell back more and more on preaching, philanthropy and missions, leaving "worldly things" to the Government, which supported the Church on the understanding that the latter fostered in the community a religious reverence for the State. During the nineteenth century, with its great capitalist and militarist activities, the politicians employed this religious awe partly to maintain the "rights" of the privileged classes, and partly to carry through their policy of might and of naval and military aggrandizement. This conservative Lutheranism "gave idealistic and moral support to the Restoration . . . and to Prussian militarism, the qualities, indispensable to it, of obedience, piety and the sense of authority. Thus Christianity and conservatism became identical, piety and lust for power, the pure doctrine and war glorification fraternized. Thus the attempts at Church reformation were suppressed along with the world of liberal thought, and the supporters of modern social and spiritual movements were driven more and more into enmity toward the Church", an enmity which became "boundless hate"[1] on the part of the more thoroughgoing, democratic elements.

At first it looked as if Calvinism would take a wholly different road. For it appeared as a strongly organized power, deeply penetrating the life of the state and of society. It knew nothing of that contempt for the masses which Luther felt. It had too much need of the masses in its resistance towards the reigning authorities. It did not put the use of divine authority exclusively into the hands of the Government, but also into those of the people. *Le cri au peuple* of the leaders, often resorted to, not least of all here in Holland, was proof of that. With its more active and democratic character it was better able to adapt itself to the new form society was taking. With its adventurous spirit it threw itself into commerce and industry, and gave these their

[1] Troeltsch, op. cit., pp. 604, 605.

ethical basis and sanction, viz. tireless labour, honesty, sobriety and thrift in personal life, the gains to be regarded as proof of God's favour and to be applied to the welfare of God's liberated people and the reinforcement of the Church, all to the glory of God. Abraham Lincoln is an excellent representative of this Calvinistic commercial morality.

But Troeltsch, following Weber and supported by such a student of social history as the Englishman, Cunningham, points out further that this Calvinistic ethic has helped to give capitalism such powers of flight that with *its own* morality the latter has far outsoared the Calvinist ethic! It is noteworthy that colonization by Calvinist lands differed in no wise from any other; the natives were treated after the rough fashion of Joshua, for failing to acquiesce in the conquest and exploitation of the "promised land". The only fact that savoured of Christianity was that preachers were sent out in the merchant ships to convert the heathen. When these missionaries got to love their people and had courage, they often complained bitterly about the working-methods of the East India Company.[1] The disgrace of Christianity in the East had begun. Holland made its contribution thereto. The last great occasion was the action of Van Heutsz, who "put down 20,511 rebels" in ten years, in "mutinous" Atjeh. We do not here condemn Van Heutsz, personally, but the system of which he is representative. Next to the representatives of Indian capital and of the army, it was the Calvinists in particular, whether belonging to the above-named categories or not, who did him most honour, in Parliament at the time, and later at his solemn burial. It was the Socialist, Van Kol, who first besought the Government to end the war. It was the Catholic Jonkheer de Stuers who, in the name of Christianity, protested more than once in Parliament against these measures, which he likened to the work of bloodhounds. For this protest he was told by his party leader, Kolkman, that he was doing his country disservice. And to a certain extent the latter was right. For though this method of "protecting" colonies can hardly be condemned too severely, from the point of view of

[1] See what so competent a man as Professor Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje has to say about the Company in his *Colijn over Indie*; Amsterdam, 1928; pp. 32–34.

the Christian ethic, Holland is of course no whit behind other Christian lands in this respect.

It was, however, of still greater significance for the social attitude of Calvinism in general, that under the influence of capitalism it "became bourgeois"—to use Troeltsch's phrase.[1] Money has come to control our modern society, and it takes its self-appointed course. Anything with financial interests—and trade has most of all—is swept along with it. Luther, Calvin, and Beza might preach and storm against moneylenders and usurers, but the capital so essential to commerce and industry has emancipated itself from all ethical guardianship, and along with it society, boasting of "freedom". The State, seeking after power and profiting from this capital, follows suit. How then should a Christian community, existing in a practically non-moral form of society and compelled to share its life, preserve its own original moral intensity? This morality must needs withdraw from political and social life to the confines of the personal life and its immediate relationships. Thanks to its puritan character and its definite morality ("morality with a handle", as Niebergall calls it) it was able to effect this withdrawal without making itself too conspicuous! Sunday observance, prohibition of dancing and swearing, modesty of clothing and behaviour, all strongly maintained, have given the followers of Calvinism, at least in Holland, the impression that little is altered, and that the Christian ethic still governs the whole of life as far as "believers" are concerned. But in so far as this life parts company with ordinary life—and it does this in an ever greater degree—the situation has long since completely changed. At the end of last century it looked as if Calvinism would recover its democratic, reforming character under the leadership of Dr. Kuyper. "There is a flaw in the very foundation of our modern social life," said Kuyper in 1890. This was only a last flicker of the old life, which was passing away. Under the present leadership of a great industrialist,[2] it has degenerated

[1] op. cit., p. 713.

[2] See, e.g., Colijn's book *Koloniale vraagstukken van heden en morgen*, Amsterdam, 1928, wherein, according to Professor Snouck Hurgronje in his book already quoted, he dissociates himself completely from the policy laid down by Kuyper in regard to our colonies, and sets himself up as advocate of the spiritual descendants of the Company, as spokesman of a capitalistic ideology.

into a conservatism which in its reactionary tendency vies with a liberalism which also has seen democratic and social idealists disappearing from its ranks.

Thanks to its strong foundation in moral law, Calvinism was formerly a church with a progressive organization, but it has lost this characteristic, and with it its vision of the future. The "Church" in the narrower sense looks to the past more than to the future, to the grace, then given, now proclaimed and dispensed. She knows the story of salvation only in so far as it belongs to the past. Therefore, of the two positions, conserving and reforming, which a Christian must take up, keen ecclesiasts are inclined only to assume the former. Many call themselves "historical Christians", not only for the good reason that as Christians they will thankfully recall God's work in history, but also for the bad reason that they really do not believe in a work of reformation by God in the coming days, they do not believe in a future more Christian than the past has been, and their longing for it is not so great as to be conspicuous. "So they [the Calvinists] degenerated into an orthodoxy which, by its limitation to the Word, the Doctrine and the Creed, was much narrower and harder than Catholicism itself. . . . At the same time, however, an ever stronger alliance was effected with the earthly power, which was alone in a position to afford outward protection at least to the rule of the true faith"—as, for example, in our Dutch Republic, where Calvinism has had its wishes for centuries and even now urges the Government to forbid Roman Catholic processions. And so the difference between Christian and worldly morality "was more and more effaced, and morality itself became more worldly. The problem that lies in law, force, violence and war was soon no longer felt. On the contrary, it was extolled as an advantage of the pure reformed doctrine that this found room and divine justification for all these things, which monks and fanatics and other enemies of Christ denied."[1]

Without saying so in as many words, Troeltsch, who is familiar with Kuyper's Stone Lectures, criticizes the neo-Calvinistic doctrine of "sovereignty within each proper sphere".[2] If, accord-

[1] Troeltsch, op. cit., pp. 807, 808.

[2] See Dr. A. Kuyper: *Souvereiniteit in eigen Kring*; Amsterdam, pp. 10–18, and Dr. C. B. Hylkema: *Oud-en Nieuw-Calvinisme*; Haarlem, 1911, pp. 273–278.

ing to Calvin, society and State were bound up with the revealed sovereign will of God, which spans the whole of life, the neo-Calvinist calls all authority on earth "deputed sovereignty", and then establishes that there are spheres of human life, which possess sovereignty within their own confines, viz. politics, commerce, science, art, etc. Each of these spheres has its own authority, which rules, however, by the grace of God. Originally designed to be a protection for the reformed communities against state sovereignty, this neo-Calvinist theory, derived from Groen van Prinsterer and worked out by Kuyper, contributed towards giving society and the State greater licence to follow their own rules of life, independent of the Christian ethic. The danger is lest "God's sovereignty" becomes merely formal, and that grand idea, which is the glory and power of Calvinism, is named only as a memory, while State and society are allowed to take their own course, often anything but a Christian course, in the name of "sovereignty within each proper sphere". Worse still, there is a danger lest the course they take be covered by the authority of "God's sovereignty". It is said that each of the "spheres" must be subject to "a high authority at its own heart", but who gives the guarantee that this authority is in keeping with the Christian norm? Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "sovereignty in each proper sphere" holds much reality and truth: each expression of life follows the law of its own nature. But if we do not want to arrive at an "anarchy of values", towards which we are hurrying with "Christian" sanction, we must set the simple Christian values clearly before our eyes again; through the great window of God's revelation in Christ his sovereignty must be sought and seen and served. God is the Hidden One, and life is mysterious and rich and bewildering and tragic, but God is just as certainly the Revealed, in Christ. And what does this revelation profit us, if we not only *recognize* the real—though, for the Christian, relative—authority (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) of society and State, but even *bow down* before it? We do not say neo-Calvinism intends any such subservience, which would be idolatry from the Christian standpoint; we only say that it tends to it in a manner that is so dangerous, because it is preached in the selfsame circle where the old Calvinist belief in the State as a divine institution and instrument is still steadily

maintained, and where "authority" in the political sense is regarded more highly to-day than it is in other circles; it altogether imperils the rule of Christ, in so far as that rule *can* come, and so *must* come now, here on earth.

From all these causes Calvinism has lost its reforming power and democratic character, becoming conservative and quite unconscious of the crying discords between Christian ethic and pagan actuality. In this connection, however, we cannot forget that the Calvinist ethic is legalistic through and through, bound up with the Old Testament rather than with the New. By this process, during the course of last century, Calvinism approached very near to Lutheranism in its social and political attitude, in Holland anyway. Like so many other countries during the last century, Holland directed her gaze chiefly towards the East. The approach we have mentioned has been furthered by the works of F. J. Stahl in particular, who was professor of constitutional and ecclesiastical law and of the philosophy of law, at Erlangen and Berlin, from 1832 to 1858, becoming the legal and theological director both of the Prussian political reaction and of the revived Lutheran Church. His legal and political doctrine, *Auf der Grundlage christlicher Weltanschauung*,[1] and his works on *Kirchenverfassung*, *Das monarchische Prinzip* and *Der christliche Staat*,[2] were read in Holland, and had great influence there.[3]

Since then there has remained little difference between the Lutheran attitude and Calvinist conservatism. A remarkable feature of this attitude is the dualism of a strong realistic politics of power and force coupled with a reverence for Christian love, which love must give way, however, in the event of conflict. So we can understand—at least this is how it seems to us—how it becomes possible that the most militaristic association in Germany, the "Stahlhelm", which would have nothing sooner than revenge, and would wade through torrents of blood to get it, should once conclude its manœuvres with the chorale:

[1] *On the Foundation of a Christian Philosophy.*
[2] *Church Constitution*, *The Principle of Monarchy* and *The Christian State*, respectively.
[3] e.g. on Groen van Prinsterer and De Savornin Lohman. See the treatise by A. C. Leendertz: *De grond van het overheidsgezag.*

Ich bete an die Macht der Liebe
Die sich in Jesus offenbart[1]

The spirit disclosed here is not at all foreign to that of many of our own Calvinistic circles. Only the circumstances differ.

What especially appealed to Groen in Stahl's political doctrine was his sharp conflict with the ideas of the French Revolution, and his "application of natural law to the existing, legitimate monarchy". Troeltsch, who puts it this way, remarks that this last characteristic is not found in Luther. He could have added: nor in Calvin. The deification of the existing monarchy was largely determined for Stahl and Groen by the circumstances of the age. But it has remained the heritage of conservative Protestant orthodoxy in Lutheran as well as Calvinistic lands down to the present day. It is not democrats alone who protest against this canonization of the traditional; even Catholics have little sympathy therewith. With an ironical allusion to the historical character of the restoration of our royal house, Professor Struycken writes: "We need not necessarily stamp as the work of God the Revolution of 1813 and the installation of William I as prince and King; we know nothing of that, unless we mean to attribute every human endeavour that is successful to the government of God."[2]

Yet Stahl found this deification of the existing monarchy necessary to support the authority of the Government, which Luther regarded as the power ordained of God, before which men must bow. "Rebellion", said Luther, "is deserving of death as the crime of *lèse-majesté*, as sin against the Government.[3] As Stahl himself puts it: "You should not break this connection [i.e. with the traditional rule] without good reason, you should have reverence for that which has come about by the guidance or approval of God; you should not only obey the Government, where you come in contact with it, but also show trust and devotion to that dynasty which is deeply rooted in history."[4]

We can thoroughly endorse this plea for trust and devotion towards a royal house which has given the nation such cause for thankfulness, all the more when the princely honour is upheld

[1] "I adore the power of Love which reveals itself in Jesus."
[2] From *Ons Koningschap*; quoted by Leendertz in his treatise, p. 260.
[3] *Ob Kriegsleute*, p. 531. [4] Quoted by Troeltsch, pp. 536–537.

by the person who is invested with it. But we object to the attempt to make a Christian duty of this loyalty by the apotheosis of the royal house. Like Germany in former days under the Hohenzollerns (God, Prussia and Hohenzollern), orthodox Holland (God, the Netherlands and the House of Orange) is full of a Byzantinism at which our Calvinistic forefathers would have shrugged their shoulders in contempt. But the worst of it is that neither the House of Orange nor our orthodoxy is fully aware how this monarchism serves very strongly as a cloak for a not disinterested conservatism which wears this clothing in whatever way best suits it. Thus, on the one hand, orthodoxy becomes involved in a world of wealth and power and might, where it does not belong, and on the other hand, Orange becomes a mere class ruler in the eyes of an ever increasing number, the protector of the high-born, the capitalist, the militarist, the conservative and ignorantly traditionalist part of Holland, which loses no opportunity of claiming the House of Orange for itself by singing the National Anthem and sending loyal telegrams to the Queen on every possible occasion. The House of Orange has let itself be far too much encircled by conservatives and militarists; when it realizes the position into which it is being dragged, it will indeed have good reason to sigh: "Save me from my friends."

Along the lines indicated above, we believe, it must be explained how the Protestantism of the Churches, and especially of the orthodox part, which is by far the largest, has become a strongly reactionary force in social and political life, an ally and supporter of capital and army. Catholicism is too elastic to have any definite form. Whether it is reactionary or progressive depends on the land in which it finds itself, and on the strength of the Labour movement within its own communion, and this again depends on the Labour movement outside that communion. But orthodox Protestantism is almost everywhere conservative *en bloc*, with the few exceptions which here and there are beginning to appear. We shall not now enlarge upon the connection of this with its *religious* conservatism (chiefly lack of faith in progressive revelation, and absence of the early Christian hope of God's reforming this fallen world), though that connection positively does exist. It would take us too far. Nor shall we speak of the religious depth and worth of its personal life

of faith; we can only regard that with respect, knowing that rich stores of religious power lie concealed therein. But this power could be applied so much more beneficially in the world if it were not firmly attached to political and social conceptions from which little good may be hoped for in the days to come.

7. *The Christian "Supplement" to the Pagan State. Naumann*

Lutheranism seems to be the victim of heredity at this point. The sharp cleavage of morality into two halves, personal and official, seems to make impossible any independent and critical attitude determined by Christian principle. A striking example is afforded by the movement for social Christianity which arose under the leadership of Friedrich Naumann, at the beginning of this century in opposition to die-hard conservatism. Naumann was a preacher and member of the Reichstag, and, through his fine pen and outstanding personality, a very influential man.

Also since so much of the Lutheran sociology has entered Holland, as we have seen, and has so largely determined the attitude of many Dutch Christians, it seems to us instructive to follow the course of this movement, as Naumann himself has described it.[1] The movement was born out of the painful conviction that Christianity was becoming weaker and weaker in the modern world, that "neighbourly love has lost influence and effectiveness in the midst of a modern capitalist age bent on the acquirement of wealth", that it was "homeless", so that it became hard even to celebrate Christmas with an untroubled conscience (pp. 26, 27). Naumann had long before grasped what Harnack had expressed, in 1900, in the last lecture of his *Das Wesen des Christentums*. "The course which history has taken has surely opened up a wide province, in which the Christian sense of brotherhood must give practical proof of itself quite otherwise than it knew how, or was able to do in the early centuries—I mean the social province. A mighty task lies to hand here."[2] Naumann and his followers enthusiastically under-

[1] F. Naumann: *Briefe über Religion*; 1st ed., 1903, 7th and last ed., from which we translate, 1916. He died soon after the war.

[2] Harnack: *What is Christianity?* (E.T. of *Das Wesen des Christentums*) 3rd ed., 1904, p. 305.

took the task, but for the most part got no further than speech-making. "Our ideals have remained hovering like light fleecy clouds" around reality. "It was a grievous experience to realize that we were not in a position to adapt Jesus' practical conception of life directly to our modern age." It avails nothing even if we protest against the Mammon, which in the time of Jesus did not yet belong to the very fabric of social life. "We live in an epoch of capitalism, and have a religion inherited from a pre-capitalist period. However little we ourselves may be Mammon's slaves, we all live in the midst of Mammonism. In this world, present-day Christianity is like a tree brought from Asia which we try to acclimatize here, but every leaf makes plain its longing for its former Paradise" (pp. 57–63).

How did the Christian Naumann come to terms with this state of affairs? The answer must be made, alas: by his acquiescing in it. The Lutheran Protestantism, Naumann said elsewhere, "is the Protestantism of trust in God, trust in Him who appoints their track and course and way to clouds, light and winds". What is, is by the Providence of God. With the help of this incontestable charisma, which however, if it has no counterpart in the charisma of the prophetic calling, may lead to a quietism that paralyses every impulse to reformation, Naumann found a solution with which he fell back entirely on the old Lutheran distinction between Christian and worldly morality. And it was especially his idea of the State which drove him to this position.

The State, said Naumann, had its birthplace not in Nazareth but Rome. "The State is part of the struggle for existence, a suit of armour, which is a condition of civilization, for all its hardness" (p. 69). "Both are necessary to life, the mailed fist and the hand of Jesus . . . Caesar and Christ. . . . Only upon this foundation is the higher morality of the Gospel to be realized, in so far as it may be realized on such a foundation" (pp. 74–75). My conviction "sounds hard and cruel to everyone of Christian training, but it seems to me to be soundly Lutheran" (pp. 83–84). Naumann is right here. This Lutheran idea, however, has also permeated non-Lutheran lands: keep spiritual and worldly things rigidly apart! But Naumann goes a step further on the path of honesty than is customary with the dominant official ethic, and explains that this political morality is not semi-Christian,

or even relatively Christian, but wholly pagan. Pagan, but yet necessary and good. "The State is pagan, its demands are pagan, but not on that account immoral. . . . It is another ethic as inevitable as the Christian ethic is" (pp. 75–77). "Christianity must not attempt to mould the State, nor to dominate civilization. What Jesus required was, even then, a *supplement* (*Zusatz*) to the civilization of the time, and this supplement is what He requires in our day too" (p. 83). Thus the honest and earnest Naumann contrived to be, at one and the same time, Christian and *Flottenpatriot*, zealous of the naval supremacy of Germany. "The future of the German world in particular depends on the preservation of the military sense within the race" (pp. 80–87). Yet he would have nothing to do with the Prussian-Christian idea, which "would make the State with all its cannons into an element and auxiliary of the Kingdom of God. . . . Leave the name of Christ out of this; can you conduct foreign policy in the name of Christ, when its final resources are always bayonets and cannons? Shame on you even to think such a thing!"[1] "So men destroy what is tenderest and finest in the soul of Jesus", whose Kingdom is certainly not of this world (p. 69). We humans see the Almighty in two forms: as the God of the Universe, who creates the morality of the struggle for existence, and also as the Father of Jesus Christ, who wills the morality of mercy. "Here is but one God, not two. This dualism in our consciousness remains a riddle and a grief to the Christian" (pp. 71–74).

It is plain that Naumann is no superficial talker. He preserves the integrity of Christianity, and he knows both the depth and the discord of the Christian life. To my mind his error lies in his complete acquiescence in this discord, so that no conflict and no strain remains in the view that the "pagan" morality of a capitalist society and of a military State may be called "good", nay, even the indispensable "foundation of the Gospel".

Naumann could not realize his error. In his seventh edition, published in 1916, in the midst of the war, he still explains, in an addendum: "I have read over my statements, and hold them, almost without exception, to be true and confirmed by the war" (p. 112). Yet he is not wholly at ease. He recognizes

[1] Naumann at the assembly of the National Social Movement at Erfurt, 1896, quoted by Wendland: *Sozialethik*, p. 239.

that "the unfettered powers of destruction", which even in peace-time were at work in the whole of our modern social life, with a selfishness that was regarded as refined, forced the question to the lips, whether it is still possible to be a Christian, and whether "the corporate application of the Gospel to the present day is not to be regarded as a beautiful dream" (p. 106). He also sees with dismay that "the enormous extent of the slaughter in the European family of nations" far outstrips all memories of 1870, and that "our Christian nations of the West possess, and are daily perfecting, a terrible technique of human destruction" (pp. 112, 128). But he comforts himself, first, with the reflection that "the killing itself is not the goal, but only an unavoidable accompaniment of the last struggle for power, justice and coming day" (p. 128), and second, with the thought that "in every social and political conflict, and in the whole organization of the industrial nation, this faith remains as a supplement of undeniable worth, for it silently binds and tempers egoism in a thousand ways" (p. 106), a supplement which has not utterly lost the power of its healing ministry even in the war. "Do you not see", he asks, "how Jesus the supermundane, the Jesus of faith, stands by the lamp of the night-nurse?" (p. 129).

It seems to us that this consolation has little value. That the Great War would be the last men could believe during the war, but not afterwards. That the killing itself is not the goal, but only an "unavoidable accompaniment"—a view in which Naumann shows himself a good disciple of Schleiermacher[1]—can perhaps be believed when the war is considered as a whole, but not when one thinks of the battles. "Le but immédiat du combat", writes Lieutenant-Colonel Montaigne in his *Études sur la Guerre*,[2] "ce n'est pas la victoire, c'est tuer. Et l'on ne marche que pour tuer; et l'on ne tire que pour tuer; et l'on ne saute à la gorge

[1] See Chap. III, para. 4.

[2] Quoted by Armand Charpentier: *La Guerre et la Patrie*; Paris, 1926, p. 59. "The immediate purpose of the battle is not victory but killing. We are on the march simply to kill, we shoot simply to kill, and we spring at the throat of the enemy simply to kill. Also the true passion for war is supremely the passion for murder, the spirit of vengeance, of hate. . . . And all the acts of war must bear the character of violence, and of such slaughter as shall give the enemy the terrifying impression of a hate tirelessly directed on its object and insatiable."

de l'ennemi que pour tuer. Aussi, la passion de la guerre par excellence, c'est la passion meurtrière par excellence; l'esprit de vengeance, la haine. . . . Et tous les actes de la guerre doivent exhaler un caractère de violence, d'arcarnement tel, que s'impose à l'adversaire l'impression terrifiante d'une haine toujours attachée à son objet et insatiable."

And as regards this Christian supplement to a necessarily unchristian world, a supplement which, already small in peace-time, is confined in wartime to the service of the Red Cross, trying to heal on a small scale what is wantonly injured on a large one, Naumann could hardly have given a more striking example of the decadence, which had made itself master of Christianity, since the latter surrendered itself in chains to the State, to a belligerent State, and thus lost its dignity and independence. It often looks as if Christianity had transferred its feeling of dependence from God to the world, especially to the State—for in God's Providence was not the world conducted by His ordained government? So the feeling of "simple dependence" (Schleiermacher) is "simplicity" depraved! Hegel once observed, in refutation of Schleiermacher's theology, that if the feeling of dependence is the ground of the Christian faith, "so wäre der Hund der beste Christ".[1] I have never cared for this remark, but it will serve my purpose here. As a thrashed and exhausted dog will still thankfully receive the bone his master throws him, so Christianity, in the midst of the black darkness of a world that has abandoned Christ, must forsooth rejoice in the Red Cross night-light! That night-light, the last flicker of that light that was intended as the Light of the world! Naumann here shows, more plainly that he meant to, whither this "supplement" idea regarding Christianity leads. Let us not forget, however, that this conception is not the result only of an unbecoming humility (unbecoming, because it affects not our interests, but those of Christ), but also a cleavage of morality into personal and worldly, Christian and pagan, both "good" and complementary to one another. The war has shown us how much power is left to that Christian supplement! Even Naumann has not been able to feel at ease about this cleavage

[1] "A dog would be the finest Christian!" Hegels Werke, pub. Matheineke u. A., Berlin, 1835, Vol. 19 (*zu Hinrich's Religionsphilosophie*), p. 295.

since he came to see the consequences. At least so I understand the hope he expresses, that the younger generation, returned from the war, will take up the task more vigorously: the task of "saturating the whole social life with Christianity" (p. 107). So I understand his hope that a new realization of values will come to pass, one that is associated with religion: "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you" (p. 123). "We must rise above the Reformation", said Eucken as early as 1911, "because this, and especially the Lutheran conception, too much narrowed down spiritual activities to the inner life, and gave up the wicked world to its own course or to 'God's Providence'; we Christians of the new age must stand up with greater determination for the validity of the spirit in worldly affairs, for its full permeation of the world . . . for a more manly type of [Christian] life."[1]

8. *Christian Socialism*

"Above the Reformation", assuredly, inasmuch as we have such bitter need of a new Christian sociology. But the Calvinist Reformation certainly cannot be charged with "restricting its activities too much to the inner life". No wonder then, that after the hard lesson of the war it was precisely the "reformed" theology of the so-called "Swiss school" ("Theology of Crisis") which rose to light again, that school which accuses nineteenth-century theology of allowing the Christian faith to be so wrapped up in "religion", and of restricting "religion" to a mere province of the spiritual life. This charge was not confined to Lutheran lands, for the influence of German theology was great! This nineteenth-century theology, the main interests of which were psychological, confirmed the political and social *laissez-faire* of the Christianity of last century to a remarkable degree. The more religion restricted herself to the inner life the more civilization, left without helm and guiding hand, became materialist. According to Reformation convictions and especially Reformed (i.e. Calvinistic) convictions, Christianity is first and foremost not "religion" but faith, faith in God's Truth, and this embraces the whole of life and the whole world. It remains to be seen whether the Swiss theology will play its part *die arge böse*

[1] R. Eucken, *Können wir noch Christen sein?* Leipzig, 1911, p. 153.

Welt keck zu erfassen, or whether it will be hindered by its onesided, otherworldly character which, I think, is partly a result of the war. It is hoped that this school will take closely to heart the warning of Hermann Kutter[1] that the most profound theology is of little value apart from a "demonstration of the Spirit and of power" (1 Cor. ii. 4), a demonstration in social life as well. But it is by no mere coincidence that their leaders, Barth and Brunner, are close adherents to socialism, to the dismay of many Dutch Calvinists. Not for nothing have they lived in Switzerland, where the Christian socialism of Kutter and Ragaz, Lejeune and Matthieu for years has thundered with loud voice against that "official Christianity" which has lost all its reforming power, and which by its quietism in the face of the existing state of things, "willed by God", gave only too much cause for Marx's charge against religion, that it is "das Opium des Volks, der Heiligenschein des Jammerthals" ("The opium of the people, the hallowing of the vale of tears").

Not only in Switzerland, but also in Holland, Britain and America, and after the war in Germany as well, Christian socialism has arisen. When the strangulation of the Christian social idea in the grip of modern capitalism threatened, as Troeltsch says, the original Christian social elements in Calvinism reappeared, and "developed into Christian socialism". Troeltsch explains how "such a socialism was inspired through and through by the Genevan idea of the holy congregation. . . . It developed in the communities under the Cross, where the religious ideal was free to expand. . . . The present-day British Christian social movement is by nature of Calvinistic origin."[2]

We believe that other, especially humanistic, factors joined to produce this last-named movement.[3] But if we take "Calvinistic" broadly enough, Troeltsch is right in the main. Over against the Calvinism of the present day, which, at a standstill in regard to social questions, seeks stability in Lutheran quietism, and in the Lutheran distinction between worldly and spiritual concerns, Christian socialism can be regarded as a religion in

[1] Hermann Kutter: *Wo ist Gott?* Bâle, 1926.
[2] Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 721.
[3] See: *The Background of the Social Gospel in America,* by Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft; Haarlem, 1928. (The thesis for his Doctorate.)

the old Calvinistic succession, emphatically postulating the sovereignty of God over every area of life, and the equality of man in the sight of God, yet (i) discarding the doctrine of "election", (ii) as regards moral and social life, drawing more advanced conclusions than did Calvin from the spiritual equality of man, and (iii) seeking to supplant the Old Testament foundation of Calvin's social and political ethic with one derived from the Gospel, especially from the Sermon on the Mount and from the expectancy of the coming Kingdom of God. These features, however, are from of old the characteristics of the Christian sects which, together with the Church and the individual mystic, formed, as Troeltsch says, the heirs of the New Testament: together they make up the history of Christianity. But it was precisely Calvinism, at its zenith, which, on account of its strictness and its ideal of holiness, most nearly approximated to the type of the sects. Just as in sixteenth-century Holland Calvinism gained many recruits from the sect of the Anabaptists, so nowadays, we can say, the Christian socialist movement has arisen out of those religious circles where the rigorous reforming spirit of the old Calvinists is yet coursing in the blood, though many of their ideas have been changed. For it is obvious that Christian socialism would not have arisen, but for Socialism itself, but for the social-democratic ideal.

We shall not give here a sketch of this social democracy, which has assumed quite a different spiritual form in Britain from that in Germany. Neither do we pass judgment here on its function and position in the world. We will only point with approval to the religious meaning which Troeltsch detects in this movement, even in Marxian Germany, Troeltsch, himself was not a Socialist, having both ethical and sociological reasons for not being so. It was social democracy, he writes, which opened the eyes of the Christians who became Christian socialists, to the implications of the Gospel. Troeltsch sees Socialism as the continuance of the old aggressive sect, in the only form possible to-day, i.e. economically and politically enlightened. For thus alone is it possible to affect the fabric of this world. Socialism has recognized what even the most advanced Calvinism had not seen: "how much the possibility of spiritual and moral progress demands a sound social structure as its basis, how closely the

spiritual is bound up with physical and material conditions". Thus Socialism has begun the battle against "the gospel of unlimited competition and of the right of the strongest", and thus it exhibits, though in altered guise, "the features of that aggressive sect with its belief in practical world-reformation. Uncompromising Christianity, realization of God's kingdom here and now, unconquerable faith in the victory of goodness, expectancy of wide-spread conversion. It is the grand old sect-ideal, it is just the chiliastic faith, translated into comprehensible human terms." In these words we catch something of Troeltsch's criticism of Christian socialism but, criticism apart, he continues —and I cannot refrain from quoting further and at some length from this great and far-sighted writer: "Especially, this Christian socialism has rent to shreds the old social theories which had been handed down since the days of the Church Fathers, theories which with slight alterations have dominated all denominations down to the present day, and which have been reiterated almost continuously to this present day, with touching detachment from the world, and with complete disregard for the wholly altered circumstances in the time that has elapsed. It has compelled Christians to reconsider the social ethic of Christianity, and its relation to the actual changes of society. Christian socialism has revealed the worm-eaten condition of the conventional Christian morality dominant till now, which, at its best, has offered something by way of a personal and family morality, but has nothing else to teach in the way of social morality but contentment with all existing institutions and relationships, very much to the satisfaction of the ruling powers. Christian socialism has recaptured for Christian morality its old utopian and revolutionary character, and has again laid upon its preachers the contumely of Christ, bestowed by priests and rulers upon every humanitarian fanaticism, all theorizing and idealistic dreaming, each unseemly failure to realize the unconquerable power of sin and the stern necessity for means to suppress it."[1]

If we thus regard Socialism as the foundation of economic ethic upon which Christian socialism raises its ethical and spiritual structure, we can understand how it is that in various small

[1] op. cit., pp. 845–846.

countries (Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Norway) the social-democratic party was the first to include disarmament in its programme. The man who ascribes this simply to crafty revolutionary tactics, to opportunism, or to the influence of an irresponsible demagogy, does not understand the situation, and his efforts against it are in vain. But it is very certain that the *religious* socialists are the leading opponents of war and preparations for war, on ethical grounds. The Swiss Christian socialists have done this most impressively and systematically, especially Ragaz and his followers in their paper, *Neue Wege*. Dr. J. C. Wissing has described this Christian socialism for us,[1] mainly by drawing on the annual volumes of this paper, and we make willing reference to his account. Wissing's *description* of this Christian socialism is fuller and more accurate than his *evaluation* of it. Just as he incorrectly believes the attitude of primitive Christianity to be rendered obsolete by altered views of the future and altered estimation of the State,[2] so he also does scant justice to the views of Ragaz and his followers. From the Christian standpoint there is much more to be said for this view than Wissing's conclusion allows, especially when we bear in mind what this chapter tries to show, how the alliance between Christianity and the State did much injury and violence to Christian principle, how every Christian theory of the State down to the present time has failed to protect Christian truth, and how this failure, plainer to-day than ever, has left imperialism and militarism a perfectly free hand, nay, has even provided "Christian" haloes for them to wear. Whoever perceives how the State has dominated the Church, especially in the last century, so that in the Great War the Church was rather an ally than an opposing factor, and with her religious inspiration of nationalism, with her upholding of the military code, with her blessing of weapons and her prayers for victory, actually became deeply involved in that infinite slaughter of men, all of which Ragaz had foreseen: whoever, I say, perceives these things feels that the neglected warning of the Gospel, "no one

[1] See his treatise already alluded to: *Het begrip van het Koninkrijk Gods, vooral met betrekking tot de religieus-socialisten in Zwitserland*, pp. 135–178.
[2] We have seen that the primary motive of the early Christians was not affected by these things. See Chap. I, D.

can serve two masters", and the neglected warning of the earliest Church Fathers, that one cannot fight at the same time in the army of the Lord and in the army of Caesar, have taken heavy vengeance for their neglect. Whatever conclusion one forms about the necessity for this neglect, from the point of view of a Christian living by the Gospel and conversant with primitive Christianity, one can understand how Ragaz and his followers come to regard war as the fruit of anti-Christian faith; faith in violence, faith in Caesar not in Christ, and how therefore they come to be radically anti-militarists: "Gegen alle Heere des Tieres setzen sie das Lamm, das erschlagen worden ist"[1] ("Against all the armies of the beast they set the Lamb, that hath been slain").

From this standpoint they judge the State. Although they approve of law with its constraints as a temporary educative expedient, they oppose the idea of the State as an institution of brute-force. The State, which must maintain law, tends to the abnegation of all law, i.e. to the "law" of war. Because the State, by its very nature, seeks to maintain itself in all circumstances, at all costs, against any claim from elsewhere, it has in it the irresistible tendency to make itself absolute, and can therefore recognize no moral law above itself. This *Eigengesetzlichkeit* (absolutism) makes "Christian politics" a contradiction in terms, an illusion or self-deception. The State is of pagan origin. It is the morally relative which tries to overcome with violence the absolute, which is the Realm of God. Therefore the Christian must concern himself with politics with a view to abolishing, some day, all politics. For the State is something which must be overcome.[2]

Inasmuch as this view of the Swiss Christian socialists, which is shared by many in Holland, includes a hope of the future based on religious faith, we can share it, provided that we, like Dr. Wissing, expect that future on a plane transcending the temporal, a plane towards which our *present* social life, as far as possible, must tend. But in so far as it includes a judgment that it were better that the State should disappear, straightway, it confronts us with a dilemma; some form of belief in the State or Christian anarchism. Though it is difficult for a Christian to go on believing in the State, when history shows him the close connection between

[1] Wissing, pp. 159–161. [2] ibid., pp. 161–166.

State and war, and although it is a serious question whether he might go on believing in the State if it could be proved to him that the State ethic and the war ethic are permanently inseparable, so long as this last has not yet been proved—thank God it has not happened yet—it is impossible for us to choose Christian anarchism. Our belief in man, in his ability now or later to lead an orderly social life without coercive justice, is too slight for this, our impression of the powers of selfishness and of short-sightedness is too strong for it. We choose the State and constitutional authority, but now we have the duty to make searching inquiry into the nature of the State in relation to the nature of war.

For although we believe in the State we are not therefore ready to tolerate any sort of State. Although we see in the just State a necessary mean between the demands of the Christian ethic and the demands of hard actuality, we have seen and shall see again, that we are forbidden to tolerate the warring State, and therefore war, by fundamental Christian principle.

CHAPTER III

STATE AND WAR

1. *The Nature of the State: Might or Right?*

FROM the first, the State has played its part in the history of mankind under two aspects, might and right.

As soon as a group-forming social life came into being, the need arose not only to order the social life, but also to maintain this order and protect the group against assault. From this protective function and by expansion the State originated, as a "power"; States are indebted to warfare, if not for their origin, at least for their might. Hence the man of might, the war-lord, was originally not only king, but also supreme judge. He was "the Government", and his will was law. So it remained for centuries, until in more recent times the peoples' growing self-consciousness no longer tolerated the autocratic sovereign, and the modern State arose, in which the people took the lead, by political organization, and appointed a responsible Government; at first in name and afterwards in deed, the State or constitution became the sovereign authority, having the exercise of might.

But the growth of national consciousness had also strengthened the peoples' sense of justice, and so jurisprudence was both extended and defined, while justice, backed by might, became a spiritual force in the State. Owing to the influence of Christianity and to the value it gave personality, this spiritual force received richer and deeper significance.

From then onwards the State has shown itself in its dual aspect, might and right, more clearly than before. The relationship of these two constitutes the great political and legal problem of modern days. As organized might, the State had essentially a natural and historic character; as organized law, although growing with history, it has primarily an ethical basis; from this, the concept of justice, it derives its moral significance. This original dual nature of the State for a long time produced little conflict, for might had the unrestricted lead, but nowadays it reveals its duality more plainly, and the clash is sometimes painfully perceptible.

There is a theory of the State, the one indeed which is still

dominant, that does not recognize this potential conflict, and cannot see any clash between might and right, since it identifies right with the will of the State. And, of course, so long as by "justice" only empirical justice is meant, i.e. the justice of the statute-book, those who see no conflict are correct; justice is what the State demands, and what the State demands is just.

But besides this narrowly legalistic conception, justice has another meaning, viz. the temporary and local deposit of what is just. "Justice" is thus a human attempt to get to grips with what is just (i.e. the ideal), for a given time, taking historical and social data into account; to give expression to that and to establish it. There are those who grant this, but think that a guarantee of the success of the endeavour is to be found in the nature of the State. Thus Professor de Louter, among others, has written: "It [the State] alone is competent and qualified to voice the will of justice . . . when that is denied and this competence attributed to conscience . . . the door is opened to a greater arbitrariness and error than is to be feared from any state authority."[1]

This utterance of the same writer who just before had written, "There is certainly a justice exalted far above established justice . . ." [2] seems to me to be prompted less by reason or reality than by fear of individual judgments of the State's authority. "What it [the State] requires or forbids must be, regardless of the individual judgments of its subjects."[3] This sounds remarkably like that political absolutism which Professor de Louter elsewhere repudiates,[4] of which we shall have more to say anon. Legal justice is only a human and therefore fallible attempt to realize what is just. It is a mean between eternal and temporal, between the ideal and the actual. Necessarily, "justice" and the truly just approach each other, but under pressure of necessity they diverge again. So there is often a conflict between the two, of greater or less intensity, sometimes scarcely perceptible, sometimes extending to the *summum jus, summa injuria*: that extremity of "justice" which may prove the cruellest injustice.

[1] J. de Louter: *De Toekomst van het Volkenrecht*; De Gids, February 1912, p. 244. [2] ibid.
[3] de Louter: *Staat en Maatschappij*; Utrecht, 1899, p. 27.
[4] ibid., pp. 15, 33, 3 .

It is the *moral* judgment that perceives this, and the moral judgment is essentially personal, even though collective judgment may spring from it. However much the individual judgment may err, however much it needs the consideration, checking and correction of other judgments, if only because it is often quite uninformed, it alone has knowledge of the unwritten, eternal laws which make up righteousness. "The eternal is in God and the human soul alone, all else is transitory" (Max Huber). This individual judgment ought to be amenable to reason and advice, but it cannot renounce its competence to judge even the law and the conduct of the State, and in future will be less and less able to renounce it. As to the belief that the State can do no wrong and therefore cannot be called to account by its citizens, a belief defended by Spinoza, Professor Kranenburg remarks: "In this regard the course of legal development has itself thoroughly discredited the philosopher."[1] The moral credit and authority of established justice depend ultimately upon that same individual judgment. The conscience of a nation, likewise based on this judgment, cannot and may not renounce its competence to assess the "intrinsic worth of law".

This last expression is by Professor Krabbe.[2] Krabbe has been for many years the noble and enthusiastic advocate, in Holland, of the theory that the State is simply an instrument of justice, existing for the sake of justice, and that justice has its own intrinsic authority and worth. He has vigorously argued against the idea which is the prevailing one, especially in Germany, viz. that the State creates the authority of law. No, says Krabbe, quite the contrary. The authority of the State depends on the authority of justice, the ruler is not above law but under it; law derives its essential authority not from the will of the State but from true justice. Krabbe teaches that "apart from justice, no one, be he crowned, robed or armour-clad, can rule, or has any right to rule".[3] And this justice, from its very beginning, derives its only authority from conscience, which is moral by nature and the source of all standards of justice.[4] The description

[1] R. Kranenburg: *Positief Recht en Rechtbewustzijn*, 2nd ed., 1928, p. 22.
[2] Title of his rectorial oration; The Hague, 1924.
[3] H. Krabbe: *De moderne Staatsidee*; The Hague, 1915, p. 147.
[4] H. Krabbe: *Het Rechtsgezag*: The Hague, 1917, pp. 1–7 ff.

of the State "as a phenomenon of power" Krabbe will only admit "on the one condition, that it is clearly recognized that might reveals itself in right".[1] In these days, justice demands authority and sovereignty, more vigorously than ever. "Hitherto political science has taken no note of this,"[2] at least not in full measure, but it will surely be compelled to do so. For "everywhere, in every region of the social life, the new ruler, justice, presses to the fore, with the conviction that to it some time will fall the lot of holding full and sovereign sway over the whole earth, and the hopes of the best of our human race in all ages have gone out thereto".[3] This, in Krabbe's view, is "the modern theory of the State", coming to light out of the actual experience of national life, and "conquering the difficulties of political doctrine".[4]

We fully share Krabbe's conviction that the State only has a future in so far as it develops more and more as an expression of justice. Only we think the difficulties to be overcome are greater than Krabbe realizes. For when once conscience, issuing from the moral judgment, and therefore in living contact with it, has become competent to judge and direct the conduct of the State, it will go hard with the bully State, and as yet we have seen no State which has maintained itself as anything but organized might.

But how, we shall be asked, shall the State maintain itself as a legal institution without coercive power? How shall the State exist as right, unless it is also might? Justice requires might behind it for its fulfilment. Certainly, we reply, coercive power is indispensable. Though there is some disharmony between justice as a spiritual principle and coercion as unspiritual means, we must put up with this disharmony, for in this sinful and shortsighted world only the strong arm can maintain justice. Here on earth no right can exist without might. But in speaking of the State as organized might—and this point needs greater emphasis—we understand in the first place the State which holds and exercises power for its own ends, because might alone enables it to maintain its existence, position and possessions in this world, and eventually to expand. In theory it may be

[1] *De moderne Staatsidee*, p. 169.
[2] ibid., p. 9.
[3] ibid., p. 10.
[4] ibid., p. 2.

asserted that even the exercise of power abroad is for the maintenance of justice (Why should men be allowed to protect their rights at home and not abroad?), but, while international judges and laws are still so few, this maintenance of justice consists in practice of selfish judgments, i.e. the assertion of one's own claims.

True, it is said, but these claims are the conditions of existence for the country and people, and therefore it is morally just and a moral duty to assert them. Here we come to the special reason for the identification of might and right in the minds of many people when thinking politically. People and country possess the highest justice for that people and for that country; the power of the State serves to protect that justice. But granted that the State is "healthy", that is, the organization of a single complete, national life; granted, also, that nothing beyond its preservation and the protection of the homeland is intended, is the moral justification of the State's use of force thereby proved, so that the State in maintaining itself by force may without hesitation call itself a just State? That remains to be seen, but people generally forget to ask what ethical value is to be attached to the word "country".

It goes without saying that in normal circumstances every natural man is attached to his native land. But has this attachment any spiritual value? That again depends on what men see in their native land, and *why* they are attached to it. The meaning of country, and of patriotism, was generally regarded very highly by the Christians of last century. In many, especially orthodox Protestant, circles, patriotism was on the list of Christian duties, and came to be thrust nearer and nearer the head of that list, with the encouragement, easily to be understood, of the governing classes. But the patriotic feeling was not clearly analysed, nor its place among Christian values defined. It cannot be called analysis when Wendland roundly declares[1] that patriotism contains three moments: love of the homeland, love of the inherited nationality, and a strong political sense; and then allows that all three, home, nationality, State, are without qualification conceptions of high ethical worth. We have already seen and shall see again how difficult it is to define the ethical value of

[1] J. Wendland: *Handbuch der Sozialethik*; Tübingen, 1916, pp. 217 ff.

the State from the Christian standpoint. For my part, I do not believe that much political sense is to be found in the patriotism of the mass of men. For the majority "the State" is too abstract an idea. "Home" has a natural worth of its own, and its moral value is determined by the ethical depth of the feelings directed towards it. "Nationality", too, is a conception which contains elements very diverse from the ethical point of view. Overestimation of one's own nationality, from which all people suffer more or less, is defended by Wendland, with Treitschke's expression: "Without overestimation, the nation as a whole does not attain self-consciousness", and this is to be avoided, because —says Treitschke—every nation possesses some ray of divine light.[1] Inasmuch as there is some particular human quality of good in each nation, this last statement can be accepted, without, however, assuming that the value of nationality is thereby proved. For besides this particular quality of good there is always some feature not so good, as, for instance, in the average Dutchman a certain dullness, in the German a certain coarseness, in the Russian a certain cruelty, etc. Beside these special features, there are others more general, some good, some bad, unequally distributed. And the character of a nation is the resultant of all these forces. Moreover, love of one's nation is directed towards the higher element in it only by the greater minds; as far as the majority is concerned it is blindly egotist, as when a man gives preference to his own family.

Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye would disown his analysing faculty if he could not dissect more finely than Wendland! "Patriotism", he says cautiously, "is a complex sentiment. It consists of attachment to the country, to the country's character and to one's immediate surroundings; of holding fast the living tradition, with honour and thankful remembrance for the past; finally, in conjunction with these two factors, of the feeling of national vocation."[2] De la Saussaye overlooks the influence of local pride. Think of the excitement of the townsfolk when the home team wins, at football, and of the delirium of the supporters when Holland beats Belgium. This characteristic of patriotism Renan saw clearly when he wrote: "Patriotism is for nations

[1] Wendland, op. cit., p. 224.

[2] *Het christelijk leven*, II; 3rd ed., Haarlem, 1923, pp. 153–154.

what vanity is for individuals, namely, perfect self-complacency."[1] The truth, no doubt, lies in the mean between De la Saussaye's theory and that of Renan. Just because love of country and people is innate in everyone, a native instinct, one must be careful how one values it ethically, and how one exalts it; not everything that comes from the depths is of high worth. Much of what men call love of country, or patriotism, is simply its debased form, nationalism. And anyone who bases his action on that, as we know too well, plays with fire. Only noble and broadminded men are patriotic in a broadminded and noble sense. Yet these are not the ones to shout "Hurrah" and wave the flag at every pretext.

To resume the thread of our argument. When "country" is an entity of worth, its value, ethically speaking, is very varied and always relative, so that in no sense may it be exalted, as the highest good, to the summit of all moral values, as many people unsuspectingly would do with it. But in that case the moral sense has competence to judge over the legitimacy or otherwise of "the country's" exercise of power, especially in regard to war. Especially in regard to war, for here not only is its justification from the moral standpoint often a matter for grave doubt, but also, the means of maintaining the fancied right are so wholly different from the means which the State normally employs to maintain justice, that the question certainly arises, whether the State at war *is* acting as an instrument of justice, whether the belligerent State, and in peace-time the State prepared for war, can be called a *just State*.

This question, with which Krabbe does not fully deal, is all the more urgent, in that war and preparation for war lay "duties" on the citizens which are certainly sanctioned by the authority of the State (i.e. the authority that the State assumes to itself), though it becomes a matter of ever graver doubt whether these can be sanctioned by the authority of justice, i.e. by the authority of the moral consciousness.

Certainly, the State can make legal regulations for this extension of power, and thus devise for itself and its citizens a law of war in all its branches, but here the State in all its

[1] Quoted by Friedrich Curtius in his *Hindernisse und Möglichkeit einer ethischen Politik*; Leipzig, 1918, p. 102.

glory is independently at work creating "justice", consulting the moral sense only when this seems to itself necessary or desirable, e.g. for the distribution of "war duties". Here "justice" borrows its authority from the State, not vice versa. And whence does the State derive it? From that same sphere wherein a man says, "I live, therefore I have the right to live". But everyone will feel that this is not a moral right, indeed not a *right* at all, but only a natural impulse biologically stated. Men may point to the national interests served by the power of the State, they may try to clothe this display of force as much as possible in forms ethically sanctioned, and so give force an ethical appearance, but force itself and its exercise for the sake of its own existence, whether that be the existence of an individual or of a nation, these are not moral but natural. This conclusion cannot be evaded by talking about the value of a nation's culture thereby protected. For apart from whether a people can evaluate its own culture, whether this would be lost were the independent national life surrendered and whether it is really protected and served by war (of which more later), not a single nation maintains itself *for the sake of* its culture. This is justification after the event; every nation that wages war does so for its own existence. The legal authority by which a state applies force abroad, and at home calls up its citizens therefor, is not based on justice in the moral sense, is not, indeed, what Krabbe understood by the authority of justice. It is an authority that stands and falls with power and with it shares one province: the province of physical nature. When one "employs a conception of the State which postulates the existence of a natural fountain of authority", says Krabbe, "one is working with a fiction".[1] True, but this fiction is vigorously maintained in wartime, and in peace-time too, with a view to war.

It is vigorously maintained, for the State is fighting for its life as an absolute power. Wherefore it employs every means to keep justice subservient to itself, so that its own will shall be accepted as right. In this endeavour it receives help from the past and especially from the old conception of the "authority of government", a conception which many still maintain, not least of all with an eye to the obedience of citizens

[1] *Staat en recht, afscheidscollege*; De Gids, June, 1927.

in wartime. Conscience, it is said, is too prone to error, too much obscured by sin, for men to find a sure guide therein. Better listen to the wisdom of the ages which is protected and preserved by a Government providentially raised to the head of the State. This irrational Government authority of non-moral origin, refusing to yield itself up to the moral consciousness, seems to be indispensable to the maintenance of power abroad, and at home to that which its maintenance abroad demands. This cannot be dictated by any moral sense! For this an authority is required not based on moral sense but on history, on tradition. It is a hard task, however, to prove that the Government, in consolidating its power abroad and preserving the national existence by every means within its power, is as much a servant of justice (which tries to render everyone his due) as in its jurisdiction over its own citizens. For are not the undeniable conditions for justice, impartiality and moral sifting of the means, lacking here?

That mere maintenance of power owes nothing to ethics is indirectly proved by history. None of the world's activities is so closely bound up with violence, cunning and injustice as this. Anyone who considers this activity finds himself thinking of wars, colonization by violence, and the old diplomacy.[1] It is no accident—history proves this conclusively—that almost every state has a beast of prey on its coat of arms. That this exercise of might abroad does not aim at right is clear too from the fact that no nation has ever taken up the rights or liberty of another nation save in appearance; Finland and the Transvaal can testify to that. These rights are only championed if one's own vital interests are at stake. For which reason England but not Holland came to the help of invaded Belgium. "One can only fight", says Wendland, "for the vital concerns of one's own nation. Bismarck was wholly right when he said that the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier were far too precious for him to hazard them for the remote goal of a Balkan policy. It would be a crime for a state thus to shed the blood of its subjects in order to champion the freedom of a foreign race."[2] With its

[1] For the cloud of falsity which usually surrounds diplomacy, see J. J. Bolhuis: *Geheime Diplomatie*; Amsterdam, 1922. That this cloud is not yet dispersed is made evident over and over again.

[2] Wendland, op. cit., p. 247.

"right" to self-preservation, as we have said, the State moves in the sphere for the natural, not in the region of moral consciousness.

Whether the authority of Government in its ancient and obsolete form, viz. in its self-exaltation above the authority of justice, will enduringly suffice to sustain the authority of the absolute State, is much to be doubted. The fact that the authority of the Government instantly slumps, for many who are the strongest upholders of it, as soon as the Government changes its political colour, gives one furiously to think. That authority, which we too uphold, will eventually be able to find no other firm foundation than in the conscience of the people, especially in the conscience of that part of the nation which earnestly listens to God's voice and will. This conscience may not always be a crystal-clear judgment, reflection and examination being necessary, but it is and will remain the only spring which is directly connected with the living will of God. For out of the individual conscience the conscience of the race is formed.

But just because of this the questions which form the subject-matter of this chapter thrust themselves upon us. With the growth of the moral sense, will the State as might be able to continue in opposition to the State as right? (The latter, be it remembered, presupposes force, though only for the maintenance of real justice.) And if not, will war, an expression of the State organized as might, be tolerated any longer, in the State where justice has been victorious, the State grounded in the moral sense?

Before we fully answer these questions, and in order that we may answer them the better, we shall first survey history and listen to the political philosophers whose hypotheses and researches regarding the nature of the State have most created, defined or influenced the political views that prevail among us.

2. *Political Expediency. Machiavelli*

It seems impossible to conform the historic nature of the State wholly to an ethical standard, or even to approximate thereto. I have never seen this historic nature so clearly and impressively set forth as in the work of the Berlin historian,

Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsräson*.[1] By "Staatsräson" Meinecke understands "the principle of political action, the law of a state's development", and his views can be summarized thus: Might belongs to the very being of the State, might to give effect to right and to maintain its own existence. In itself, might is morally neutral, neither good nor bad. It derives its ethical significance from the goal to which it is directed and from the means thereto which it employs. But whoever has power at his command is continually tempted to misuse it. For "this striving after power is an instinct of primordial man, nay even of the animal, an instinct which gropes blindly round until it meets insuperable barriers". And so the State has a dualistic nature and lives like an amphibian in two spheres, one moral, one natural, utilitarian; thus "political expediency is a principle of conduct, of thoroughly dual, even divided, character". In the home affairs of the State, morals, right and might are able to work harmoniously together; not so in its relations with other states.[2] From "political necessity", i.e. in its own self-interests, the State is often obliged to violate moral sentiments. "It belongs to the very nature and spirit of political expediency, that it always must defile itself repeatedly by affronting ethics and justice, especially by the seemingly indispensable means of war, which, in spite of all the legal forms in which men may clothe it, still shows lower nature shattering the standards of civilization. . . . It seems as if the State must sin. . . . The blunting effect of custom, and the more or less defined sentiment that one is standing, maybe, before limits of humanity which may not be transgressed, make this condition of things tolerable for the majority of men." And "a deep pessimistic conviction of the incorrigible nature of the State, reaching far down into the instinctive life, and confirmed by the experience of history, makes reformation, so it seems, impossible".[3]

It is not to be wondered at that the human spirit has been

[1] F. Meinecke: *Die Idee der Staatsräson*; 2nd ed., Munich, 1925. ["Staatsräson" is here rendered "political expediency", but throughout, that phrase should be read with Meinecke's definition in mind.—TRANSLATOR.]

[2] Meinecke here forgets the measures which a state must take at home with a view to policy abroad.

[3] Meinecke, pp. 1–27.

unable to rest in this dualism, and has sought for solutions wherewith it could be at peace. In his comprehensive work, Meinecke appoints himself the task of setting forth and criticizing the solution of those thinkers who have exercised any great influence. Anyone who wants to understand the conflict between Christianity and the State, which has become so acute to-day, should read this book. Here I venture to give a brief survey of some of the leading characters in this spiritual conflict, and of their theories, for the first part drawing upon Meinecke's well-documented work.

Really clear awareness of the conflict only begins after *Machiavelli* (beginning of sixteenth century), who with his famous book, *Il Principe* (*The Prince*), destroys the medieval illusion that Christianity and the State should form one harmonious whole, a *corpus christianum*. In Machiavelli, writes Meinecke, there rose up again the old-time pagan, who had never really died in Italy,[1] and who, thinking in purely this-worldly and naturalistic terms, again saw man, as Aristotle had, as the *zoön politikon*, a mere means to the State. The Christian ethic, Catholic as well as Lutheran and Calvinist (which last two had grown up alongside Machiavelli's doctrine, and so could make little resistance to it), had, as we have seen, achieved a compromise with worldly politics, a compromise based on the belief that all politics ought to serve the glory of God and the coming of His Kingdom. For, as Augustine had put it, "Banish justice, and what are kingdoms but great robber-bands?"[2] In medieval theory the State was not reckoned as sovereign, but in practice it became so very largely, without much heed being paid to the doctrine of the *corpus christianum*. Machiavelli reduced this practice to theory and system. And realizing that Christian beliefs stood in the way of this theory, he opposed them.

Christianity, he taught, made men submissive, unmanly and weak.[3] In its place he put an ethic wholly in sympathy with the ethic of the State, which he wished to strengthen and glorify at any cost, and into whose service even religion had to enter. "Religion, law, army," these are the three great pillars of the

[1] Not even yet: Mussolini!

[2] "Remota justitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia," *de civitate Dei*, IV, 4.

[3] *On Livius*, II, 2. Meinecke, p. 39.

State: such was his Roman teaching; the truest virtue is that consecrated courage which is convinced that the individual is nothing, the State everything. The prince ought in the first place to possess this virtue, but should also realize that "necessity"—i.e. the need which a state sometimes has of pursuing its own ends without hesitation or any scruple—necessity may require him to override all moral considerations undismayed, and with eyes wide open to go clean against prevailing ethical conceptions, and to do the so-called immoral deed. The State is the highest good, and therefore possesses the highest justice. Consequently, a prince, whose duty is to be honourable and true so long as he may, must also learn to be *not* "good", if need be, and must understand the art of using the beast in man, as well as man himself, to best advantage.[1]

This systematic teaching came at a time when the moral and religious unity of the medieval Christian ideal lay shattered, and Christianity was therefore not in a position to set up any strong and well-built system over against it. True, the Reformers opposed it, and in 1552 Rome put Machiavelli's writings on the Index, but time subsequently proved that the Christian Church had got too much entangled with the State, and Machiavelli's teaching was too closely modelled on the actuality and practice of the State to be refuted by Christian theory. Machiavelli revealed the unchristian character of prevailing statecraft, but he also exalted this unchristian statecraft into a theory of political necessity, even of political virtue, into a widely influential theory, which infected even those who opposed it! This theory forthwith established itself in the midst of Christian thought, and urgently demanded union with it; a demand to which the latter had to give audience, often reluctantly. As Meinecke put it, "the devil thrust himself into the realm of God".[2]

This conclusion agrees with that of F. W. Foerster. "In the first centuries of Christendom, no one thought of rigorously separating politics and Christianity . . . no one then would have dared to postulate might as the aim of political activities. . . . The veneration of the Christian Church for the supreme, overwhelming dignity of moral truth weakened, after the Renaissance [Machiavelli], more and more generally. . . . Consequently, in

[1] Meinecke, p. 48, 52. [2] op. cit., p. 49.

many minds to-day, political ends have won a thoroughly pagan supremacy over moral ends."[1] It also agrees with the view which Friedrich Curtius expressed in the middle of the war: "However great might be the distance between the medieval ideal of a condition of peace ensured by 'the two swords'—the power of the Church above worldly might—and war-filled actuality, in the very existence of that ideal lay the possibility of belief in a divine world-order. . . . Since the suppression of this ideal, the political world seems to have been deserted by God. And so ancient pagan philosophy reassumes its sway."[2]

Meinecke's book goes on to describe in bold phrases the conflict between Machiavellianism and anti-Machiavellianism from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, and shows how the former again and again had the upper hand, in various ways. Humanistic jurists like Grotius for the most part overlooked it, because in their optimism they depicted the State rather as it ought to be and must become, than as it was. "Grotius", writes Meinecke, "constructed his system of international law as if there were no such thing as political expediency, and he held firmly to the old illusion that it would always be possible to distinguish between the righteous war and that which was unrighteous and illicit."[3]

In the eighteenth century, *Frederick the Great* discovered the dualism of ethics and political opportunism, to his cost. Philosophically inclined, child of the "Enlightenment", wishing, as first servant of the State, to further the welfare of its citizens, giving great impetus to concerns of the State which Machiavelli had hardly known: justice and culture; he was nevertheless again and again compelled by "political necessity" to follow in the wake of a man he hated: Machiavelli. He justified his unexpected acts of violence, and even the breaking of his word, with the plea that force was necessary to ensure the welfare of his nation, for the sake of which the might of the State must needs grow. That the well-being of the nation was injured by immoral acts abroad, he realized less readily, because,

[1] F. W. Foerster: *Politische Ethik und politische Pädagogik*; Munich, 3rd ed. 1918, p. 173.

[2] F. Curtius: "Christliche Politik"; *Intern. Rundschau*, 1915, quoted by Foerster, p. 173.

[3] op. cit., pp. 261–262.

in common with his age, he saw that well-being to consist primarily in cultural development and the prosperity of his subjects. So Frederick the Great reached what was for him a satisfying synthesis of morality and might, in which might had primacy. When this might was at stake, all ethical considerations were suspended. The barbarous way, for instance, in which he formed his army and prepared for war is notorious. "He never allowed the light of his humanity to shine on to this dark background of national might." By seeking power before all else, Frederick the Great also made way for the transition from people (population) to nation and national State. This was a transition of ill omen, to which Meinecke pays insufficient attention. The love of power-seeking statesmen was transferred from the people as living entities to the abstract unity, the nation, the State, which latter was more and more thrust into prominence as a sort of abstract personality on whose honour and greatness depended everything. Here Frederick the Great prepared the way for Bismarck, of whom one of his admirers reports that he loved not the German people, i.e. not the individuals, but the German Reich, the German State. It is notorious how fiery nationalists will speak scornfully of "the people", or even more contemptuously of "Demos".

Not only herein, however, but with his whole political theory, in which morality and might concluded an alliance under the hegemony of might, Frederick the Great prepared the way for the nineteenth century. But this century was not to be entered upon before the French Revolution had supplanted the mercenary army with a great people's army, which the nineteenth-century technique of capitalism was to endow with unheard of powers. But the chief point for us is that Frederick the Great created a tradition, whereby Christian ethics, which had become more and more closely allied with humanitarianism, found scope *within* Machiavelli's framework, a framework which expanded or contracted as the need for exercising power and national policy demanded.

3. *Hegel and the Sovereign State*

At the beginning of the nineteenth century stands the great thinker, *Hegel*, whose philosophy has dominated modern political

thought down to our own day. It was not given to Frederick the Great to build a bridge between the polity of power and ethics. He remained tied to dualism, knowing only how to content himself for the time being with the thought of the beneficial influence which the power of the State is able to exercise over the people's welfare. But the happiness of the many, supposing this to be attained, gives no greater *moral* sanction than the happiness of the few. German Idealism, that great spiritual movement which followed the "Enlightenment", refused to come to terms with such utilitarianism. The conflict between might and the moral idea, being insoluble, should have compelled this idealist movement to repudiate force. But impotent and shattered Germany, the object rather than the subject of world-politics, longed for might. Hegel himself, says Meinecke, shared the longing, and with his vast intellect created the philosophy of might—political might. His monistic principle, which proclaimed the unity, or rather, the identity, of thought and existence, of reason and reality, formed the basis. "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig."[1] Every actuality has its place in Reason, contradictions are only stages, whereby the dialectic of the Spirit presses forward to attain its goal. Even evil, as it were by "a ruse of Reason", is employed as means to this end, and is thus not absolutely ill.

As a conservative thinker and a trusty servant of existing Governments, who gave philosophers the opportunity to develop, and paid them salaries, yet who were "often poorly enough rewarded for their trust", Hegel opposed all innovators in the sphere of politics and all amateur state-building. True philosophy, he said, repudiates such things, and "binds itself in closer alliance with actuality". It must teach us to reconcile ourselves to the actual by understanding it. Philosophy has to investigate the rational (which is identical with the ideal). This rational is the inner reality, but becomes visible in the actual world of things. So the conclusion that "what is rational is real and what is real is rational"[1] may be applied both to inward and to external reality. Political science must thus "be nothing else than the attempt to understand and interpret the State as an entity real

[1] This famous expression appears in special type in Hegel's preface to his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821).

in itself". To teach the State not what it ought to *be* but how it must become recognized as the ethical "universum".[1]

For Hegel, the very heart of visible reality, and thus that which is most intimately bound to ideal reality, is the State. Not the human personality but the State is most deeply rooted in the metaphysical substratum of all things. He inherited the ancient Greek reverence for the State as the highest end on earth, to the service of which the individual must completely subordinate himself; fearless, unselfish dedication to the State is the highest duty of man. In one of his youthful works, Hegel declared that Christianity could only be accepted by a *verdorbene Menschheit* (degenerate manhood) which had lost its country and freedom, and in its misery comforted itself with the doctrine of the depravity of all human nature. "It [i.e. Christianity] honoured what was shameful, and hallowed and perpetuated incompetence by stigmatizing it as sin for a man to put trust in the potentialities of his own being."[2]

The State powerful, and therefore free, was Hegel's ideal. Freedom of the spirit and true national culture can only hold sway in such a State. Because of these spiritual "goods", the State is the highest good, for the strife and trafficking of earth. Therefore, as its first aim, the State has to maintain itself and extend its power. It may and must do so, for it is the chief revelation of the super-human, i.e. of the Absolute Spirit.

The State organized as might finds justification not only in Hegel's doctrine of identity (i.e. identity of reason and reality), but also in the ideas which had been pressing vigorously to the fore for some time (Herder), ideas, which Hegel accepted, of the perfect distinctiveness and full rights of the separate modes of life (individualities) of which nature and history consist, and which attain unity only in the World Spirit. For Hegel the State was far and away the most significant of these modes of life. Again, each state had its own individuality, destined for the fullest possible self-development. For this, power is indispensable. Should two states clash in their development of power, they are both acting with similar rights, the rights of their own

[1] Hegel: *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*; newly edited by G. Lasson; 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1921, pp. 10–15.
[2] From his *Jugendschriften*, quoted by Meinecke, p. 438.

individualities. Under the direction of the Universal Spirit, in whose drama of the universe the nations are only marionettes, the struggle will then show which right must yield before the other. In the victory the righteousness of history is revealed. Hegel's elimination of evil, by "a ruse of Reason", and his faith in God's directing hand in war, Meinecke calls "transcendental optimism".[1]

"The State has no higher duty than to maintain itself." "It is a well-known and admitted principle that the special interest of the State is the highest object."[2] For the State, that is, and therefore for the individual too. The entire life of the individual must be directed toward the State, the highest good on earth, from which it derives its own significance. "Every scrap of worth which the individual has, and all his spiritual reality he possesses through the State alone."[3]

The cosmic appealed to Hegel more than the ethical. He refused to impose a moral standard upon great master-natures, like Napoleon, under whose influence he was. The judgment of this universe, Absolute Righteousness, consummates itself in the course of history, the actual being also the rational. The State is the—albeit temporal—working out of the ethical ideal, the spirit of the race made manifest, which the individual man must serve.[4] Hegel calls this serviceable attitude of the individual towards the State *Moralität*, distinguishing it by that name from the ethics of the State. There can thus be no question of moral conflict between the personality and political ethics, first, because citizen morality offers the best criterion for the uncertainties of individual thought and action, and second, because the ethics of the State *is* the true morality. "A higher righteousness of nature and truth" reveals itself in the will of the State. The ethics of the State is not the moral, reflective sphere, where one's private conviction rules; the modern world, it is true, is more amenable to this last, but the true, ancient morality is rooted in the principle

[1] Meinecke, p. 458.
[2] From *Über die Verfassung Deutschlands*, quoted by Meinecke, p. 444.
[3] From *Über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, quoted by Meinecke, p. 454.
[4] In the succession of Hegel, Richard Rothe later on voiced the demand that the work of the Church be gradually taken over entirely by the State. See Wendland: *Sozialethik*, p. 189.

of each man holding to his duty (i.e. towards the State).[1] In the face of all private opinions and objections, the interest of the State is always the truest justice, and must avail itself of whatever means necessity demands. "In this matter there can be no question of choosing your means."

This, briefly, is Hegel's political philosophy. "So came to pass the new monstrosity," says Meinecke, "viz. that Machiavellianism was inserted *into* the context of an idealist philosophy which included and endorsed all the values of ethics, whereas formerly it had been obliged to lead its life *outside* the moral order which man had built himself. What ensued here was, so to speak, the legitimation of a bastard. . . . The individual State absolute, which had only been able to lead an *un*holy life, though a vigorous one, in previous centuries, now received all the hallowing which the new cult of [State] individuality could give."[2]

Two grave perils here lay close at hand, and Meinecke does not fail to point them out, although he should express the second more clearly and emphatically.

1. The danger that the moral sense should be blunted and the excesses of a policy of might too lightly regarded. The result was a feebler handling of the problem of political ethics.[3] "What is real is rational." Here is the philosophical basis and sanction of subsequent *Realpolitik*.

2. The danger of a "deification of the State", which resulted in forgetting the holy God, and so in little attention being paid to His revelation in Christ. Indeed, God was only the great Unknown, remaining hidden in the background. The State became the visible, concrete Godhead. Hegel himself spoke of "the ideal of the State, of this real God". Hegel certainly recognized a higher Divinity, the Absolute Spirit, the Eternal Truth, but he confused this truth with "the truth that lies in might' Not the State itself but national culture was the real goal for him. Yet the course of events has avenged itself for the element of violence in Hegel's system—violence, that is, in opposition to the Christian conscience—by perpetuating his influence especially in the slogan: "National power the highest goal."[4]

By his reverence for a higher or true morality, the basis of

[1] From *Über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, quoted by Meinecke, p. 449.
[2] op. cit., pp. 345, 452. [3] ibid., pp. 459–460. [4] ibid., p. 457.

which is not in our conscience, Hegel made a fatal mistake. The error mainly arose, it seems to me, from his making the *cosmic* truth, out of evil God brings forth good, into an *ethical* truth, and putting it in that form at the disposal of the individual man. A man is not the course of history nor is he Providence, and he must not behave as if he were. Hegel's primary fault lay in his conviction that the divine reason comes to consciousness in the human, i.e. it lay in his intellectual pride.

It is remarkable that Hegel, in his great, pagan conception of the State, which has strongly influenced and still influences modern political and ethical theories, still conserves a trace of that Christian dualistic philosophy which held to a distinction and contrast between God and the world, the ideal and the actual, retaining with it a trace of the true morality. This appears when he is only able to endorse Machiavelli's approval of all means to the goal, even the basest means, as a just punishment for the chaotic evildoing of that age. Hegel held that when states have organized themselves and so come into conflict one with another not every means is permitted to them then. Lucky and significant inconsistency!

4. *Fichte: State and Nation. War-utopianism*

The second philosopher who held Machiavelli in high honour was *J. G. Fichte.* Meinecke is less detailed and objective here than when dealing with Hegel. To my mind, he stands, in spite of his critical faculty, too near Fichte and not near enough to Christian thought to be quite successful in estimating Fichte's worth, from the Christian point of view. We must consult Fichte's own writings.

After Hegel, it was Fichte who heavily impressed his mark upon modern political theory, not only as the latter took form in Germany, although most strongly there, but also generally in lands beyond. German philosophy of the nineteenth century has practically dominated recent European thought.

It may be said that Hegel was rather the philosopher while Fichte gave to modern political theory more of its *ethical* basis. Hegel's ethic (his philosophy of justice) was deficient in regard to personal values, and his "transcendentally optimistic" plea for the rationality of the actual and for the cosmic rightness

of wrong—the "ruse of Reason"—would not long have gone on convincing men whose consciences were still vocal. The higher morality of the State was not fully funded, and the State, as Hegel saw it, was an abstraction, unable to inspire men.

At these weak points, Fichte set to work, with his enormous strength. Unlike Hegel, he did not, in his thinking, contemplate the cosmos so much as ethics and the human will. He was philosopher and the prophet in one. His political theory was supported in the first place not by cosmic dialectic, but by will-power and enthusiasm. The circumstances of his time largely determined the direction of his thought. While in Berlin, Fichte went through Prussia's humiliation and evolution, and he took part in the latter with his glowing *Reden an die deutsche Nation* and *Über den Begriff des Wahrhaften Krieges* (1813).

It was Fichte who gave the State concrete meaning, by seeing it as a national life, as nationality, as nation. He impressed on the German states that they were *one* nation, and thus prepared the way for the German Empire. The Fatherland is not just a bit of the earth's crust, but the ground of nationality; that being so, people and land are coterminous, and together they give the State just that high worth which it cannot get from property, prosperity and the exercise of law. "People and Fatherland in this sense, as bearers and guarantors of earthly eternity, forming what may be eternal here below, are raised far above 'State' in the ordinary usage of the word. . . . For that very reason this love of the Fatherland should rule the State itself, as the highest, perfect, ultimate and independent authority."[1]

In these words we find Fichte's reverence for nationality expressed. "The natural tendency of man is to find heaven already upon this earth." Only in times of necessity and oppression, such as the first Christians endured, does he find sufficient consolation in a heaven above. He wants to work out and enjoy the imperishable in visible fashion within the temporal. "The worthy man" seeks an eternal life even on earth. Well, he *has* it, in the race from which he springs and which shall spring from him. The faith of the worthy man that what is real in him shall abide eternally, even on this earth, is thus

[1] J. G. Fichte: *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*; Deutsche Bibliothek, 8ste Rede, p. 138.

based on the hope of the imperishable nature of the race he has sprung from, and of the racial character. . . . A man's own race-character is the eternal, upon which he trusts for the immortality of himself and all that he achieves; *that* is the eternal order of things wherein he deposits what is eternal in himself, and peculiar to him. . . . This is his love for his race. . . . Something godly has appeared to him in it. . . . Therefore the divine shall burst forth yet again from that race. . . . In order to ensure the independent continuance of the nation he must be willing even to die, that this may live, that in it he may live the eternal life, and that he may for ever call it his. . . . To the last drop of blood he shall strive to preserve that beloved treasure undiminished, for posterity." This is "not the spirit of the docile citizen's love for constitution and statute-book, but the consuming flame of highest patriotism, which accepts the nation as the shrine of the eternal, for whose sake the honourable man will sacrifice himself with joy". Whoever feels his nation's divine right to live, feels a "deep repugnance" for the requirement of the Sermon on the Mount: "Withstand not him that is evil." Precisely that "higher sense" of his, that "true and almighty patriotism", forbids him to give heed thereto.[1]

What impresses us about this conception, which Fichte, strange to say, regarded as soundly Christian, is that it has nothing to do with Christianity, for the simple but sufficient reason that Fichte has not lighted on the eternal in the Christian sense at all. With him, the eternal is not timeless, but is endless time. An "earthly eternity" there is not. Of course this eternal can clearly appear in earthly form, but then the eternal must be distinguished, and a difference made between reality and appearance. Neither the one nor the other happened. Fichte's religious patriotism remained wholly *this* worldly. It was accordingly no mere chance, but only to be expected, that Fichte did not appeal to the example of the great Christians, but to the Romans. "What was it created such ardour among the noble-minded Romans? . . . Their tremendous faith in the eternal continuance of Rome and their sure hope of themselves living eternally in this eternity, forward through the stream of time."[2] With that

[1] *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, pp. 136–137, 141, 150–151.
[2] ibid., pp. 137–138.

same faith Fichte's forefathers, the *Germani*, opposed the thronging Romans. Fichte is the spiritual child of the *Germani*, not of evangelical Christianity.

The theology of the nineteenth century overestimated the religious worth of German Idealism. Its religious content in the Christian sense is slighter than has been supposed, and one of the causes we see clearly here, in Fichte, as in Hegel; not only the characteristic failure to realize sin and guilt—and so, also, God's grace—but likewise the lack of any vivid sense of the reality of the beyond, of the supermundane, of the other world, and so of personal immortality. Fichte had not eye enough for the Christian view of the eternal worth of every human soul, which had reversed the ancient order of State and land *before* the human personality. It is the tragedy of Fichte's philosophy, the central thought of which was precisely the ideal of moral personality, that he was unable to do any real justice to the distinctive inner meaning of that ideal, through his feeble sense of the really eternal and transcendent. Therefore he did not know how to give "moral personality" any other future, any other fulfilment and *Verklärung* than in the "eternal" life of the race. In like manner, ancient Israel knew no other eternity for man, and therefore did not foster the idea of personality. This idea, not just the name, but the idea, is a holy inheritance from the Gospel, with its faith in man's kinship with God; yet Fichte knew nothing of this inheritance because he had not found the only way, which Christ exhibited in life and death. The ancient deification of race and country, revived last century for thousands of people, not least in Christian circles, through the great influence of Fichte, has been for the most part coupled with and caused by a weakening of the Christian sense of the transcendent, as in Fichte himself. Where the eternal has receded and vanished, the transitory and earthly automatically presses to the fore, as the chief, or even the only, reality. The patriotism of many to-day lives very largely by default of real Christian feeling, all unawares, as with Fichte. The supermundane, exalted Christ is no longer vividly before their eyes, at any rate not as "the Way, the Truth, the Life". For right Christian thinking *His* kingdom, not the nation, is the highest good.

It is plain to us that Fichte, as also Wendland, who indeed

largely follows him, made no preliminary examination of the idea of "nationality", but posited it categorically as an absolute value, from which the idea of "Fatherland" derives a value independently of all else. We have already seen[1] that this is illegitimate, since race and native soil in themselves are only natural, empirically given quantities, blends of good and ill, whose moral significance must be carefully scrutinized. Only a non-idealistic, naturalistic philosophy would be able to work with race and Fatherland as highest values. That it is *my* race, and that I find the "earthly eternity" of my life in my race makes no difference to its ethical dubiety; as philosopher, Fichte of course felt that quite well. And Fichte is ultimately too much the ethical thinker to get from the mere ideas of "race" and "Fatherland" unqualified motive-power sufficient for his patriotism and his ardent political convictions, for very long, even in the tension of those Napoleonic days. At first his further qualification of them was vague. The worth of the State lay in its "culture". In his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* of 1806, Fichte says: "What is the homeland of the truly developed Christian European? Broadly speaking, it is Europe, in particular it is, in every period, that state in Europe which stands highest in civilization." Which state has this pre-eminence? Fichte answers formally, "The pre-eminent state in the European community of nations, in every age, without exception, is the state which strives most". The state which declines in civilization offers no Fatherland to the noble-minded world-citizen. Let the worldly man still find his "Fatherland" then, in the mere territory, but "the sunlit spirit will be irresistibly attracted, and will turn towards that land where light and justice are found".[2]

Here speaks the true idealist, whose real country is the realm of the ideal, because the Idea alone is the true Reality of perfect worth. At this point Fichte might have found his way to the Gospel, if only he had more closely defined the content and relations of the ideal. German Idealism, however, is by nature the philosophy of freedom. Here too it should have been possible

[1] See pp. 121 ff.

[2] Fichte: *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*; Ausg., Fritz Medicus, 14te Vorlesung, pp. 220–222.

to find a bridge to Christianity. For Paul also speaks of freedom: "the freedom whereby Christ has set us free". And Luther likewise lays emphasis on the freedom of a Christian. Do Fichte and Christianity mean the same? Yes, in so far as they mean, in principle, the freedom of the spirit. No, in so far as Fichte, largely under pressure of circumstances, gave a turn to the idea of freedom which agreed with Christianity as little as with idealism.

The result is to be found set out in Fichte's lecture, *Über den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges*, delivered in 1813 as an encouragement to the war of freedom against Napoleon.[1] Here he makes a distinction between inner and outer freedom, but he makes it so fine that national freedom is regarded as a natural condition of the people's development towards the realm of spiritual freedom. In this connection he says, "God is a God of freedom. . . . Without freedom we remain without God, without anything."

Whilst not wishing to undervalue the great influence of the outward life upon the inward, we must insist that Christianity deems otherwise. Paul in bonds was a free man. The great, God-filled Christians were to be found precisely at times of oppression and persecution. And it was not in the days of her might and freedom that Germany bore her greatest sons.

But Fichte goes a step further. The race which stands in the forefront of development towards the realm of right and freedom is the German; everything therefore depends on the freedom of that race, and on its development. Here begins that over-estimation of one's race—inevitably coupled with under-estimation of the rest—wherein even thinkers of high intent get ensnared, as soon as the idea of war lays hold of them. Fichte began on a roomy scale, filled with the ideal of humanity, and as a pupil of Kant, whom we are about to consider, filled with thoughts of "eternal peace". In his *Grundzüge* of 1806 he had, as we have seen, still spoken of the Europe of the spirit, and of the most civilized state therein—for him, the state which strove the hardest, as the Fatherland of the honourable man.

[1] Fichte: *Die Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältnis des Urstaates zum Vernunftreiche*. Ausg., Fritz Medicus, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1922, 2te Abschnitt, pp. 45 ff.

Yet as early as 1808, in his *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, he shows a change of front: it is *his own* nation now. Already he is saying that the German people, more than any other, has seen humanity to be an eternally progressing species, and has staked everything on that progress; that it has kept its integrity; that as a people it has always held itself open to noble sentiments, to a deeply earnest conception of life, and to feelings of respect for other races, running little risk of being deceived by men and new things, idolatry of which foreign peoples are guilty all too easily; that the German people by its history, its situation and its spiritual training may be called the parent-stem of the new world, etc. And he ends his last lecture with the words: "Is there truth in the views set forth in these lectures? Then be ye [the German people] the nation, among all modern states, which is most determined to display the germ of human perfection, the nation to which is committed primacy in that germ's development. Should you fail in this, your true being, then fails with you all hope of redeeming human kind from out the depth of evil! . . . We know no race that is your equal. . . . There is therefore no escape: if you go under, all the human kind goes under with you, without hope of recovery!"[1]

This special significance of the German people was to be put to the test in the very fiercest light in 1813, when the full force of sentiment and will had to be flung into the strife against the tyrant. In Fichte's address, *Über den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges*, the perfection of humanity is regarded as that kingdom of righteousness and liberty to which Germany is so gloriously on the way. On the other hand, the French nation cannot find this way, though it has tried, because it has not grasped the idea of moral personality as the very fountain-head of truth. Nor can other people show the way: Spain is enslaved, Italy and Britain have not attained internal unity. Only the Germans know true unity, liberty and equality, and it is they, therefore, who are called to bring in the reign of reason and liberty.[2] The French nation is led by a man who has not the slightest interest in the highest destiny of men, and who sacrifices everything to

[1] *Reden*, pp. 150, 127, 235, 237, 246–247, 264–268. Here is the inspiration of the song, "Am deutschen Wesen, soll die Welt genesen".
[2] *Die Staatslehre*, pp. 55–56.

what he regards as the welfare of his nation and the glory of his army. All hostility towards God is concentrated in him. And so his power must be resisted as the kingdom of the devil.[1]

Thus Fichte laid the foundation for his *Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges* (idea of just warfare). He spoke contemptuously of the state which is built up on selfish interests alone, and of the war which is waged with mercenaries for the protection of earthly life and possessions, neither of which is a goal desirable in itself. The enlightened man has nothing to do with such a state or such a war. When a state aims only at earthly goods, when the majority of the people is not capable of higher aims, when a state is thus hardened, it openly stamps itself with the seal of reprobation, and "the honourable man saves his immortal life by fleeing from it". Henceforth "he has no country upon earth, but seeks his citizenship in heaven, acquiring his right thereto by sowing, according to his power here and now, seeds from which shall spring one day, after him, a land for men of high intent".[2]

If anyone would see a great and noble thinker, in the midst of his war-distorted thought, appear again suddenly in his true stature, let him ponder carefully that last passage. Here indeed speaks a man who is citizen of the "invisible spiritual world".

I speak of "distorted thought". I do not mean by that his resistance to the dominance of France, which resistance had certain ethical elements about it. Nor do I mean his *Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges*, which amounts to this: just war is undertaken by a nation not only to protect its own growth towards the reign of liberty, but also, and especially, to protect developing humanity, when this development would be impossible without the war.[3] Truly this presentation gives a clear idea of just warfare. If only the means with which war is waged complied with these same high ethical demands (see below), war could be presented as so high and exalted in nature and purport that it would be impossible to conceive any higher human work or striving! But, alas, this presentation is grounded in false data,

[1] *Die Staatslehre*, pp. 51, 57, 59–62. [2] ibid., pp. 47, 48.
[3] Fichte regards it as out of the question that he may be mistaken about God's plan. "I rightly recognize God and His plan for the world, as I firmly believe . . ." ibid., p. 53.

it does not correspond to reality. The same fixed idea which possessed so many noble minds during the Great War (see next chapter) warped Fichte's thinking, too, a century before: it was right at issue with wrong, liberty with bondage, God's kingdom with the kingdom of the devil; God's glory was at stake. We know that this mental process goes on among all belligerents; in Fichte's time, as in ours, the enemy knew it too, as Fichte himself had recognized in his earlier and more reflective years.[1] Whether true or not, a nation must believe it, if that nation will go to war. From a certain standpoint, then, it is possible to say: happy the land whose spiritual leaders have that fixed idea and can inspire their people with it, as Fichte did. Then it can at least fight with a good conscience!

Hegel spoke of a "ruse of Reason", whereby good was attained by means of evil. With Fichte and his associates, it would be possible to talk of a "ruse of political expediency",[2] for attaining its own interests by means of noble-minded men, whose task it is to find excuses for the less worthy means that might be necessary. Even if Prussia had had lower aims than its political freedom, even if it simply had in view the aggrandizement of its power and possessions, its prestige and its sphere of influence, in the strain of threatening war, and then its outbreak, political expediency would certainly have made itself master of a Fichte or of other eminent thinkers, and compelled them to see and speak in such wise that the war was justified. Our experience of the last war gives us the right to say this.

Besides Fichte's "this-worldly" conception of eternity, it was his unreal presentation of Germany's significance and position that brought him, the sternest moralist of ethical personality, which he insisted *must* become what it was designed to be, to join Hegel in deifying the State as the potent representative of the people, as national State, in which alone the individual attains his rights and finds his real liberty, and which he must therefore serve with full surrender. Hence "national education", on which Fichte often wrote at length, directed in Platonic fashion by the philosophers, has the task of making citizens

[1] e.g. in his writing against Machiavelli (1807), pub. Hans Schulz, Leipzig, 1918, pp. 22–23.

[2] i.e. "a ruse of *Staatsräson*".—TRANSLATOR.

understand that "the State, as truest protector of human interests and guardian of the immature, responsible to God and its conscience alone, has perfect right to compel these latter, for their own good", for example, in compulsory war-service. For those whose national training is complete, force will be necessary no more. They will obey and render military service of their own will.[1] Indeed, in his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* Fichte had already spoken of "inner permeation of the citizen by the State" as a requirement of the time. Fichte's ideal was: "In the perfect State no private aim shall be legitimate which has not found its place in the computation of the whole, so that the whole is concerned for its attainment."[2] Professor Paul Scholten, who calls attention to this last dictum, rightly adds: "Not even the Spartan would hand the citizen over more completely to the State."[3] What indeed remains of a man's personal concern with God, and of His holy rights over the individual man, rights which do nevertheless stand far above those of any earthly power and majesty? Here again the "this-wordly" character of Fichte's religiosity takes its revenge. The political life, too, issues from the religious heart.

The State thus deified compelled Fichte, as well as Hegel, to accept the consequences, i.e. to confess Machiavellianism. Fichte did this very outspokenly in his lecture on Machiavelli in 1807, which was intended both as a "rescuing of the honour of a brave man"[4] and also as a stirring call to the German people. People might call Machiavelli a pagan, he said, but through that paganism he was able to face the world stout of heart and lay hold of life, and this we must approve, "since life, in every case, has more worth than death".[5] Machiavelli sternly and directly set his face towards reality, which is something that "cannot be said of the philosophy of the last half-century (Fichte meant "the age of Enlightenment" which, "sick and pitiful", offered "as her highest good a sort of humanitarianism, liberality and popularity".[6] We must recognize, according to Fichte, that the fundamentals of Machiavelli's politics must be accepted by "every political science that understands itself". They amount

[1] *Reden* (11), pp. 196–197.
[2] *Grundzüge* (10th lecture), p. 158.
[3] *Recht en Liefde*, p. 12.
[4] *Über Machiavelli*, p. 57.
[5] ibid., p. 11.
[6] ibid., p. 28.

to this: It must be granted that all men are evil inclined, and were they not restrained would fall into warfare of everybody against everybody else (Hobbes). So the State must even watch other states; your neighbour is always ready to magnify himself at the first favourable chance, at your cost, from lust for gain, and from the inborn need of every nation to thrust its own spiritual goods upon others, thus increasing its might. It is not enough merely to defend your own territory; what does not increase, grows less. Therefore you must keep your eyes open, and lose no single moment in which you deem you may turn anything to your account. Do not rely on the word of another if you can extract a guarantee. A ruler may not say, "I have believed in humanity, loyalty and rationality"; he may only do that in his private life. And then Fichte traces the final consequences: "The prince is bound by the ordinary rules of morality in his personal life . . . but in his relations with other states he is beholden neither to law nor to justice, save to the law of the strongest. . . ." Like Hegel, Fichte gives this *Realpolitik* an ethical blessing, by declaring that "these relations . . . lift him above the sphere of personal ethics into a higher moral order, the material content of which is indicated by the words, 'salus et decus populi suprema lex esto' ".[1] "This earnest and forceful conception of statecraft", concludes Fichte, "must needs be renewed to-day."

It is amazing to hear one of the greatest exponents of idealistic philosophy thus sacrificing the ideal to the actual. To a certain extent excuse may be found not only in the times, but also, and especially, in the disastrous type of spirituality fostered in German lands by Luther's differentiation of personal and official morality. But all allowances made, it is still a humiliation for idealist thought. What Foerster wrote is hard, but true: "Fichte's estimate of Machiavelli is speaking testimony of the general ethical weakness of German philosophical idealism in face of the demands and sophisms of political expediency."[2] Not without reason does Foerster speak of the "unconscious sophistry of our German idealistic materialists". What is this doctrine of "higher

[1] "Let the welfare and worth of the people be the highest law", ibid., pp. 20–28.
[2] *Politische Ethik*, p. 183.

morality" but a great sophistry, dependent on the apotheosis of an earthly might which turns every earthly means to account for its own maintenance! Earthly means, for this power which must at all costs be maintained is the power of war. If this speculative, cosmic philosophy of might was in a sense to be expected from Hegel, says Meinecke, Machiavellianism should have remained wholly unassimilable to the subjective idealism of Fichte, which subordinated the world to free ethical personality. It was a vigorous hacking through the knot, by sheer will-power, rather than an intellectual solution of the problem."[1] But just because it was such concise reasoning, hallowed by the name of so great a philosopher, it has had great influence upon those statesmen and philosophers who glorified might. Treitschke and Bernhardi have appealed to Fichte. And where might is glorified, war comes into its glory. Fichte reprinted a chapter of Machiavelli, for the great element of abiding truth which he discovered in it, beginning with the words: "A prince should have no other aim, nor other thought, than that of war-readiness, nor should he deem any other work to have such claims on him as that."[2] Again and again Fichte pointed out the uplifting powers of "just legitimate warfare". "In opposition to all materialists and utopians", writes Wendland, "we may, with Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel and Moltke, praise war as awakener of moral strength."[3] Wendland wrote this in 1915. In the years that followed, and especially in the years after the war, when demoralization, nay, immoralization, reigned in almost every sphere, a process that has hardly ended yet, he may perchance have realized that he had sought the utopians on the wrong side!

Fichte's utopianism appears in the rules he drew up in his *Völkerrecht* (international law) for the humanizing of war, in which, e.g., he condemns the employment of snipers in ambush.[4] Here, as at so many points, where his conscience has obviously been at work, he shows himself a disciple of *Kant*. For Kant too had said in his *Rechtslehre* (1797): "Defensive measures of every kind are permitted to the belligerent state, save those the use of which would unfit its subjects for their citizenship, for

[1] Meinecke, op. cit., pp. 464–465.
[2] *Über Machiavelli*, p. 35.
[3] *Sozialethik*, p. 294.
[4] Fichte: *Über das Völkerrecht*; Sämmtliche Werke, Vol. III, pp. 377–78.

then the state would be also unfitting itself to count as a person, sharing equal rights with others, in its relations with international law. Among the forbidden measures are—the employment of its own subjects as spies, of these or even of foreigners as assassins, or as poisoners (in which class must also be reckoned the so-called 'snipers', who lie in wait for scattered enemies, behind some ambush), or their being put to spread false reports; in short, the use of such sneaking ways as would destroy the trust which will thereafter be needful for the establishment of lasting peace."[1]

We hardly know which surprises us more, in this full quotation from Kant, his cry of conscience over the darkest aspect of the work of war, or his childlike faith that this aspect may be prevented. Poisoners come on to the stage of war in great numbers in these modern days, only in other, more effective, wise than Kant had dreamed! How very practical is the prohibition of spies and snipers! It is very remarkable that the philosophical and religious basis of "war-prepared *Realpolitik*" was laid by thinkers who, in their German abstractedness, on many points had such meagre sense of reality. Indeed, but for this defective sense of reality, their coupling of this political theory with ethics would probably never have succeeded.

The great, noble-minded theologian *Schleiermacher*, who so largely dominated nineteenth-century theology, in Germany and beyond, has afforded perhaps the clearest example of a defective sense of the realities of war, in the chapter from his ethical work, *Die christliche Sitte*, entitled "Das reinigende Handeln eines Staats auf den anderen"[2] (written 1822). In the light of this title he sees war, not indeed aggressive war, which had been forbidden already by Luther, but defensive. His views may be expressed in his own words as follows. In the face of those "who will not allow the Christian to bear arms . . . it is very important to give the conscience some enlightenment on this point. On the whole that is not difficult, but we must not follow the common practice of tracing everything back to an obedience unconditionally due to the governing powers; the only adequate view being the truth that in war it is certainly not required of the individual that he

[1] Karl Vorländer: *Kants Zum ewigen Frieden, mit Ergänzungen aus Kants übrigen Schriften*; 2nd ed., p. 66.

[2] i.e. "The conduct of one State purifying the other." *Schleiermachers Sämmtliche Werke*; L. Jonas, Berlin, 1923, Vol. 7, pp. 273–290.

shall deliberately shed human blood. . . . *No state that conducts war morally orders its subjects to kill at sight the subjects of the opposing state; thus it never has the intention of killing them, but what it really aims at is nothing but reparation and security for the future.*[1] Certainly, both these ends have to be attained by force; there is no other means to them than that of weakening the enemy state so much that no more reasonable course is open to it than to grant what is required. Only it must not be weakened by the slaughter of its subjects, but by taking possession of what constitutes its might, viz. land and men. If the war is not conducted on these lines it is so much the more barbaric and immoral; for a state may not put its own subjects to death, let alone those of other states. That enemies meet their death is not the outcome of a definite will to kill them, and is not the consequence of striving to place oneself and the enemy in a certain position, but only of their offering obstinate resistance. Formerly it was quite different, but there can be no doubt for us which warfare is more moral, the old or the new. Granted, a greater personal courage was developed when men fought with sword and lance. But as a life-and-death fight started more easily then than with the now prevailing use of ordnance, which is only designed to compel the enemy to withdraw in face of the putting forth of a definite amount of natural force, modern warfare is very much more generous. Only our outpost-fighting and sniping is unchristian, these being directed against individuals and profiting only the very least."[2]

In our own land to-day, we are accustomed to hear well-meaning people palliate the nature of war on traditional lines, but it is very good to know how distinguished, honourable and Christian an origin this way of thinking has! Schleiermacher dismisses the difficulties far too light-heartedly. Even Wendland calls this argument sophistry. "To kill or take prisoner the greatest possible number of the enemy", he says, "is the most effective way of attaining the goal, and so is not contingent but essential. . . . However abhorrent it may sometimes be, the Christian must put innocent men to death in bayonet-fighting, shoot spies, deal mercilessly with *franc-tireurs*. It will be granted much more readily that strategy and technique will seek ever

[1] The italics are Schleiermacher's.

[2] op. cit., pp. 280–283.

new means to drive the enemy off the field by killing as many soldiers as they possibly can."[1] This opinion of Wendland's finds confirmation in the saying of Colonel Montaigne already quoted: "The immediate object of the battle is not conquest but killing."[2] Wendland omits to add that had Schleiermacher had Wendland's insight into the realities of war, he would have been obliged, by his own words, to adjudge war "barbaric and immoral", and would have lost "the only adequate view" by which the State can be conceded the right to send its subjects into war.

5. *Glorification of State and War*

Hegel laid the metaphysical basis, and Fichte the ethical, for nineteenth-century state absolutism. But this absolutism, with its *Realpolitik*, naturally set aside all their ethical reserves and scruples, feeling none of them and being unable to cope with them. It made use of philosophical idealism, as it made use of the docile and tractable Christian Church—as sanction and support for its own enterprises. The rôle of mediator was played by the historian *Treitschke*, who from his Berlin chair, for twenty years after the Franco-German War, upheld "the Iron Chancellor" before a captivated audience, and helped to extend his influence. Machiavellianism received from Treitschke its modern form, prepared for by Hegel and Fichte. That is to say, what Italy did at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Germany did in the nineteenth: provided a theory for what was already the practice of the State. The German spirit, says Meinecke with truth, with its brooding disposition to gaze into the depths, has plumbed the dark gulf between ethics and expediency, and in its need to express itself sharply has not shrunk from calling a spade a spade; but at the same time its philosophic urge has driven it to overcome the dualism speculatively.[3] Thus arose the doctrine of the State as "power", which—only Meinecke forgets to point this out—gave new driving power to the evil side of actuality. Ostensibly Treitschke corrected Machiavelli, actually he was one with him. In the midst of all relative values, Treitschke believed firmly in the Prussian military monarchy as a blessing, and

[1] Wendland: *Sozialethik*, p. 284. [2] See p. 108.
[3] op. cit., pp. 488–91.

announced "that the essence of the State is primarily might, secondly might, and thirdly still might".[1] Where this is so, it is the highest duty of the State to cherish its own might. "To hold its own: this, for the State, is absolute morality."[2] To come by its power, the State may turn all means to account without any squeamishness—in this he agrees wholly with Machiavelli—but thereafter—and here he considers Machiavelli's doctrine fell short—it must apply its power "to protect and advance the higher interests of men".[3] On Darwinian biological lines (struggle for life, natural selection, survival of the fittest, which phenomena Hegel had already pointed out) this theory of power was worked out by Treitschke's followers and disciples, e.g. Bernhardi: "In such cases, that which is able to survive and conquer is right. Might is also the highest right, and the question of right is settled by the dynamometer, war, which always decides biologically with justice, for its decisions issue from the very nature of things."[4] With Bernhardi this state-philosophy passes over into war philosophy, as indeed it logically must.

This transition is complete in the fully documented book, written in German, of our fellow-countryman, *Dr. Steinmetz, Die Philosophie des Krieges*. The Idealism of the beginning of the nineteenth century was followed by Positivism. We have seen that there is direct connection between the two. Steinmetz is one of the offsprings of Positivism, in a time which has set against it again and in which metaphysics has revived, and with it genuine philosophy. He avows a social, evolutionist utilitarianism, that postulates the greatest possible happiness of the people and race as the highest good.[5] Although Steinmetz as positivist rejects Hegel's "metaphysical, mystical hypostasizing of the State"[6]—we shall see how far the rejection goes—he is in all respects a disciple of Hegel with Darwinian modifications, in his thoroughgoing belief in the cosmic court of justice, which he recognized in war[7], and a like disciple of Fichte in his glorifying of the nation as our earthly pride and eternity.[8]

Steinmetz rejects "the metaphysical hypostasizing of the

[1] Quoted by Meinecke, op. cit., p. 497. [2] ibid., p. 507.
[3] ibid., pp. 497–498. [4] Quoted by Foerster: *Sozialethik*, p. 250.
[5] S. Rudolf Steinmetz: *Die Philosophie des Krieges*; Leipzig, 1907, pp. 7–8.
[6] ibid., p. 338. [7] ibid., pp. 184–204, 328 ff.
[8] ibid. See especially p. 8.

State". "The State", he says, "is not something ideal, but something real."[1] But then begins its glorification and *positive* hypostasizing. "The State, great or small, is the greatest real, living organization of human beings that exists." Its "deepest significance does not lie in practical usefulness as the conserver of justice. . . . Its purport is otherwise. It is able to fulfil these duties because it leads an existence all its own, and . . . combines the broadest expansion of men with the most intensive life. . . . The unique priority of the State, which lifts it above all voluntary associations, consists in this, that it alone is a fully compulsory association, never specialized in its aims, and incapable of ever becoming so." Thus the Church as a power must be absorbed into the power of the State. "Every other community is trivial, compared with this. . . . If states, as corporate personalities, are to lead a fresh, pure and intensive life—they must be able to develop their own power; their existence must be assured." Great love and perfect dedication are needful for this. Love for the State is much more of a possibility than love "of humanity", because the latter does not lead an independent, visible existence. . . . When Lipps says that patriotism must broaden out into love of humanity, he utters an empty truism: "Who can love 1,600 million people? 'Humanity' must remain an empty abstraction, whereas the Fatherland, one's native land, awakens ardent love and trust lasting to the very grave. . . . Anyone who regards the highest summit of human life as the ideal must wish to retain patriotism, of course along with its presupposition, the powerful State, which fills its citizens with passionate love and dedication."[2] May "the really pious people of Japan", where patriotism and religion are in close association, and where students know no higher ideal than to die for the Mikado, be an example to us.[3] So Steinmetz reaches what is for him the holy trinity: "State, Fatherland and War are irreplaceable and may therefore demand their sacrifices."[4] Steinmetz, inspired by the liberal competitive ideal, sees the states as powers in perpetual competition, in an endless process of rivalling one another, of conquering and being conquered. That is world-history. Consequently the static and therefore unfair arbitration

[1] *Die Philosophie des Krieges*, p. 338.
[2] ibid., pp. 190–199.
[3] ibid., pp. 176, 182.
[4] ibid., p. 200.

of a court can never replace the dynamic and righteous judgment of war. In war, the only true competition of the states, all the resources of a nation, material and spiritual, are fused in one. War is the test of values, victory is no accident.[1] Wars were necessary in earlier times for the creation of states, now to keep the states alive, for apart from war they petrify and die.[2] And so patriotism, "the highest end of all modern education", must not cease; and if this sublime virtue is not to fade away, wars are needful. "In earlier days, patriotism may have been exhibited in war, now wars must help to preserve it as an abiding attribute." This great sentiment provides for us the greatest happiness. And when shall this joy rise higher, and more occupy and swell our hearts, than when the Fatherland is struggling for its life? Wherefore, foolish the man who "can only set against this great sentiment, which inspires millions and makes them blessed, the limbs shot away in war, and the vanished millions. . . ."[3]

Thus far, Steinmetz. Be it said for the better understanding of his words that the "great sentiment" of which he speaks does not necessarily mean "lofty sentiment". A consistent utilitarian inquires only into the quantity, not the quality, of happiness. Hence Steinmetz does not hesitate to put the pleasure of cruelty into the balance of war, over against the pain of cruelty![4] This passage shows the depth to which a political "philosophy" can sink, when it issues not from ethical standards but from the ideal of might.

When the Great War had been in progress a year, Dr. Leo Polak had little difficulty in showing[5] that Steinmetz's hope was not to be fulfilled; the hope that a modern war would end speedily and therefore would cost little more in sacrifice than formerly. What is of much more importance is how Polak sets the primary characteristic of the State as an entity of justice over against its characteristic of might, which Steinmetz put first. Polak's chief difficulty is that war is essentially "a settlement of differences *not* by justice, but by might". "War negates justice. Thus war is morally condemned."[6] Polak clearly shows the connection

[1] *Die Philosophie des Krieges*, pp. 184–188, 203, 204, etc.
[2] ibid., pp. 207–208. [3] ibid., pp. 209, 210. [4] ibid., p. 158.
[5] Dr. Leo Polak: *Oorlogsfilosofie*; Amsterdam, 1915.
[6] A view of Professor Heymans, quoted by Polak, pp. 11, 12.

between justice and morality, when he contests Steinmetz's view that the individual may no longer employ any coercive means he likes against opponents, *for the sole reason* that he has transferred this function to the State, which now does it for him. No, the State prevents this, in the first place, because this method of attaining one's goal is immoral, and therefore contains injustice.[1] The majesty of the State lies in its justice, and this suffers irreparable injury in war.

This disdain for the dignity of moral consciousness is bound up, in my opinion, with another characteristic of this school of political philosophers, already noted in Hegel and Fichte, namely, contempt for the individual man. Not the individual man, but the nation, the State, it is that matters; *that* is the good for which a man must sacrifice himself, body and soul. This is in complete conflict with Christianity, which sets forth a man in his relations with God, man with his independent faith and conscience, God's highest treasure upon earth. Who can feel for so vague a thing as "humanity"? asks Steinmetz. But the Gospel speaks not of "humanity" but of a man, "thy neighbour", "thy brother", called to be a child of God, the highest honour that a human life can receive. Therefore a Christian cannot pass it over as merely incidental, when Steinmetz, in spite of his glorifying war, feels bound to note that "as a result of the war we must expect from the soldiers and officers who take direct part in it a certain increase of coarseness, cruelty, contempt for the property and life of others, self-importance and contempt for others, especially in regard to a woman's honour and personality".[2] A fine sense of justice and fine moral feeling are closely bound together, and the latter also goes with respect for personality. Kant too witnesses to this truth, when he declares his conviction that "the value of human personality" forbids the use of a man merely as a means to an end external to him. "Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden Andern, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloss als Mittel brauchst."[3] "Man", says Kant elsewhere, "is indeed unholy enough, but he must regard *humanity* in his own person as holy.

[1] Steinmetz, p. 215; Polak, p. 54. [2] Steinmetz, op. cit., p. 113.
[3] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*; Reclams Universal Bibl., p. 65. See Abbott: *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, 6th ed., p. 56.

In all Creation, everything one chooses, and over which one has any power, may be used *merely as means*; man alone, and with him every rational creature, is an *end in himself*. By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy." . . .[1]

And so Kant storms against the famous "Pharisaic catchword", in the suit against Jesus, that it was better that one man should die than that the whole nation should perish (John xi. 50). "For if righteousness perish," says Kant, "it is no longer of any consequence that men are living upon the earth."[2]

6. *Kant: Moral Statesmanship and War*

With Kant we stand at the beginning of the Idealist philosophy. With his keen powers of analysis he established its epistemology, with his stern-voiced conscience he gave it an ethical basis. As one reads Kant, however, one cannot help thinking how far this Idealism has shifted from its basis, when it can become a part cause of such a political philosophy as that of Treitschke and Steinmetz. For Kant there is only *one* ethical standard; that to which conscience testifies. For Kant only two things are really great and exalted: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and more deeply they are reflected on: the starry heavens above and the moral law within."[3] When Kant said that, his monistic period already lay behind him. The two worlds of being and of obligation had risen up before his eyes, and he had chosen the second. "Conscience is more than heaven and earth." He therefore called the infinity into which the "moral law" compelled him to gaze "the true Infinity". He alone whose actions are prompted by this inner law does good. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a Good Will."[4] To this inner law, which comes to him as a categorical imperative, a man must bind himself: "Thou

[1] *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*; Reclams Universal Bibl., p. 106; Abbott, pp. 180–181.
[2] Quoted by Polak, op. cit., p. 11.
[3] Opening of the Conclusion to his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*; Abbott, p. 260.
[4] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*; Abbott, p. 9.

shalt". Should he fail to do so he relapses into his sensual evil nature, which in its defiance of moral law becomes "root evil" (*das radikale Böse*).

This is the rigid line which Kant draws through life and life's problems, and it is also to be seen clearly in Fichte's purely ethical writings. It is also the line Kant follows in politics. Here too Kant demands freedom for the moral judgment. "If there is no freedom and no moral law based on it, if all that happens or may happen is only the mechanism of nature, politics and the conception of justice are empty dreams."[1] "Politics says, be wise as the serpent; morality adds by way of limitation, and innocent as the dove. If both these cannot form one commandment there really is strife between politics and morality, but this conflict only arises when men pursue a policy based only on the hope of gain, and on cunning, a policy which worships the divinity 'Good Luck' as the truest administration of justice."[2]

Kant recognizes the "antinomy between politics and morality", but so long as this is not due to the desire for speedy success, it disappears, as he says in his next chapter, when political aims are brought into the open. The politics that is in conflict with morality cannot bear the light, for in the open it cannot stand its ground. On the contrary "all policies which require publicity in order that they may not miss their goal harmonize with justice and *true* politics.[3]

"Political principles must not be formed with a view to the prosperity and happiness which a State may expect from following these principles—not, that is, out of mere desire—but out of a clear sense of duty: out of '*ought*', be the consequences what they may. The saying *fiat justitia pereat mundus*, i.e. let justice reign and the rogues in the world perish one and all, 'that is a sound principle of justice that rejects all crooked ways, with their craftiness or violence'. *Pereat mundus* . . . but the world will utterly perish because of moral evil rather than moral good, for morality has this peculiarity, that the more absolute

[1] "Über die Misshelligkeit zwischen der Moral und der Politik", appendix to Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Vorländer, p. 39.
[2] Kant: *Zum ewigen Frieden*, pp. 37, 42.
[3] ibid., pp. 49–55.

it is realized to be, the more it serves human ends, while the moral evil in nature has this peculiarity, that in pursuing its own aims it turns its hand against itself and is destroyed." There is even practical wisdom in the injunction: "Seek ye first the Kingdom of pure practical Reason and its *righteousness* and your desire [the blessing of eternal peace] shall be added unto you."[1] And then Kant concludes this essay, which is really a vigorous refutation of Machiavelli, with these striking words:

"We must admit that the pure principles of justice have objective reality, i.e. they are practicable; and that they must therefore be observed by the nation in home affairs, and also by the states in their dealings one with another, let empirical politicians make what objections they please. Thus true politics cannot advance a step without having first paid homage to morality, and though politics is in itself a difficult art, its alliance with morality is on the whole no art, for morality hacks asunder the knot which politics cannot loosen, when the two come into conflict. The rights of humanity must be held sacred, at however great a sacrifice from the ruling power. This cannot be done by halves, nor may one contrive the compromise of a prag matically limited justice [i.e. compromise between justice and necessity], but all politics must bend the knee to ethics, cherishing the hope, however, that it shall attain, albeit slowly, the heights whereon its glory will not fade."[2]

Upon this strongly ethical foundation, Kant bases his conception of "eternal peace", in which he builds up international peace, in a fashion almost wholly modern, upon the requirements of democracy, republican form of government, league of nations, international law and the abolition of standing armies. The philosophers of might, whom we have just reviewed, would probably ascribe Kant's hope and expectation to excessive optimism and a defective sense of reality. His optimism may have been at fault, but instead of ascribing to Kant a defective sense of reality, we must rather say that he had in mind another reality. The reality of moral obligation, of morality and justice built thereon, was for Kant all-conquering, and his religious faith awarded it the final mastery. It was because of this reality

[1] *Zum ewigen Frieden*, pp. 45–47. [2] ibid., pp. 48, 49

that Kant held his distinctive views of war.[1] In his opinion war is inherent in the State as organized for might but in conflict with the State as organized for justice. War is below the level of morality, in the low-lying plain of nature, i.e. of the non-moral. In Hobbes's dictum, *status hominum naturalis est bellum omnium in omnes* ("the natural condition of men is war of each against all the rest"). the emphasis must be laid on *naturalis*. States, too, exist in the natural condition, in "the aimless condition of wild beasts", and according to this judgment they have "the barbaric liberty" to wage war on one another and thereby to exhibit "warlike courage—the highest virtue in the savage mind".[2]

War, that scourge of the human race, which retards the development of the natural life by its ravages and by its wasteful and uncivilizing preparations, is an indispensable means, at the stage of civilization to which our race has attained, to compel the nations into better mutual understanding; in this sense it is a condition of progress.[3] This understanding must be clearly expressed in an international law recognized by the nations' mutual consent. Other than justice there is no foundation for enduring peace. The attempts to establish peace by world-conquest, by the balance of power, or by any other artifice Kant calls "chimerical, . . . snakelike twisting of an immoral craftiness, trying to bring about peace among men in the sphere of the warring elements of nature".[4] Kant thus concedes to war a place, it only a temporary one, in the development of the nations. And a state may defend itself against an "unrighteous enemy", although as he says, the phrase "unrighteous enemy" is "pleonastic in the condition of nature, for the condition of nature is itself a condition of unrighteousness".[5]

Kant was led to this temporary admission of war by his belief in the possibility of confining war within the limits of a certain decency. With the same *naïveté* which we found in Fichte and Schleiermacher, Kant speaks of the possibility of conducting

[1] Kant's ideas on war are mainly to be found collected in the *Ergänzungen*, which Vorländer places after Kant's tract *Zum ewigen Frieden* in his edition, i.e. excerpts from various writings of Kant. See also Paul Natorp's work: *Kant über Krieg und Frieden*; Erlangen, 1924.

[2] *Ergänzungen*, pp. 61, 63, 57, 60.

[3] ibid., pp. 57–59.

[4] ibid., pp. 43–63.

[5] ibid., pp. 68–69.

warfare "in an orderly way, with respect for civil rights", avoiding, as we have heard, the use of spies, snipers, etc. Such a war, Kant considers, may exalt the spirit of the nation, by the dangers it brings, while a protracted peace enables the "naked spirit of commercialism" to gain the mastery and in its train, "base selfishness, cowardice and effeminacy".[1] If, however, those "hellish arts" should be employed which Kant would have eschewed, "they will not long remain within the bounds of war . . . but will even become familiar in time of peace".[2] Kant is himself well aware that it is hard to say a good word for war. At one point, he even calls war "the destroyer of all good", and again, "the greatest stumbling-block of morality", always "hindering the attainment of an ideal training of youth, and making more evildoers than it destroys".[3] Kant's hope is firmly fixed upon the remedy David Hume prescribed, which he quotes: "When I see countries at war one with another, it seems to me like two drunken fellows thrashing each other in a china-shop. Not only will it take a long while to heal the bruises that each has given the other, but also they must afterwards pay for all the damage which they have caused."[4] "So at last weakness must effect what good-will should have done, but did not."[5] It is almost impossible for Kant to glory at all in war, which, according to him, indeed, belongs to a state of nature, i.e. to a "condition of unrighteousness".[6] This appears most vividly in its disregard for the human personality (cf. our own remarks above on the connection between the moral judgment and respect for personality). Kant felt what Schopenhauer also knew:[7] "Nature does everything for the species alone, and nothing for the individual, because in her eyes the species is everything, the individual nothing. What we pronounce the effective principle, however, [i.e. personality] is not the natural but the supernatural metaphysic, whole and undivided in every individual, on account of which the individual is everything."

[1] *Ergänzungen*, p. 59. [2] *Zum ewigen Frieden*, p. 8.
[3] *Ergänzungen*, pp. 74, 30. [4] ibid., p. 74.
[5] Quoted by Natorp: *Kant über Krieg und Frieden*, p. 31.
[6] *Ergänzungen*, p. 69.
[7] Arthur Schopenhauer: *Parerga und Paralipomena, über die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit in Schicksal des Einzelnen*; Sämmtliche Werke. Ed. Griesbach, Vol. 4, 2nd impression, p. 238.

Kant compares the disregard for personality in war with the indifference of nature. "For in relation to the omnipotence of nature or rather to her unattainable chief motive the individual man is insignificant. But that the rulers of their own kind should regard and treat it as such, partly by using it like a beast of burden, as a mere instrument of their desires, partly by thrusting it out to slaughter in their quarrels one against the other—that is not insignificant, but is a perversion of the *ultimate aim* of the Creator Himself."[1] "What right", asks Kant, "has the State over its own subjects, to employ them in war against other states, to imperil their property, and even their lives thereby?" Scornfully he answers, "the right to do what it will with its own," just as men may dispose of "their potatoes and domestic animals". But man is not merely a means, but is an end in himself. There can only be talk of justice when the people has somehow given its consent. Does Kant mean that with the consent of the people (the majority?) the injustice is removed? After what he had previously said we know he only means that in part. Even though the disposal of the life (and conscience?) of the minority should be made over to the majority, still, according to Kant, there would remain in warfare the immorality of the "natural" contempt for human life, bound up with the "natural conditions" of war. And so "the morally practical reason within us utters its irrevocable veto: war must not be . . . for that is not the way by which man shall seek his rights."[2]

So Kant almost exclusively considers war from the standpoint of justice. But we have seen how for him the question of justice is bound up closely with pure morality, and this again with the value of personality. That after his stern condemnation of war and its immoral and unjust character, Kant still values it to some extent, that eminent student of Kant, Paul Natorp, explains as due to the times during which the quoted works of Kant appeared (1795–1798), and to the difference in the methods of warfare then and now. Natorp should also have called attention to the naïve belief we have discussed, belief in the possibility of a war which made no use of immoral means, a belief which even in his day was already put to shame; but this comes up for fuller treatment later. Natorp's criticism runs thus: "This

[1] *Ergänzungen*, p. 73. [2] ibid., p. 70.

comparatively favourable judgment of the moral value of war is quite comprehensible in the time of the American War of Independence and the Wars of the Revolution. Even the thoroughly Heraclitan[1] attitude of Hegel towards war can be understood. But whether either philosopher would have come to the same conclusion in the face of a war such as we have experienced, and such as our children and children's children will experience, even more terribly, unless this mad unreason is checked once for all, is doubtful. The sublimity of man's moral destiny has no part in such a war. Kant would rightly have classified it simply and solely as root evil (*das radikale Böse*)."[2]

7. *Double Morality!*

War, at least modern war, *das radikale Böse*! Thus, with this judgment of the Kantian, Natorp, the philosophical discussion of the problem of State and war returns after much wandering —the aberration began with Hegel—to Kant and his purely moral consciousness. That is to say, the *philosophical attempt to justify war must be regarded as a failure.* We believe, after all that we have brought to light, that no other conclusion is possible. We see now what value must be attached to the familiar appeal to "the great philosophers who have all believed in the rightness of war". We have seen that the imperialist statecraft of last century profited by that aberration of philosophical and ethical thought, which resulted from the stress of the times. "The whole hemmed in and often desperate situation of the German nation in the midst of Europe", says Meinecke, "played its part repeatedly in perverting into an alliance with Machiavelli that German Idealism which had begun with a proclamation of the categorical imperative."[3]

At the beginning of his study Meinecke openly recognizes, as we have seen, that the moral justification of political expediency must always miscarry in one respect, viz. when the State uses its power not for the maintenance of justice, but for its own selfish ends. Then reigns the "instinct of primordial man, nay, even of the animal, an instinct which gropes blindly round until it meets insuperable barriers". These barriers, however, are never

[1] Heraclitus: "War is the father of all things."
[2] Natorp, op. cit., p. 34.
[3] *Staatsräson*, p. 468.

in the ethical sphere, but always merely physical. Owing to its partly ethical and partly natural character, "political expediency is a principle of conduct of thoroughly dual, even divided character; it belongs to the nature and spirit of expediency that it must always defile itself by affronting morality and justice, especially by the seemingly indispensable instrumentality of war, which in spite of all the legal forms in which men may clothe it, is still indicative of lower nature shattering the standards of civilization. . . . It seems as if the State *must* sin." We have already quoted this comment with which Meinecke begins, but we repeat it here to couple with it the final judgment with which this writer concludes his historical survey of the philosophy of State and war.

"In history we do not see God, we merely assume that He is in the cloud which surrounds Him. But there are far too many things in which the divine and the demonic are interwoven. Among them, as Boccalini was the first to discover, is 'the principle of political expediency', enigmatic, tyrannical and misleading, since man first became aware of it as a factor in life, at the beginning of modern times. The reflective mind cannot help but gaze upon its sphinx-like face, yet without wholly understanding what its nature is. Philosophy can only give the warning that the politician in power should couple State and God together in his mind, in order that the demon whom he cannot wholly thrust away from him may not become almighty."[1]

We respect this conclusion of an exhaustive study, for the manner by which it is attained, for the depth of insight into the problem which it reveals, and for the honesty with which it calls black what is black, and devilish what is devilish. We have one serious objection however: that it preaches resignation to the demon of political expediency, and this means resignation to sin. This is not permitted to a Christian. For a Christian sin has no right to an existence: it may not be; sin cannot endure before God's holy countenance. Meinecke wrote this book in 1925, apparently during a process of development which is not yet fully mature. For in 1917 he put himself more or less alongside Hegel by declaring that "morality, besides its universal side, has an aspect individually defined, and even from this side, the

[1] *Staatsräson*, p. 542.

State's apparently immoral egotism of power can be justified. For nothing can be immoral which arises from the depths of the individual nature."[1] Since the war Meinecke has apparently given up this standpoint, gradually, as ethically untenable, which he reluctantly, but luckily, openly avows.[2] But what the above-mentioned politician in power would have to do, if he came to feel that the interests of his country and the interests of morality were in conflict, Meinecke leaves unanswered. I fear he would not blame the politician for choosing the former, comforting himself with the explanation that after all the State has a dual nature, that "the devil cannot be wholly thrust aside", even if at other times he should think of God! I fear that even in 1925, Meinecke, in spite of his conversion and as a result of his former conviction, would still have given the answer he gave in 1918: "The experience of history as well as one's own conscience teaches with overwhelming power that—in such a case—the statesman can only act in accordance with the saying: *salus populi suprema lex esto.*"[3]

F. W. Foerster who quotes the last two passages rightly remarks: "In this wording the *peccatum originale* of all Prussian and modern German politics appears. The appeal cannot be made too strongly to the modern German conscience: not your *salus* but obedience to the eternal, irrefragable moral laws in the fulfilling of which alone lies the true *salus populi*; this obedience must be the statesman's first obedience." However difficult it may be for the politician to accept this standard, if he fails to do so he will indeed give cause for men to pass on him the selfsame judgment which once even the *Kreuzzeitung* dared to pass on Bismarck, that he had "lost the compass of the eternal".[4] Meinecke and many historians with him are the victims of "the modern spirit", which, as he himself points out, feels "perhaps more keenly and painfully than in former days the contradictions, the antinomies and the insoluble problems of life, because the comforting belief in the unity and absoluteness of human ideals has been taken away by the relativity of historical studies and

[1] *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 4th ed.; Munich, 1917, p. 92.
[2] *Staatsräson*, p. 468.
[3] i.e. "The welfare of the nation is the highest law." *Preussen und Deutschland im 19ten Jahrhundert*; Munich, 1918, p. 493.
[4] Foerster: *Politische Ethik*, pp. 247–248.

by all those experiences ot modern civilization that conduce to scepticism." Meinecke feels, however, that this modern spirit will not help us out of the morass into which we have fallen. Apparently without being aware that he contradicts his own final conclusion, which is based on the duality and divided nature of "political expediency", he says just before it: "Yet it is necessary both for theory and for practice to win back the faith that there is an absolute ideal, for, without such a faith, contemplation would be dissipated into a mere trifling with things, and all action delivered up without hope of salvation to the natural forces of life."[1]

If anyone should be convinced of this truth it is the Christian. "As soon as we begin making mental reservations and setting up limits," says Max Huber, "the Gospel ceases to be a source of divine revelation to us, and becomes a mere collection of human opinions, from which our selective spirit, as from any other well, may draw or not draw, at our pleasure. The Gospel must be received in all its gravity and earnestness, or else be utterly rejected. . . . The Gospel neither will nor can come to an arrangement with the world and its man-made contingencies. . . . It must not frighten us, to be convinced of the extraordinary difficulty of following Christ in political affairs, but it must rather convince us of the depth and full seriousness of the demands of Christianity.[2]

Concerning this "full seriousness of the demands of Christianity" in regard to the State and its claims, Max Huber has many splendid and true things to say, and we shall quote some of them to end this chapter. Something of the primitive, thoroughgoing Christianity comes to light in this "child of Calvin" as Professor Anema calls him. That in certain respects his conclusions show little of this Christian radicalism is due, we think, to a residue of that naturalistic political absolutism, fed by nationalism and furthered by nationalistic religious philosophy, which estab-

[1] *Staatsräson*, p. 542.

[2] Professor Dr. Max Huber, formerly Professor of civil, ecclesiastical, and international law at Zürich, later a member and President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in his work, *Staaten-politik und Evangelium*, originally a lecture before a congress of Swiss clergymen. In the Dutch translation: *Internationale politiek en Evangelie* (which has an introduction by Professor A. Anema); Utrecht, 1924, pp. 39, 40.

lished itself, last century, in the minds of even the best, in the minds, even, of those who opposed it. This makes Huber say naïvely: "It is inherent in the law of nature that we first care for ourselves and then for those whom life brings into closest contact with us." This applies to the State still more. "The State, true to its nature, strives for full autonomy, and so has the highest authority over all persons and affairs within its bounds."[1] Thence Huber deduces the rightness of self-defence and military service. We shall let this pass for the moment, simply remarking that such natural morality has very little relation to the demands of Christianity. But it is in thorough accord with those demands, when Max Huber, in the name of Christianity, takes up the cudgels against the full sovereignty of the State, against a coercive expediency and against an independent political "morality".[2] He writes as follows:

Even in Christian circles a double morality, fatal to the earnestness of Christianity, prevails. This "equivocal attitude of great numbers in the Christian world, which really betokens a renunciation of the Christian ethic, is explained by the high position given to the State. . . . The State with its 'morality', with its natural conditions of life and its claims, plays its part as a world independent of God and His Kingdom. Anything that puts itself beside God will itself be God. This exalting of the State to the same plane with God must be intolerable to the Christian conscience, even though the State should claim only the smallest corner as its own due and unqualified possession. *Aut Christus, aut Caesar*: that is the word, never before has this dilemma emerged so powerfully and alarmingly for Christians. In home affairs the boundless power of the State may be limited by the claims of Christian morality, but in foreign affairs and the closely associated questions of minorities of other nationality or of other religious confessions it is often quite otherwise. In these spheres the negation of all morality frequently becomes 'morality', if only the interests of the nation may be thereby furthered. Here is the hitherto unconquered stronghold within which the spirit of the world, the spirit of might, has fortified itself. . . ."

[1] *Internationale politiek en Evangelie*, pp. 40, 41.
[2] See also what we have written, pp. 62–63, 102–106.

"A new, earthly god appears before the eyes of the modern man who has lost the true God, in the State, with its demand for sacrifice from every man, and, according to this conception of things, having authority to make such a demand. . . . But in truth this is only self-deceit; what we see here is only a more exalted and more powerful self-seeking. In the State, it is *himself* that a man loves, his mightier *ego*. . . . Just like the *polis*, the city-state of the ancients, the modern State monopolizes the whole man, even his soul. . . . The idea of the State dominates a man like a religious conviction. From the State begins a conscious reformulation of all values in a sense clean contrary to that in which the Gospel has made all things new. . . . If biology takes precedence over ethics, for the State, why not also in the social struggle for existence, in sexual questions, in philanthropy, etc.? That a great many Christians cannot perceive the supreme importance of this question makes our age one of great gravity, and that so many who call themselves followers of Christ consciously choose the side of Caesar, instead of Christ, is the great modern paganism. . . . To what a pass it has come with the civilized nations becomes plain from the cold-blooded and matter-of-fact way in which the possibilities of the so-called chemical warfare are discussed, a form of warfare far surpassing all the cruelties of wars hitherto and of the Reign of Terror, and simply treating men as so much material for destruction. . . . If Christianity does not set itself against this exalting of the State above morality, the spirit of the world will soon enough break loose from its fastness of non-moral political power, and will gradually reconquer every region which the Christian conscience has subdued to itself in the course of twenty centuries."[1]

We could not refrain from quoting these passages from Max Huber's work, both on account of the authoritative personality of the writer, and because they set forth precisely the conclusion to which our own inquiry has led us. In Max Huber's word sounds the protest of true Christianity, which rises up again after centuries of decline, and after a century of deep humiliation, in which the State seized its opportunity to establish itself as a god on earth and to get its pseudo-morality accepted even by

[1] Huber, op. cit., pp. 19–26.

Christian people, rises up again with something of the elementary power which was the characteristic of primitive Christianity, and in the name of Christ declares war against the spirit of the world, which avails itself of this political morality for its own ends.

Let us not be misunderstood. Unlike the Christians of the earliest centuries we cannot leave to others the maintenance of law and order. We would not annul the alliance which Christianity made with law, when it became responsible for the world and its course. But Christianity to-day, since its life is at stake, *demands*, with more insistency than ever, that true law shall not be lost in a political morality hostile to Christ, demands that the State shall learn to form part of a *corpus christianum*, which does not mean that the State ought to become a Christian—that cannot be—but does mean that the State shall so recognize its alliance with Christianity as to honour it and to take heed lest it encroach on or undermine Christian principle. This demand implies that the State shall give up behaving as an absolute power and determine, for the sake of righteousness, to become simply and solely just, only using its might for the maintenance of justice, with means which justice allows.

If Huber had considered still more deeply and consistently the attitude which Christ requires of Christians to-day, he could not have stopped at this vigorous statement of Christ's high and inexorable demands, but would also have drawn the conclusion that seems inevitable to-day, that Christianity must oppose, with all its strength, that most brutal and fatal expression of the pagan idea of super-moral political power, namely, war; that Christianity may no longer apply itself to war, under any consideration, or in any circumstance whatsoever. Huber does not draw this conclusion, partly from fear of anarchy, partly because of the residue in him of that political "morality" which he himself condemned, and partly because of his—as we think—too optimistic and so still unreal view of war. "The terrible passions that war causes to well up, the conscienceless methods which are employed at such times are undoubtedly exceptions."[1] Anyone who views war like that cannot oppose it as, from the

[1] Huber, op. cit., p. 34.

Christian standpoint, it must be opposed. We think Paul Natorp shows a better sense of reality when he decides that Kant could have assigned to our modern warfare no place but among "root evil".

In the next chapter we shall consider more closely whether this condemnation of war is right. There too, the question of the relation between justice and war will be answered.

CHAPTER IV

MORALITY AND WAR

We shall now try to form from the Christian standpoint a moral judgment of war as complete and accurate as possible, and especially of war as we experience it, viz. modern warfare. This we shall do by means of three questions, each of which we shall attempt to answer.

A. Can the State fulfil her moral task in and through war?
B. Can war as a means to an end receive moral sanction?
C. What value may be attached to the arguments used in defence of this means?

A. The Task of the State

In regard to the national life the modern civilized State has a threefold task: 1. To maintain justice; 2. To protect the nation's spiritual possessions; 3. To safeguard land and people.

1. *To Maintain Justice*

For everyone who has a sense of justice this is clearly the foremost duty. A State which gave up caring for justice would cease to have any right to exist. Apart from sound reason, personal love and a personal conviction of duty, it has been law, humanly speaking, which has kept this disordered, sinful world going. Therefore, the chief objection to war, raised by those who see this, is that it settles differences, not by justice, but by might. And so the whole basis of our civilization is shaken. "What is the whole tenor of our moral culture if not to supersede might by right. . . . War ignores justice. Thus war is morally condemned."[1]

This expulsion of justice is not usually felt strongly by the belligerents, because they all fancy they are fighting for right, and do not realize that when each seeks his own rights, right is lost. Indeed, the nation feels that some just grounds are indispensable; therefore it is the first business of a warring Govern-

[1] Professor Heijmans: *De Oorlog en de Vredesbeweging*, pp. 7–8.

ment to procure such justification at any price, for if the notion of right were dissipated, the nation would not go to war.

Yet everybody may see this violent expulsion of justice in its results. Christian theology has accepted the State's system of law as *poena et remedium peccati*, as once the task of the State was described. And so the State forbids its citizens to struggle for life with morally illicit means. But what do we see happening in war? The selfsame State employing the selfsame illicit means, but more intensely and on a wholesale scale. "Is it not morally absurd," asked Dr. Leo Polak (now Professor of juridical philosophy), during the war, "is it not a moral outrage, when the same State, the upholder of justice, which forbids and punishes all 'competition' among its individual citizens that is accompanied by the slightest violence against life, liberty and property, itself 'competes', with a violence that desecrates all justice, on behalf of those citizens, ay, even organizes and drives them, if need be, against their consciences, into such 'rivalry' with the help of slaughter, incendiarism and destruction; in short into outraging and scorning men's highest spiritual possessions?"[1]

When the State goes to war, thereby openly paying homage to a morality and demanding of its citizens a conduct which are the very negation of the morality it honours and the conduct it requires in time of peace, it undermines its primary ground for existence, viz. to be the upholder of justice and the sense of right. All the instincts and passions which justice serves to curb are provoked and stimulated to the highest degree by war: pride, hate, cruelty, blood-lust, contempt for one's neighbour and his life, brute sensuality. People should read such books as Gustav Höft's *Fluch den Waffen* (the judgment of famous Frenchmen on war), Andreas Latzko's *Menschen in den oorlog*, Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*,[2] Henri Barbusse's *Under Fire*,[3] which last book gave Professor Bavinck so vivid an impression of reality that in his brochure, *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond* (1920), he says, "The representation of war given to the people in the Press is utterly unreal". What does correspond with reality is the collection of soldiers' snap-

[1] *Oorlogsfilosofie*, pp. 55–56.
[2] E.T. (1929) of *Im Westen Nichts Neues* (1928).
[3] E.T. of *Le Feu* (1916).

shots in the work *War against War*.[1] One need not always agree with the accompanying letterpress to realize that those who have seen and gone through this cannot but laugh scornfully, henceforth, when they hear the State, which drove them into war, called "the upholder of justice, the avenger and repressor of sin", and also to realize that for many of these men, especially for those who live instinctively, the sense of justice has received an irreparable blow. No wonder General von Schönaich, in his book, *Vom vorigen zum nächsten Krieg*,[2] has to say that war, this so-called "means to justice", leaves with the community, among other things, the following after-effects: "Everywhere moral confusion. All good instincts suppressed, all evil ones aroused. . . . Thousands of homes shattered. Divorce enormously increased. Youth made dissolute. Venereal disease rampant on an unprecedented scale. . . . Usurers, thieves and murderers everywhere shamelessly at work." It is a vicious circle which war sets in motion: its substitution of brute-force for justice has moral confusion as a result, and this in turn brings forth contempt for justice. "Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill."

"It is for law to see to it", says Professor Scholten rightly, "that a man be not deprived of his opportunity to become a personality."[3] If then the State, in defiance of this duty, sends its young citizens to war, where they have to obey like so many machines, and where the beast in man breaks loose, and many cease to be as personalities, it must not complain if, after the war, respect for the authority of its "justice" be considerably reduced.

We do not deny that the State may protect the interests of the nation abroad or that this is within the sphere of its legitimate pursuits. We only ask whether war can be a means to a just end, when this means so much undermines the sense of justice of those who are involved actively or passively in its application. The next few pages will make the answer to this question plainer.[4]

[1] *Krieg dem Kriege*. Obtainable in four languages: pub. Freie Jugend, Berlin C.2. Parochialstrasse 29.

[2] Verlag der neuen Gesellschaft, Fichtenau bei Berlin, 1924, pp. 98, 112.

[3] Paul Scholten: *Gedachten over macht en recht*; Onze Eeuw, December 1917, p. 339.

[4] For the League of Nations and war, see Chapter V.

2. To Protect the Nation's Spiritual Possessions

We say spiritual possessions, because the cultural worth of a nation consists therein. There is no nation whose life is worth while merely for its material possessions, however vital to the national life they may be: these possessions will come up for discussion later. But the question how far the warring State protects the spiritual goods of a nation has already been partly answered above, in discussing the maintenance of justice. For as surely as the sense of right is supported by the nation's whole spiritual life, so surely that spiritual life is sapped when conscience is suppressed. Our spiritual life and possessions form such an organic whole that when one part is assailed, all the rest suffers too. When the sense of justice declines it is just those moral qualities that form the heart of a nation's civilization and wealth, which suffer most. The moral qualities of a Christian nation are closely bound up with reverence for man as the image of God and object of His love. Here too justice rests. A fine sense of justice, as we have already said, is rooted in fine moral feeling, and this last in respect for man. That Professor Krabbe, e.g., steadfastly asserts the high worth of the sense of justice and the just State, is closely connected with the value he recognizes in human personality. And although antiquity did not understand the modern idea of personality, Krabbe is nevertheless right, in his lecture on "The idea of personality in political science" (1908), when he calls the sense of the worth of personality the chief contribution of Christianity to political science, a contribution which must never be lost. In like manner Scholten remarks: "For the ancients, a man was primarily a citizen of his State (*zoön politikon*), first member of the community and only afterwards a personality. If Christianity has done anything new for political science and jurisprudence, it has been to reverse this order."[1]

We ask however—what becomes of this criterion of Christian ethical culture in wartime? Does not war, with its conscription and its wholesale destruction, display utter contempt for man, for his person and life? The introduction of compulsory military service could only occur in an age when Christianity was not in a position to protect its own spiritual possessions against growing

[1] *Recht en Liefde*, Synthese III, 4, pp. 18, 19.

nationalism and increasing political absolutism, with its hunger for ever bigger armies. Napoleon set the example and almost the entire Continent followed suit. "It is a fact established by history", writes the Catholic Professor Prunner, of the Great Seminary at Eichstatt, "that compulsory military service could only arise where the State had become religiously indifferent, or anti-Christian, and no longer recognized any right but its own omnipotence." The Roman Catholic moral theologian Aertnys rightly calls compulsory military service "the slavery of our age, which boasts loudly of its freedom". Father J. M. Keulers, who cites both these last passages, himself remarks "that those who have introduced compulsory service have laid on the nations the sorest, most degrading, burden they can bear".[1] He adds elsewhere that "each land is under obligation to root out and do away with that monstrous and scandalous slavery or traffic in men".[2]

This word "slavery" may seem rather strong, but we think it is not too strong, considering how our youths are seized at a stage of life when their characters are most in need of shaping, and trained, with utter disregard for their personalities and personal feelings, to kill the enemy.[3] In conflict with their Christian upbringing, and in conflict with the faith they professed not long before, they are taught on high authority, in a practical way, that the life of their neighbour who happens to be in another uniform is a thing of naught. And if, by and by, this training to fight has to be put to use in actual warfare, the worthlessness of men, the "idea of man as so much *materia delenda*" (Max Huber), is then demonstrated in the clearest light. While the Christian believer, in agreement with Christian principle, exerts all his strength to save a single soul, and the doctor —still in accordance with that Christian principle—does all he can to save the weakest and most wretched human life, in warfare hundreds of young men, like so many rats, are drowned and poisoned, while the spraying of machine-guns and the biting

[1] J. M. Keulers: *Oplossing van het Militaire Vraagstuk. Uitgevers vernootschap "Futura"*; Leyden, 1920 (with ecclesiastical *Evulgetur*), pp. 35–42.
[2] In *De Nieuwe Eeuw*, February 24, 1927.
[3] The sections on bayonet-fighting in the official army handbooks on infantry training should be read.

shell-splinters beat upon the living masses as on dead material. No wonder Barbusse reproduces his memories of the battlefield and the mood of his war-comrades thus: "Heroes? Some sort of extraordinary being? Idols? Rot! We've been murderers. . . . Yes, hard and persistent murderers, that's what we've been."[1] Many may not feel thus about it, because the worst slaughter does not result from hand-fighting but is mechanical: those who think will find this fact all the more demonic; and besides, close fighting, the fierce struggle for life or death, in which no man can remain human, is still inevitable. Otherwise, why train with hand-grenade and bayonet?

The man of sympathy usually thinks only of the war-*victims*, and deplores their lot. The Christian thinks especially of the *authors* of this thing, and asks what becomes of them. For the Christian the worst evil is not suffering, however terrible, but sin. The spiritual treasures which the State must guard are not necessarily harmed by suffering, though that is often the result; the character and spiritual worth of a man or a nation *may* be chastened and enhanced by suffering, even by unutterable suffering. But moral evil makes assaults on character and spiritual worth; a Christian may never rest content with that. That able and courageous Dominican, Father Stratmann, in his comprehensive and well-documented work, *Weltkirche und Weltfriede*,[2] becomes very fierce when he writes of the demoralizing influence of war. "Men turned into hyenas, not because they really have the nature of hyenas, but because that terrible Force which they have to serve dehumanizes them so that they become mere machines of slaughter. No slaughter-house of animals can be compared with the battlefield of man. Exaggeration is impossible."

Max Scheler had written, in 1914, that war destroyed only the products of civilization, not civilization itself. Father Stratmann replied in 1924, after all he had learnt and noticed in and since the war: No, but the soul of civilization too; Mars is disdainful of the soul; where he reigns, she is trampled underfoot.[3] Along with Stratmann's concern for the destruction of Christian and

[1] *Under Fire*, p. 342 in the combined volume, H. Barbusse, *Under Fire* and *Light*; London, 1929.
[2] E.T. (abridged), *Church and War* (London, 1929, under imprimatur of Westminster), p. 31.
[3] ibid., pp. 34–35.

Catholic society, his chief sorrow is for the destruction of morality. Neither the solemn, often exalted, mood of the first war-awakening, which, roused by the Government, is coupled with great self-exaltation at the cost of the enemy, and which speedily comes to an end ("Three weeks' carousal, three years' remorse,"[1] as a member of the German Reichstag put it in 1917); nor the true readiness for sacrifice, which gets clouded by the firm resolve to sacrifice another first and spare oneself as far as possible; nor the chivalry, which is often merely imaginary in modern war, where men "fire at the invisible enemy trusting to good luck, spray the trenches with levelling machine-guns, and wipe out whole regiments with creeping poison-gas"; none of these can counterbalance the increasing demoralization of a sustained war.[2] War breeds contempt of death, simply because it thrusts upon man contempt of life, contempt for others' lives, and ultimately for their own. Who can go on valuing life in such conditions? Much "bravery" has its origin here.

Is it not also demoralizing for the soldier who thinks, to know that all this work of murder and destruction is thought out in peace-time by esteemed and able men? Is it not demoralizing in the highest degree for him to find out afterwards that he was systematically plied with false information and ideas, to keep him up to scratch? Without falsehood no war could be entered on and certainly not sustained, for falsehood is one of its most indispensable weapons. Hellmut von Gerlach's *Die grosse Zeit der Lüge* [3] should be read, in particular the chapter on "Die Lügenzentrale". "From the first battle of the Marne," writes Martin Rade, "how we were beset with lies! The people of August 1914 did not deserve such treatment."[4] It was just the same in other lands, if things were going badly. And if only the lies had concerned the chances of war! But no. "The enemy", said the English Jesuit, E. Keating, "must be painted absolutely black and accused of every imaginable cruelty, as a monster outside the pale of human consideration. If this were not done the hateful work of killing and being killed would be impossible."[5]

[1] "Drei Wochen Rausch, drei Jahren Katzenjammer."
[2] *Church and War*, pp. 36–39.
[3] Charlottenburg, 1926.
[4] M. Rade: *Christentum und Frieden*; Tübingen, 1922, p. 9.
[5] Quoted by Stratmann, op. cit., p. 41.

Which of us will not recall, at these words, the fiction of the "corpse factory" which obstinately went the rounds of the allied Press for years! A pretty collection of these and other Press fabrications which sprang up during the war like poisonous toadstools, and did their work, is to be found in Lord Ponsonby's well-documented work, *Falsehood in War-time.*[1]

Although this spreading of lies may be mainly done with intent, often it arises wholly or in part from that restriction of intelligence which befalls every belligerent people. "Objectivity", wrote Kautsky in the first autumn of the war, "has become almost impossible, is even counted a misdemeanour." And on the other side, the old Communard, Albert Goule, wrote, "When the young men of my land are fighting the young men of any other land, I cannot and will not be impartial. Ours are heroes. They who want to kill our men are ruffians." Here something survives of the feeling that all is not as it should be, but for most people that feeling is wholly absent. The German classical scholar, Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, remarks, "Yes, war is something great, for it weighs men's hearts, it brings to light what is in every heart". Thus in the German people it has disclosed courage, concord and faith even unto death. . . . "And see what the war has discovered in the rest! What has come to light out of the Belgian soul? How it has revealed itself as the soul of cowardice and treachery!" On the other side, Colonel Wilfrid Ward wrote that the Germans "conduct a campaign of systematic savagery. . . . Chivalry, honour and humanity seem almost to have vanished out of the German Army." Mrs. Annie Besant called it a war of "white" forces against "black", of "right against might, law against violence, freedom against slavery, brotherhood against tyranny". Dr. Leo Polak, who reported these opinions in 1915, rightly observed, "These great names stand out conspicuous. But the disease rages in all circles".[2]

While the mind of the onlooker is poisoned in wartime, so that even their religious worship is attacked by hate and vengefulness and the deifying of their nation, and sinks back to the level of pagan State-worship (read the war-speeches), the combatants themselves are morally dulled; in a certain sense, fortunately, otherwise they could not stick to the "work".

[1] London, 4th ed., 1928.

[2] *Oorlogsfilosofie*, pp. 72–78.

Outbreaks of madness were not uncommon during the war,[1] especially when the soldiers were on leave and yet could not get rid of the pictures of the battlefield stamped on their minds. But most of them were kept from this fate by a blunting of sensibility. "The first night", I was told by a Prussian officer who had been campaigning in Russia, trekking from village to village, "we let the people sleep in the house and we slept in the stall; the second night we sent them out of the house, slept in their beds, but were disturbed by the cries of the women and children outside in the cold; the third night we laughed at it: what someone else felt didn't matter." The wounded and dead lying about soon ceased to matter; so long as you slept, and got your food and smokes!

It is obvious that such an existence leaves little room for moral and religious living. Dr. Raimund Dreiling, O.F.M., who went to the war as a chaplain, reports, "Even believing soldiers presently went into the battlefield without religious preparation and frankly said to us padres, 'It leaves us cold'. Men are dulled to everything and ask nothing better. They lose all religion and all morality, only the mad war goes on. Towards the close of the battle of the Somme some Bavarian cavalry-men made it quite plain to their commanding officer that they were not going to services or confession any more, but that they would do so again when this farce was over. . . . 'Before Verdun', so I was told by a wounded soldier in 1916, 'we used to pray; but now on the Somme there is no more praying—only cursing.'"[2] As in the army, so it was also with the people that remained behind and even with neutrals. Under the influence of shocking happenings, at first there seemed a great religious awakening. But as early as November 1914, Bavinck must needs testify, "This conversion has not gone very deep in many quarters; after these few weeks decline has visibly set in".[3] And after the war the same writer said, "Owing to the war and its manifold sufferings, thousands and thousands have yielded to scepticism, materialism and atheism".[4] But let us come back to the combatants themselves.

[1] G. F. Nicolai: *Die Biologie des Krieges*, 2nd ed.; Zurich, 1919, p. 96.
[2] Quoted by Stratmann, op. cit. See pp. 36–37 (abridged).
[3] Dr. H. Bavinck: *Het Probleem van den Oorlog*; Kampen, 1914, p. 28.
[4] *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond*, p. 31.

Along with this breaking away from religious restraints goes sexual licence. "From time immemorial Venus and Mars have been inseparable companions," says Stratmann. "In comparison with peace-time who shall tell the appalling number of adulteries and sins which must be laid to the charge of war? These excesses of course are easy to understand. The man who has been so cut off from all the amenities and decencies of ordinary life as the soldiers at the front, the man who has been plunged, as they have, for weeks and months at a stretch, into hell for both body and soul—just think what their eyes have seen, their ears heard, their nostrils smelt, their mouths tasted, their bodies felt—when he returns for the first time among people who are not armed to the teeth, but who invite him to rest and enjoy himself, may easily lose his head and break loose from all restraint. This same result may come about by the opposite process, i.e. by their having to wrench themselves away again from life's joys and plunge anew into the carnage of the battlefield." A chaplain told Dr. Dreiling about his men, who attended Mass as they were going up the line, but that night stormed the brothels of the town. "They are sampling the attack already," a soldier cynically remarked. And everyone knew that these troops were expecting an inordinately dangerous task. "But the licence of individuals", remarks Stratmann, "is not the worst feature. The worst is the . . . system. According to modern ideas brothels for soldiers are as much a necessity as baths or hospitals."[1] In the collection of war snapshots, *Krieg dem Kriege*, mentioned above, a military order is reproduced regarding the licensed house at München-Gladbach, whose women "are not able to appease the numerous visitors who swarm their house, before which there are constantly large groups of ravenous customers". And so the military authority gave order: "Each woman receives ten men every day, except Sunday. . . . For a stay of quarter of an hour, 5 Marks. . . . Plan: Monday, 1st Battalion, 164th Regiment; Tuesday, 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment; Wednesday, 2nd Battalion, 164th Regiment", etc. Tickets to be obtained from the sergeant-majors.

It may be said that there is no need to have anything to do

[1] See *Church and War*, p. 40, which, however, abridges the passages cited above.

with this official filth. True, those who are morally strong beyond the average will keep themselves sexually clean even in wartime, but if they have not yet given up praying like the soldiers on the Somme (see above), they will not do amiss to pray, "Lead us not into temptation". There are some who stand firm in this respect. And in other respects too? The best and finest spirits, are not they affected by the demoralizing influence of war? They cannot evade its bloody handiwork, they must take an active part therein; should they shrink back, the officer stands behind them with a revolver. They recoil, not from cowardice, but from moral revulsion and disgust, but they *must* carry on with bayonet fixed, grenade in hand. The very best are not dulled, God has made their souls too fine, but what they *suffer*. . . . If there is anything that can bring a curse to the lips of a Christian it is the thought of this enforced moral suffering on the part of the finest men. "Out here in Flanders", an Austrian soldier, George Leinhos, wrote to his parents in the autumn of 1914,[1] "we have to endure not only ghastly and terrible things but unspeakable and inhuman things, so that a man shuts his eyes and forgets he is a Christian." And later, as it drew towards Christmas: "How can I receive Christ here where all the devils of hell are loose?" He complains he can no longer hear the voice of God. Thank God, this earnest youth fell, before Christmas, at Dixmude. His conscience was troubled no more. He had borne himself bravely enough, had shown enough scorn of death, the Iron Cross was awarded him, but how far he felt withdrawn from that other Cross for which his soul yearned but which he could not attain by way of the "work" he was compelled to do. The worst is not that men are killed but that men must kill. It is mere talk to assert that the State takes responsibility away from you. The agonizing soldier answers, "Yes, but *I* have to do it". What Christian who cannot fully enter into the prayer of that father who, thinking of the possibility of his own boy being sent to the war, wrote, "O God, if this befalls him, grant him grace to die rather than lift his hand against his neighbour".[2]

Towards Christmas 1924 a Reformed Alliance at Leyden published a Christmas manifesto against disarmament, declaring

[1] A letter published in Holland during the war.
[2] *Kerk en Vrede*, December 1927.

that Christmas had nothing to do with disarmament, that the League of Nations must not lead us astray, that there would always be wars, but that it was still possible to keep Christmas, because the Christ-child was born. Now I can wholly approve of this manifesto as a protest against that superficial idea of Christmas which sees it, not as a feast of thankfulness for the divine love, but as a feast in honour of human love (a poor feast that would be!), and which sees in the phrase "peace on earth" only an injunction not to make war. No, from the world's blackest clouds the light of Christmas rises, shining as the grace of God. But here lies the gross untruth of this church manifesto: *we*, like Herod, "cannot bear the light" when we know that our sons or those of our neighbours are doomed out yonder in the trenches, like that Austrian soldier, to be deprived of the grace of God, no more to hear His voice, no longer able to receive Christ, because of the "unspeakable and inhuman things" they must endure and do.

With this we will end our answer to the question how far the belligerent State fulfils its task of protecting the spiritual possessions of the nation. We consider that the answer we have deduced from various aspects of the reality itself is one great indictment, and this is gravest when, as Christian conviction demands, the spiritual possessions of a nation are regarded as concentrated in the human personality, for the sake of which spiritual value Christ came to earth. And so we declare that where, owing to a State's waging war with its inevitable results, the child of God is checked in his growth, driven from the Kingdom of God, and abused in his very nature, not only is the task of the State to protect the spiritual possessions of the nation, neglected there, but also those possessions are actually attacked, injured and assaulted, with State authority.

3. *To Safeguard Land and People*

From the foregoing it appears that "national security" by means of war can only be understood in a material sense. When men speak of protecting or defending the national existence, we must not think of the spiritual quality of that national existence, which is much more harmed than helped by war:

we have to think only of biological existence in that land. I intentionally avoid speaking here of the "Fatherland", because that phrase is bound up in our consciousness with the thought of many spiritual possessions which come to grief in war. It is possible, however, to recognize some spiritual worth even in this material survival, by hoping that the people, restored from their wartime demoralization, will cultivate anew their old virtues, and so contribute again to the culture of mankind. The question whether that people could not contribute far more to civilization in some other way, as, for instance, by refusing war on ethical grounds, we leave unanswered for the moment, and confine ourselves to the question whether land and people can find security, in this material sense, in being prepared for war, either for the maintenance of neutrality (supposing that neutrality still exists for a nation affiliated with Geneva) or for defence, and possibly for meeting the first shock, until the "League of Nations' forces" appear.

Though we derive our chief arguments against war from quite other considerations, and our conviction would still stand fast, even if we were totally mistaken in this respect, we yet deem it worth while to say somewhat about it, if only to show that the reproach of utopianism which the "politicians of realism" throw in our face, turns back on those who utter it. Since we are not experts in this sphere we will listen to those who certainly are, and try to digest what they say with our whole understanding.

The question whether it was our arming which kept the Great Powers from invading Holland is variously answered, but everyone must concede: (i) that if Germany had had as much interest in a passage through our territory as she supposed herself to have in a passage through Belgium, she would not have hesitated to strike at our defences as quickly and vigorously as she did at the Belgians', and (ii) that in the event of another world-catastrophe in the future we must not count on having a repetition of the great good luck that was ours in the last war. As it was, the Great Powers did pretty much as they liked with our waters and mercantile fleet, but for the most part we remained unharmed. We may not count on that again, quite apart from our "obligations" to the League. If we are prepared for war, the

probabilities are that we shall be actively involved in the next one. And then, if our land should be attacked, our military authorities would be compelled and ready with all speed to abandon the outer provinces, and withdraw to the "fortress of Holland". There could only be talk of "protecting the land" in the most limited sense, even if resistance were successful, while military tactics might result in the abandoned provinces undergoing systematic destruction at the hands of our own army.

But our resistance would meet with no success, if I may believe the experts I have consulted. They vie with one another in insisting that the next war will be waged in and from the air, and with poison-gas. Regarding this gas-warfare, however, the English expert W. H. Livens, who eventually outdid the German gas-attacks in the last war, with the invention of his gas-projector, states that victory in the next war will depend mainly upon two factors. First, on the question, who has discovered the hitherto unknown gas, with which attacks may be launched unexpectedly, and against which the enemy cannot protect himself. Second, on the question, who can develop beforehand, in peace, the largest chemical industry. "Only those states that are organized to the highest degree in this respect can wage war on the modern scale."[1] And so, entirely apart from the question whether the rest of our armaments are adequate, from the standpoint of the gas-industry we cannot wage a modern war. A general on the reserve list once said to me, "I think of the next war like this: suppose, for example, France were our opponent, it would square its account with us the very first night: a squadron of aircraft would appear above our land, mock at our frontier defences, break through our little air-force with a loss of a few machines, pursue its flight, and on the following day Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam would exist no more." This agrees with the view of Professor Wester of the Netherlands Military Academy, who in 1924 insisted that we should organize a Chemical Service (which has since been begun; Dutch poison-gas officers are already trained), for we may take it "that a few large bombs filled with powerful chemicals . . . would be dropped from big aeroplanes already built

[1] W. H. Livens: "Gas in the next war", *The Graphic*, June 25, 1927, pp. 538, 539.

for the purpose and an extensive area [a town] would be wiped out in a few minutes."

Already, when Wester was writing this, these huge machines and bombs had been manufactured. John Bakeless, who, as appears from the preface to his book, *The Origin of the Next War*, possessed exceptionally good sources of information, records that from the 8th to the 11th of November, 1918, two super-Handley-Pages driven by four engines, each of 375 h.p., stood ready night and day to attack Berlin. Aircraft of six other types, almost as large, were ready or under construction. The small bombs of the beginning of the war had been gradually replaced by bigger and bigger ones, and these Handley-Pages were to carry monsters of half a ton and higher than a man. The Allies were expecting a German raid on Paris with an air-fleet which would pour over the city tons of blazing phosphorus, "whose flames water would not extinguish, and against which all known methods of fire-fighting would have been entirely useless. . . . The Allies were preparing literally thousands of airplanes, which would have sown death and destruction up and down the length and breadth of Germany. Against the new poison-gases only a secret gas-mask, which the Germans did not have and could not manufacture, offered any protection. 10,000 new tanks and 7,500 motor transports of a new design were being constructed, able to carry pursuing infantry steadily forward day and night over any kind of country at a rate of some 10 to 15 miles an hour."[1]

Owing to the armistice and subsequent "peace" these surprises did not come off. They were reserved for the next war, but in other forms. Let us not forget, Bakeless rightly warns us that the next war begins where the last finished, or rather, at a more developed stage, for the war industry is not standing still. In January 1927 the papers reported that the British Minister for Air had given orders for the construction of thirty giant bombers, each of 1,000 h.p., provided with an apparatus for enveloping themselves in a smokescreen. And every month other new inventions and promises are reported, on land and sea and in the air. Of course we cannot accurately and completely

[1] John Bakeless: *The Origin of the Next War*; London, 1926, pp. 253–255. Holland also now has a tank!

predict, but the worst prediction has this value, that it will help to safeguard us "against the perilous folly of believing that the next great war will be the relatively mild, milk-and-water affair that the last one was".[1]

On how great a scale the powers conceive future gas-attacks appears from the preparations which they are making. The lady-director of the bio-chemical laboratory at Berne, who visited the chemical arsenal at Edgwood, where scientific experiments are made for military purposes, reported that it covers one thousand acres and has a capacity, for chlorine manufacture alone, of fifty tons a day.[2] How the spiritual worth of science is injured and abused because of war!

What will a little country, inadequately armed and, in chemical regards, poorly organized, do against an overwhelming gas-attack from the air? Two answers are given in Holland, both of which bear evidence of perplexity. The first is, provide the whole population with gas-masks, or if that is not efficacious, the whole population of the town that is thus attacked must suddenly vanish into great cellars which have been built expressly for this purpose. Anyone who visualizes this situation hardly knows whether to laugh or cry. The second answer is, Holland will not stand alone, but like Belgium in the last war will have powerful allies. What strikes us about this answer is how little those who give it seem to feel the humiliation in it for a self-respecting country, which in this case cannot choose, but automatically accepts, its ally, at the first violation of its frontier, accepts perhaps the least-desired ally, thereafter to be harnessed to its mighty chariot of war. The national and military pride these people brag so much about seems to be wanting here. Modern warfare is well calculated to rob a people of these qualities.

Yet even the help of great allies will not avail. For it becomes more and more obvious that even they will be unable to protect their towns. Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, who was head of the British air-defences in 1918, stated in 1922, in a League of Nations' report, that the entire air-defences of London, consisting of 300 aeroplanes divided into 11 squadrons, supported

[1] *The Origin of the Next War*, p. 252.
[2] Dr. Gertrud Woker: *Der kommende Giftgaskrieg*; Leipzig, 1925, pp. 29, 36.

by 200 anti-aircraft guns with searchlights, had not prevented the bombardment of London, although the largest number of German aircraft on any one raid was only thirty-six. "It is plain", he wrote, "that it would be impossible for a country to maintain a defence for every town and every other centre on such a scale: but even if it were possible, such a defence would be useless before an air-attack of thousands, or even hundreds, of aeroplanes." The air-manœuvres over London in August 1928 have completely confirmed this statement. The English Press admitted that, had it been in earnest, London would have been wiped out, in spite of the fact that a strong and alert defensive force knew both the objective and the time of the attack. *Defence is no longer possible, although not a single government dare say so.* Of the gas-clouds which would emerge from the bombs dropped by such an air-fleet, and which, being heavier than air, "would penetrate to the cellars and shelters to which the inhabitants had fled", this same General Groves writes in a League of Nations' report in 1923, "All gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civilian population against this form of attack". From which considerations Air-Marshal Lord Trenchard, till lately Chief of the Imperial Air Staff, drew the conclusion that the only real defence consists in counter-attacks on the cities of the enemy. "Although it will be necessary", he said in April 1925, "to have some means of defence, with the object of maintaining the *morale* of our own population, it is *much more* necessary to crush the *morale* of the enemy population, for no other means can end the war." The Norwegian, Dr. Chr. Lange, general secretary of the Interparliamentary Union, viewed it thus in 1926: "The recent development of destructive means makes the idea of defence more and more illusory. A new war would much rather consist of a series of attacks, now from one camp, now from the other, without any particular connection or common plan, against the big cities of the different lands. It would be a war of reprisals."

This is the support which the Netherlands would receive from its great ally, whoever it might be, in the next war, and this is the fate which our people might then expect. A defence of national existence with the slogan: Destroy and be destroyed

en masse! A state cannot, in and through war, fulfil even its third task, "to safeguard land and people," though we conceive that safeguarding only in a material sense. Least of all can the Netherlands do so.

B. Can War Receive Moral Sanction?

We have seen (i) that war leads to a weakening of the sense of right, and contempt for justice; (ii) that it cannot protect, but rather attacks, the nation's spiritual possessions; (iii) that modern warfare does not safeguard country and people—especially a small country and people—but exposes it to devastation and destruction. On all three points the belligerent State fails in the fulfilment of its task. Inasmuch as these three conclusions to which we have come relate to moral values, a moral judgment is implied therein, a judgment which discussion must needs bring to light. But now we will leave the technical side of the problem of war, the question whether armed defence is *possible*, and survey the whole practice of war exclusively from the ethical standpoint, and ask whether it is morally *admissible*; meaning, of course, Christian morality, the morality born of the Gospel, which everyone who would lead a Christian life regards, the morality recognized by every earnest man in any Christian land.

1. *State Ethic and Christian Principle*

After all that we have said in Chapters II and III, it is evident that, although we cannot recognize any double morality, we will just as little deduce political ethic *directly* from the Gospel. As individuals we cannot act perfectly in this imperfect world, even though we ourselves be perfect. How much less can the State, which is formed and carried on by very diverse and mostly very imperfect men, and which, moreover, when it looks after itself, i.e. the community, is not necessarily to be regarded as acting selfishly. The State has other responsibilities quite different from those of the individual, and so the same moral demands cannot be made upon its collective conduct which are made upon that of individuals; only we must bear in mind that individuals have to effect this collective conduct. The conduct

of the State, which ought to be above passion, but which cannot attain the higher levels of the emotional life, reveals as collective conduct a character of compromise more often and more obviously than that of individuals, even when both try to fulfil their moral obligations. Because it bears this character to so marked a degree, it has often given cause, as we have seen, for the assumption of an alternative morality. But there is only *one* morality, *one* criterion, *one* standard, that of goodness. On the whole even the best political conduct shows up as compromise, as an inevitable compromise between the necessities which this sinful and bewildered world imposes and the demands imposed by moral sense. These necessities, however, are not always the same, any more than the moral sense is at all times equally pure. With the former, changes are possible, and with the latter, rises and falls. Thus this compromise has not always the same content and is not always on one level.

Any serious-minded man, who examines himself, recognizes a compromise within the moral sphere to be a divergence from pure morality, and regrets it. Therefore in a serious compromise there is always a certain strain, a tension which, as soon as opportunity affords, forces up the compromise, and lifts it to a higher plane, a tension which prevents one from being lulled to sleep by the compromise, which would sink, should that happen, to a still lower level.

The political morality of a Christian nation is based on such a compromise. It is very certain that it must be a serious one. The responsible citizen earnestly desires that as much as possible of the Christian ethic be preserved, as little as possible sacrificed. Not every compromise can be accepted by a Christian: that follows naturally. The less it contains of the Gospel ethic, the more it nullifies that ethic, the graver it becomes. Every Christian feels there are limits, even for the State. Where those limits lie is difficult to say. A mutual understanding may be reached, a collective opinion can be formed and from it a rule of conduct may be deduced, but the conscience, i.e. the individual conscience, is the decisive and morally authoritative factor. Yet some criteria can certainly be given. Of deliberate purpose I here quote two eminent *jurists*.

Professor Paul Scholten: "Anyone who exalts the interest of

the State above all else cannot maintain the claim of love; he must sacrifice it. But along with love—and this is indeed noteworthy—he sacrifices justice. For justice is thus divorced from the deepest principle which underlies and must underlie it. Justice then becomes synonymous with the will of the State." But "if justice is the will of the State, how can the State be bound to justice? . . . Love is sacrificed to justice . . . justice in its turn to the State."[1] Thus both justice and State are robbed of their ethical worth. The same jurist says elsewhere: "Might must be based on right. Right organizes might, binds its exercise by just rules. This is the direction in which we have to work, because, and in so far as, the idea of personality, of respect for the personality of another, issues from it. 'Love your neighbour' is not a statute, but respect for your neighbour can be its adumbration in the law."[2]

Dr. Max Huber concerns himself with the practical application of the "Great Commandment" (Matt. xxii. 36–40; Luke x. 27) which is given in the Gospels, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise" (Luke vi. 31; Matt. vii. 12), and says, "This rule, which indeed, so far as form and content are concerned, could be regarded as an anticipation of Kant's categorical imperative is adequate foundation for the building of complete social righteousness. It is a Scripture of cardinal importance. Only the man who regards the State as of absolute nature, above the moral order, can maintain that righteousness in this sense while holding good for individuals mutually does not for communities of men, and so, does not for nations. . . . Even when this commandment to love, which by its nature goes straight to the heart of the individual, is regarded as lying outside the sphere of social and political life, it can nevertheless be maintained that the righteousness of the Christian ethic cannot in any case stand in full opposition to love and brotherhood."[3]

We assent wholeheartedly. On one point all Christians should be agreed. Where the Christian ethic has reached zero, being wholly sacrificed to what men call "hard necessity"; where all

[1] *Recht en Liefde*; Synthese III, 4, pp. 19, 20.
[2] *Gedachten over Macht en Recht*, Onze Eeuw, December 1917, p. 345
[3] *Internationale politiek en Evangelie*, p. 36.

the tension has gone from the compromise, because, of the two components which form it and must be held in equilibrium, one, the Christian ethic, has wholly yielded to the other; where the "compromise" is only maintained in appearance, as a screen behind which anti-Christian morality can have its own sweet will, there the Christian may no longer give his approval to this conduct; there he sees Christian principle disdained and trampled underfoot; only one possible course of action remains open for him there: protest, protest in the name of Christian principle, protest in the name of Christ himself.

This resistance is to-day being roused and directed against war, against every war, against war as such. A public opinion is forming which unconditionally rejects war as incapable of moral sanction. For the man who knows his New Testament and primitive Christianity (see Chapter I), this can cause no wonder. He wonders, rather, that the protest has been so long delayed. Certainly one can point to the stout endeavours of Christian sects like the Waldenses, the first Baptists and the Quakers, and even vigorously protesting Christians like Erasmus, Fox, Tolstoy, who were not without their disciples, but that there is a public opinion forming against war—at least, in those civilized lands and classes that have been less badly attacked by nationalism and militarism—that is *new*. Indeed the fact of a public opinion at all is not old, and is closely connected with the democratic development of the peoples. But it belongs to the last few years, that this public opinion should turn against the idea of a state having a right to make war and to force its citizens to war. The man who wants to understand the causes of this spiritual movement should of course think first of Christian principle itself, which lives in men's hearts in spite of everything, should think too of the ghastly lesson of the Great War, which gave so severe a blow to the glorification of State and might and so undeniable a *dementi* to the prevailing political philosophy. But thereafter he should fix his eyes on two lines of development, which have crossed. First, the line of developing Christian humanitarianism and the allied consciousness of right; second, the line of development in warfare. We shall have something to say about each.

2. Development of Christian Humanitarianism

After the first heroic centuries of Christianity in which Christians were dead to the world, and had their homeland in heaven, it seemed for a long time as if the Christian regard for man, with its indirect support from Stoic ethics, could no more find entrance among Christian peoples. The times were chaotic and rude. Each nation led an independent and isolated existence, in spite of a common faith. Beyond its own frontiers was enemy land, of which one must beware, even in times of peace. Principles of brotherhood were simply barren abstractions when it came to dealing with people abroad. People felt their existence threatened all the time, not only by other people, but also, and quite as much, by natural calamities, like plague, fire, failure of harvest, etc., in regard to which they were helpless. They lived in the midst of alarms which they accepted fatalistically as belonging to a mysteriously hard world-order. They had no share in national government; they bowed before the will of war, just as they gave way before any devastating storm. In that hard, rude life the national character remained rude (remember how even men like Luther and Calvin could calumniate their earnest-minded opponents in the coarsest way), and the mind of the people narrowly nationalistic even in religion. The ideas of humanity and international law, which are inseparably bound, could gain no strength in this sphere. Even healthy national sentiments and the motive of liberty could, for the most part, find no other form of expression than the violence of war. So war became the ground of national consecration and courage, qualities which even we can honour to a certain degree, especially when we see them in the setting of their age.

In those days the idea of war did not yet rankle, it still belonged more or less to the routine of national life. Trials of heretics were still the order of the day, sometimes even among Protestants, and humane feeling did not as yet set itself against judicial torturing of accused and condemned (see the Gevangen Poortje at The Hague); in those days an upright Christian like Cromwell could say, without seeming profane, "Trust in God and keep your powder dry!" in those days men could still associate Christianity and war in their minds without much difficulty, still see Christ on the battlefield; but then another

age opened, longer periods of rest and reflection in between wars, greater security against national calamities was attained, and, partly under the influence of international intercourse, the community idea grew stronger; then arose with great strength the humanitarian idea which is at the root of all justice ("Das Fundament des Rechts ist Humanität": Albert Schweitzer),[1] and of that universal morality, which Rudolf Otto points out as "Welt-ethos". This humanitarian principle, which, as we have seen,[2] has its deepest foundation in Christian principle, has had greater opportunity to develop during the last century. "On the whole," says Bavinck rightly, "manners have mellowed; slavery and serfdom have disappeared out of our social life; God's judgments are no longer anticipated by blood revenge; the scaffold, the rack, and instruments of torture have been abolished."[3] We are not glorying light-heartedly in progress, we know that alongside development degeneration is at work, and that man is always in danger of losing from one hand what he gains with the other: but that in this regard the Gospel ethics of mercy and respect for the human soul rose up more vigorously and became more clearly known, admits of no doubt in my mind. One has only to read such a book as Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1853), which gave so powerful an impetus to the abolition of slavery. For long years men had tried to justify this injustice, even by appealing to the Bible, in which Ham's tribe were cursed, and in which even the New Testament does not attack slavery, "therefore approves it". But at last the growing humanitarian conviction could endure slavery no more, and condemned it, primarily and rightly, on the basis of Christian principle. The spirit of the Gospel has in this respect permeated the hardened hearts of men.

A like protest, born of the same spirit, is rising up against war. War is no longer adapted to the national scheme of life, it shatters civilization, it rankles like an intolerably painful wound in the conscience. After the short wars of 1866 and 1870, Bertha von Suttner wrote her striking book, *Die Waffen Nieder!* and although the politicians took little notice of it, as there was no formed public opinion in this respect as yet, the book found

[1] Albert Schweitzer: *Kultur und Ethik*; Munich, 1923, p. xix.
[2] See pp. 85–89.
[3] *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond*, p. 70.

a good public in consequence of the normal reaction of the human conscience to the inhuman business of war. What was and always has been barbarous was then felt and recognized as barbarous—and that was the beginning!

But in contrast with those of Harriet Beecher Stowe the times were not yet ripe for Bertha von Suttner's ideas. The wars which, by their miseries, had driven her to take up the pen, had also strengthened nationalism and imperialism. The growing economic conflict, and fierce competition in every quarter, not least of all in armaments, were mighty factors in keeping awake the war-spirit, praised and sung by philosophers and poets, and in increasing the peril of war. Glorification of the State and the mechanizing of labour united to diminish the value of man,[1] and to increase inhumanity despite higher influences. The development of the humanitarian ideal and of the moral sense both seemed checked. "Deutschland über Alles", "My country, right or wrong", "sacro egoismo" were the slogans. Thus inhumanity increased: the outbreak of 1914 had to come. "When the war came," wrote Albert Schweitzer, "the inhumanity which was in us was let loose."[2] But this apotheosis of inhumanity, ultimately, in spite of the persistent after-effects of the war, resulted in the revival with elementary power of the notions of humanity and justice, and accordingly changed the moral judgment, so that the latter can no longer bear the warfare that it formerly endured. Christian principle, which did much to bring about this change (of which unfortunately little is to be traced in the bosom of official Christianity, but all the more outside it), being, indeed, its real motive power, both open and concealed, may be credited with it as a triumph. It was high time! The "compromise" on which war is based threatened to crush the life out of that principle. But Christ lives, and therefore principle rises up again and refuses to submit any longer to the bondage of this "compromise".

3. *Development of Warfare*

This too has influenced the formation of the above-mentioned judgment. While all other forms of the compromise with the

[1] See G. J. Heering: *De Tijden Roepen*; Rotterdam, 1914.
[2] A. Schweitzer: *Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur*; Munich, 1923, p. 15.

Christian ethic which the State must make, e.g. the penal code and prison laws, undergo constant improvement and humanizing, war has steadily developed in the opposite direction, and will continue to do so, from its very nature. The comparison is often to be heard, "You may just as well try to humanize a tiger as a war". This is true, except that a tiger remains the same; war, however, becomes worse and worse. The low estimate of man prevalent in wartime sinks steadily lower, as fast as the technical standard rises. And no Red Cross, nor any restrictive measures for moralizing war, supposing anyone pays heed to such considerations, can alter that fact. They rather evoke the delusory belief that war is not so bad after all. Conscription obliges the whole nation to take part in what was formerly the work and lot of mercenaries, and both these have become more horrible. An immoral human ingenuity has poured forth upon the belligerent peoples one devilish surprise after another, in which a climax is plainly to be marked, and has driven them to take a hand; who does not join in is left behind and lost.

The Lateran Council of 1139 put the newly invented crossbow under the ban, but the crossbow proved effective, and so remained. When cannons were first brought into use there was indignation among the more chivalrous fighters, and Shakespeare protests, in *Henry IV*, against "these vile guns".[1] But cannons and guns proved effective—far more so than the old weapons had done—and so remained. Cannon-balls became high-explosive shells, guns became machine-guns. That distinguished writer, Simon Gorter, editor of *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, wrote in his paper, in July 1870, during the Franco-German War: "Concerning your son, of whom it was reported to you baldly that he fell in this or that encounter,[2] they say that he, along with a number of others, was mangled and torn to pieces by a whistling piece of iron, shot from a great distance out of an invisible machine." And in August, when Gorter heard of the work of the mitrailleurs, he wrote a wrathful article: "That slaughter is not fighting!" "The hero of our athletic clubs, the Achilles of our sports has fallen, together with a hundred country-bumpkins,

[1] Bakeless records both facts in *The Origin of the Next War*, p. 276.
[2] In 1914 the phrase "a hero's death" was discovered. The more hideous the death, the more beautiful the name it is necessary to find for it.

mown down by another bumpkin, from a distance of a mile or more, with a turn of a wheel. . . . Ugh!"

But the technical war-mind recognizes neither chivalry nor any other moral virtue, caring only for the quality of destructive and terrifying effect, and going on from strength to strength. It is always advancing, for its ingenuity is inexhaustible and stops at nothing. In 1914 the first aeroplanes hovered above the enemy army, dropping their bombs from heights at which they could not be touched. An indignant Russian general, Bakeless tells us,[1] swore that he would hang every German airman that fell into his hands. That wasn't fighting! But the number of air-bombers increased tenfold in no time. The ingenious war-mind went further. In the winter of 1914–1915, the submarine U9 carried out the first successful torpedo attack, and in a few minutes sank three British cruisers, drowning 2,500 young men, without having been seen. People said it was an unheard of crime and . . . set themselves to follow the example.

The wonders of technique make it more and more difficult to be ready for enemy attacks; the only defence, as we have said, will more and more lie in contriving new "arms" and making unexpected attacks. The Belgian forts were calculated to withstand the artillery which was known before the war. But when the unexpectedly heavy mortars of the Germans were in position, it was speedily all over with Liège. And with a single shot Fort Loncin collapsed and entombed eight hundred men, who all together came to the grave "in heroic combat".

Three months after the outbreak of war Germany resorted to asphyxiating gas, at first on the Eastern Front. The Hague Convention of 1899 had forbidden the use of "projectiles which have as their object the liberation of asphyxiating or injurious gases". Whether Germany first thought of the excuse that (as yet) they were not "projectiles", or whether it merely waived the prohibition does not matter. W. H. Livens is right: no nation that fights for its existence will shun any means which proves effective, on any grounds whatever. The effect on the surprised Russian troops was appalling. With blue swollen faces, bleeding from mouth and nostril, ninety per cent. of those attacked died a slow death of suffocation, which lasted days,

[1] *The Origin of the Next War*, p. 262.

in some cases weeks.[1] In the early new year, desperate over the static condition of trench-warfare, Germany used gas on the Western Front too, in the fighting at Ypres. This first gas-attack cost the British five thousand lives. The German ordnance officer, Rudolf Binding, who let fall in his very soberly written diary hardly a word of the cruelties of the battlefield, which makes what few remarks there are all the more impressive, could not refrain from commenting:[2] "Five Ways, April 24, 1915: The effects of the successful gas-attack are ghastly. Poisoning men—I don't know what to make of it! Of course, the whole world will first rave about it, and then copy us. . . . The dead all lie on their backs with clenched fists; the whole field is yellow. . . ." Binding was right. Europe howled with indignation, and then hurried to take reprisals, and at the end of the war the British, with American help, were able to boast that they held the mastery with this weapon. Germany was worsted, as it had already been over the hunger blockade, which spelt death or tuberculosis to thousands of children.

For the next, "three-dimensional" war, the militarists set their hopes upon irresistible and invulnerable tanks and aeroplanes armed with poison-gas. Gas-warfare especially opens up wide perspectives. Only childlike spirits can believe that men will agree to ban these means. In view of these people, however, it is perhaps not without need that Dr. Wester writes, "Extensive reading has convinced me that most lands[3] will not give up this weapon unless . . . they find one that is more effective".[4] The Geneva protocol forbidding gas-warfare, signed and ratified by many States but only with important reservations, will burst like a soap-bubble with the first breath of war. As we have already said, the war-mind recognizes no other criterion than that of effectiveness. We would say emphatically that we are not of those who needed poison-gas to convince them that warfare cannot have moral sanction. Even without thinking of this weapon or of the all-surpassing horror of the war which is now

[1] Woker: *Der kommende Giftgaskrieg*, p. 73.
[2] Rudolf G. Binding: *A Fatalist at War*, London, 1929, p. 64.
[3] And therefore no country that would be "prepared" will give it up.
[4] Professor Dr. D. H. Wester: *Gifgassen en bescherming der burgerbevolking*. *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, Jan. 18, 1928, Avondblad. It is pitiful that even Geneva (as recently as April 1929) engages in the comedy of "humanizing" war.

being prepared, we have made up our minds; we have already had more than enough in the last war. Besides, we do not know whether this form of war is more immoral and more savage than other forms; a high-explosive shell in a ship's hold, or fierce bayonet-fighting, seems to us at least equally bad. And the fact that the greatest executioner of the Inquisition, Torquemada, "in the fifteen years of his activities, had put only nine thousand men to death, while nowadays a divisional commander achieves the same result in a single day,"[1] is rendered none the less terrible by the reflection that these numbers will sink into insignificance contrasted with the numbers of which the future will speak. It was slaughter before; slaughter it remains, although it becomes more and more wholesale. Yet we think it psychologically quite explicable that the growing protest is directed specially against poison-gas. Not only because this new means strikes the imagination so vividly, but also because it brands war for what it is in a special way. Death by suffocation (hanging or drowning) has always been regarded as a dishonourable death; it has been the death by which men gave out that they despised the evildoer. Contempt for the individual and his life, which is inherent in the very nature of war, ay, contempt for the whole opponent nation, comes to light more plainly than ever before. In that hateful word "poison-gas", people may hear that contempt expressed. Thus far this new means can be regarded as gain: the real character of war has become much more visible thereby; this eye-opening would be greatly speeded if the peoples knew what was being prepared in the laboratories of war. This however remains secret.

Yet it is with this disclosure, which alarms people who have too long followed traditional ways, that the difficulty begins for those who would retain poison-gas, or who know well that it will not be banished and therefore must be used, and who would prevent a people, scorned by war, from scorning war and militarism in their turn. For this reason our Dutch Government has made no haste to heed the plea of the League of Nations Assembly "to afford the fullest publicity" to the report of the commission of experts on chemical warfare, which report made so powerful an impression everywhere. And so our Government contented

[1] Nicolai: *Die Biologie des Krieges*, p. 105.

itself at the finish with an abridged edition of only eight hundred copies, in French! There was danger in this publicity and it was not the danger of party propaganda alone.

To drive out this danger, says Dr. Woker, "the fairy-tale is invented of the humanity of gas, and those cases especially are reported in which it has been possible really to protect the troops with masks and other gas-defences".[1] In accord with this sort of representation, Dr. Wester writes in the article already quoted: "Statistics show that the number of dead and even wounded in a gas-attack is always very small, if only men have good masks at hand, and put them on betimes." There are difficulties, however, in that little word "if", which make the argument worthless. Not only is there the technical difficulty, which this writer himself considers insurmountable, of providing army and civilian population in time with masks adequate for protection. There are others he omits to mention. Firstly, how shall people protect themselves when taken unawares by unfamiliar gases, on which, as Livens says, victory will largely depend? and secondly, how shall they protect themselves against those gases which, like the lewisite which the Americans had already prepared before the end of the war, blister the skin, and so penetrate, doing the more damage the tenderer the skin, thus claiming most victims among children?[2] The attempt to find moral sanction for poison-gas is too forced, too full of lacunae, too apt to gloss over the main difficulties to have any chance of success. The word "humane" or "more humane", the woof and warp of this attempt, reveals its artificial character, and besides, points to a state of mind the man in the street will not accept. With no word did General Snijders excite his audience in his debate with Professor van Embden in September 1924 so much as with *this* word. If he had said "less devilish" he would have been better understood.

But poison-gas has laid still another odium on war, viz. that it has abolished the old classic distinction between soldiers and civilians, which distinction was even getting difficult to maintain

[1] *Der kommende Giftgaskrieg*, p. 18.

[2] ibid., pp. 26, 80. The International Women's League, assembled at Frankfort in January 1929, advised by chemical and military experts, thought it their duty to "warn the nations against the delusion that reliable protection would be possible against gas-attacks".

in the last war and was constantly infringed. Our ex-minister, Van Dijk, might assure the Second Chamber (March 2, 1927) that we shall direct our poison-gases only "against the active army of the enemy", but all the experts assure us that this is not possible and nobody believes it is. It is just as much idle talk as the ministerial promise that our chemical arm will only be used in defence: here again one of the weak patches in the apology for poison-gas shows up. Otherwise why all the insistence of the expert advisers on furnishing the civilian population with gas-masks and on drilling them with these appliances? Not only because gas-clouds go wherever the wind drives them, but also because it is realized that not the front-line—that can be flown over—but the industrial centres will be the first to suffer in the coming war. "The dividing line", writes Bakeless, "between soldiers and civilians, which wore perilously thin in the last war, will vanish altogether in the next great war."[1]

By means of the air arm the power has been gained of crossing the front-line and attacking the enemy nation at its heart. "The old law of strategy", writes Major Endres, "is to appear with overwhelming forces at the decisive point. . . . The decisive point more and more tends to be at home, in the industrial centres, etc., and therefore strategy appears here with overwhelming forces of aeroplanes with gas and high-explosive bombs". Besides, when the enemy's home is thus attacked he is paralysed. "When the *will* of the enemy is the crucial factor, it follows that we must undermine this will in the quickest and most direct way possible. . . . The objective of three-dimensional warfare is the non-combatant." One cannot escape the impression "that the soldier of the future *must* be an executioner and a wholesale murderer in order to be a good soldier".[2] *Le Monde Nouveau* of April–May 1927, p. 188, comes to the same conclusion: "The directors of national defence will manage to learn from the real evildoers."

The old distinction between combatants and non-combatants has certainly already lost most of its significance, for our conscripted soldiers did not go to war of their own free will. Now-

[1] *The Origin of the Next War*, p. 261.

[2] Franz Carl Endres: *Giftgaskrieg die grosse Gefahr*; Zurich, 1928, pp. 63, 69, 77.

adays too they have been rendered practically defenceless, and with their wounding or death their relatives are hit just as hard, if not harder. But, although we cannot fully grasp the great importance of this distinction which has hitherto been more or less observed, we do recognize how many have come to discover the thorough immorality of war just through this latest revelation of war's true character. So, e.g., Father Stratmann, who calls modern warfare a "crime", especially for the reason given above.[1]

We must therefore conclude that the development of warfare is a climax technically speaking—but morally, an anticlimax, in proportion. But war has not reached its summit: an unlimited future still lies before it, for, as we have said, human ingenuity is absolutely inexhaustible, and scruples at nothing. Perhaps the next step of the climax will be bacterial warfare. "Impossible!" cried out General Snijders in his debate, for "this would be a devilish method, and besides, dangerous for those who used it". This latter *may* be an objection, not so the former. It is speaking testimony of the sentiment of our former Commander-in-Chief, that he believes there are limits, even in warfare; he obviously sees those limits at the point where already adopted methods end and still untried methods begin. Yet this view is as childish as the idea that war permits of limits. Whether disease-germs will be turned to account will, in spite of all treaties, depend simply and solely on whether they can be employed *with effect*, and without having "the enginer hoist with his own petard". We must certainly consider, says Bakeless, the possibility of bacteriological warfare. "There is not the least reason, except humanitarian considerations, which really do not count, why tiny test-tubes of disease-germs [a kind of self-perpetuating ammunition] should not be sowed broadcast by airplanes or even inserted casually in the enemy's streams, reservoirs, and stores of food, by a few hundred active and devoted intelligence agents. Most of the germs thus broadcast would probably die, but enough might survive to start epidemics which would have a certain military value."[2]

One involuntarily turns from such a picture of the future with disgust, saying: This cannot be, it is too horrible! But

[1] *Church and War*, pp. 72, 73. [2] *The Origin of the Next War*, pp. 267, 288.

anyone who reflects and can visualize the realities of the last war knows that we cannot drop the matter so easily as that. We cannot be too clear about this, that the war-mind is heedless of all morality, asks only what is the *effect* and presses on, always on: inevitably the question confronts us: "Must we act only with a view to the possibilities which a mind, utterly bereft of all moral basis, offers us? That, and no other, is the vital question which faces us."[1]

Indeed this is the great question with which war, especially modern war, faces us. Among Christian leaders and other intellectuals there are still only few who can so free themselves from traditional ideas that they are able to see this central question as such. Yet they certainly feel—apart from very case-hardened men—that something is different, and it is no longer so easy to recognize war. Professor Bavinck, who defended the right to make war, had to admit in November 1914: "Truly, it is easy to philosophize about war in the study, but anyone who has taken part in it speaks of it with abhorrence. Modern war is not a war of men but of machines, the battlefield has become an abattoir."[2] In 1920, Bavinck spoke still more sharply: "War-making more and more becomes murder, for it gets its weapons from the laboratories, is waged with chemical and mechanical means, and, in proportion as it does so, as the last war overwhelmingly proved, it passes beyond all regulation and humanizing. . . . All pretty catchwords apart, the belligerent nations to a greater or less degree have trampled on the high principles of Christian morality, and when need arose, scrupled at nothing to destroy the enemy and to gain the victory at any cost."[3]

"Have trampled on the lofty principles of Christian morality." But Bavinck does not draw the conclusion that war is in conflict with Christianity. Father Stratmann does, although, as a good Catholic, he leaves the decisive anathema on war to the Church, which . . . still says nothing.

What are we to say, asks Stratmann, when soldiers from the war tell us that "it is folly to bring God into it at all", and that "this gigantic fraud is a mockery of all we have till now heard

[1] Professor Dr. P. Kohnstamm: *Nationale ontwapening als gewetenseisch en als offer*; Onze Eeuw, October 1924, p. 20.
[2] *Het Probleem van den Oorlog*, p. 26.
[3] *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond*, pp. 68, 33.

of God and Christ"? He answers, "If we would justify God and Christianity . . . there is only one thing possible, and that is to acknowledge its truth" (i.e. their complaint). "There may be exaggeration, but Christianity must be most deeply ashamed of having fallen so far below its ideal." And if "the heathen", among whom we send Christian missions, taunt us—as did the Asiatic Buddhists and Brahmans at the religious World-Congress at Chicago: "We do not deny its worth [i.e. the Christian faith's], but . . . we see that your life is a complete contradiction to what you preach, that you are not led by the spirit of Love, but by the spirit of self-seeking and brute-force, which rules in all wicked men"—"is there any way of deliverance from this shameful and terrible position into which the war has plunged the Christian world?" Stratmann answers: "Yes, but only one way. We must give up trying to square the spirit of war with the Spirit of Christ. We must acknowledge that they can no more amalgamate than can fire and water."[1]

We feel that an estimate of war appears here very different from that which we all soaked up from our school history-books. Among thinking Christians, and among all earnest people who reflect, a change of judgment has been taking place.

Apart from the blow which the deified State has received from war, and apart from the purity of that Gospel to which again in these days Christ is opening the eyes of so many, we ascribe the change to the crossing of two lines of development: that of Christian humanitarianism and that of the practice of war. The one rising, the other sinking, have met and crossed, in the minds of thousands, whether they are conscious of it or not, like the diagonals of a square. The point of intersection marks the limit of the morally admissible and tolerable; the limit is reached, and already far overstepped. Wherefore they cannot recognize war any more, whatever its goal. They *must* condemn it without any qualification, in every circumstance.

C. The Arguments Used in Defence

Here, however, we meet with opposition not only from militarists, nationalists and unreflecting traditionalists, but also

[1] *Church and War*, pp. 37, 42.

from broadminded men of high moral standing, even from thinking Christians. When the opposition of these last has to be formulated, it seems to rest chiefly on the following arguments:

1. The land to which God directed us, and the possessions He has put into our hands in the course of history must be defended now as they were by our fathers.

2. The inadmissible immoralities of war are excesses, which must be and can be avoided by means of international law and by obedience thereto.

3. The methods of war are certainly cruel, but that is a question of sentiment alone, not of ethics; the ethical question is simply whether war is justifiable.

4. While coercion is always to be deplored, the police too employ it; police coercion and war coercion are of one kind, differing only in degree.

5. Refusal of military defence is a denial of love towards one's own and of solidarity with one's nation.

6. Why should a man be allowed, if need be, to defend himself or his own, and this course not be permitted to a nation when attacked?

7. War is one with the nature of things, a natural form of the struggle for existence. Or, put religiously, war arises from the sinful state of the world; the mark of sin clings thereto. If you would oppose war, you must fight sin.

We shall go over these arguments one by one, and inquire whether they are valid.

1. *"God's guidance; the heritage and example of our fathers."* The question whether land and possessions can be defended by war has already been answered. The question *how* a people came by its land, and especially how it came by its "possessions", we shall not here consider, save to point out that the Christian faith does not entail ascribing all that has happened in history to the guiding and protecting hand of God. There is a region "suffered" by God for which not He, but man, must bear responsibility. What remains? The appeal to *duty*, the duty of protecting our heritage, and the appeal to the example of our fathers. But the ethical value of the former, however much beauty it holds, is influenced by the question whether protection

is possible (for if the result is to be the reverse of what was desired, one may well hesitate), and even more by the question, With what means will you attain this goal? Could it ever be God's will, that we should protect a "holy heritage" with the most unholy means? The second appeal, like the first, we can readily appreciate. It is more than a conservative imitation of our forefathers, it is a reference to God's guidance in history, a guidance which is marked in the Exodus from Egypt, in the wars of Israel's renowned kings, in our war of independence against Spain. "If the same God would lead us further, why should He suddenly forbid us to do what David and Prince Maurice might certainly do?" Those who ask this forget two things. First they forget that God's revelation is not merely static but dynamic, that there is a progressive revelation by the Spirit who leads us into all truth. As we have heard, the Book of Chronicles, which was written later than Kings, is already able to put into the mouth of the Lord, against David: "Thou shalt not build an house unto my name, because thou hast shed much blood upon the earth in my sight" (1 Chron. xxii. 8). Does not Jesus likewise say, in the Gospels: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, . . . but I say unto you . . ."? And is not the ethical revelation of the Gospel itself like a rose which further and further unfolds, so that better and better you can see into its heart? Because our fathers believed they might possess slaves and torture prisoners, *we* may not do so. The second thing people forget is that history is not only a guiding of God, but a judgment, or rather, in the guidance, judgment as well. Is not the fearful catastrophe of 1914–1918 one great judgment of God—thus only can we bring this war into any relation with God—a judgment which calls out to us: "This is the result of *your* work, O men; ye fall under my condemnation; repent ye and reflect; there are only two ways; the way of destruction, and the way which Christ showed you; a third way there is not!" Do we not see an arm outstretched which beckons us: leave the old way, I show you the new! God is not only a God of the past, but of the future too, and He would see us as fellow-workers with Him for a more Christian world than the past has shown!

Those who always gaze into the past run a risk either of

forgetting the future, or of seeing the future, and so the present too, as just like the past. Hence, in these circles an unreal sense of the present, even of present-day warfare, is often to be found. This unreal sense we also meet with among the "Christian nationalist" enthusiasts for armaments. Here in Holland these people always put us back into the Spanish era. We read their writings, and at once see before us again the figures of the Eighty Years War: Burgemeester van der Werf, Kenau Simonzs Hasselaar, whose boiling oil is still represented to our children in the schools as a trophy of Christian virtues, and Prince Maurice, kneeling on the battlefield of Nieuport. But where is the stage on which these things really happen before our eyes? Is it the stage of modern warfare, which Bavinck calls an "abattoir" and "murder", the thing we have indicated above in its technical, cynical horror? Who can imagine a modern general who, in the midst of the desolation achieved by tanks, machine-guns, high-explosive shells and gas-bombs, would kneel down to thank God for the victory? We do not believe that such a barbarian exists. Which of us could listen to a modern Cromwell who announced: "Trust in God, have your submarines ready and get your poison-gas factories smoking!" It would sound to our ears as a blasphemy, even if it were sincerely meant. No, it will not do to take war under one's protection by appealing to God's guidance in history, nor by appealing to the example of our fathers.

2. *"The immoralities of war are excesses!"* Here we can be brief, after all we have said already. We have seen that the war-mind knows no other ethic than that of effect, that no nation, as it wrestles for its life, will or can hold itself to any contract, and that, in addition, war provokes all the evil instincts, lets loose all the devils. Anyone who speaks of "excesses" is still dreaming of humanizing war.

3. *"A question of sentiment, not of ethics."*[1] When people talk of the horror of war they are beginning at the wrong end, it is said. "I examine the cause and nature of war" because this

[1] This point of view is copiously defended by Professor Slotemaker de Bruine in his brochure: *Ontwapening en Beginsel*; Uitgave Hoofdbestuur der chr. Hist. Unie, 1924.

"is the only proper way of going to work. . . . He who asks for the cause immediately encounters conflicts between nations and between national groups, conflicts of all sorts, economic and political: even conflicts about national honour and national pride." However dreadful war may be, "I am convinced that, judged by principle, there is something more dreadful than this dreadfulness, something, indeed, which affects not our feelings but our conscience, for war is an attempt to put an end to a conflict by force . . . to let right be settled by means of force."[1]

Now no one will deny that here a crucial point is touched on. We shall have more to say about it presently, but here and now I would deny that the main discussion of the war question ends here, and that the character of war concerns only the feelings, not the conscience, thus that it is not a moral question at all. On the contrary, it is an ethical problem of the very first rank, touching the essential nature of war. It would only be possible to deny this if it could be shown (i) that a moral end justifies *any* means; (ii) that the question whether humanity is sustained or crushed underfoot has nothing to do with morality at all. Everyone who reflects without prejudice will be obliged to admit that these things cannot be maintained. The opposite is true. Christian humanity is so surely the very ground of morality that Schweitzer is perfectly right when he says, "Where humanity ends, pseudo-ethics begins".[2]

For fear of the identification of Christianity and humanism, and especially for fear that man shall be put as the goal and standard of all things—which of course a Christian eschews as idolatry—many present-day Christians, especially orthodox Christians, are inclined to make an artificial distinction between humanitarian and Christian motives. (So long as the Son of Man is recognized in his humanity, this will never be more than partly successful.) Thus Bavinck tries to make a difference between the humanitarian conception of war and the Christian. According to the humanitarian, "*all* war is a crime and only the punitive war can have sanction". (To-day the latter also comes under the ban in the minds of many "humanitarian"

[1] de Bruine, op. cit., pp. 16, 17.
[2] *Kultur und Ethik*, p. 257.

pacifists, and *every* war is crime.) "The Christian ethic", says Bavinck, "does not accept this position; it is not pacifist in the thoroughgoing sense, and regards armed defence of country in time of need as a holy duty. It thus recognizes that there may be just wars, however rare. . . . War, then, has a justice and a value of its own, as in truth all history teaches."[1] Bavinck does recognize that "just wars are rare". "In the innumerable wars between nations any question of great principles and spiritual values has been the exception; by far the most important rôles have been played by greed of power and lust for conquest."[2] Must the people, then, who only learn the real motives afterwards, always be tractable and go to war? In the present connection there is something we emphatically demand to know. Granted, that we have to do with one of these "rare" instances, and this really involves "great principles and spiritual values", granted that protection of these *is* possible, have the *means* wherewith men try to attain this goal no effect upon the value of the goal attained? If the means are morally very low, can the moral value of the victory be high? To me, it would testify to a strange want of inward appreciation of the relations between spiritual values, and so, to a weak psychology, if anyone should try to deny the living bond between the end and the means thereto.

Bavinck feels that too. He knows very well the error of calling inquiry into the methods merely a *question of sentiment.* He knows very well that the question, what is a just war, cannot be answered apart from the methods of war. "Ambrose, Augustine, Thomas, Calvin . . . they all maintained the rightness of war", but "defended only the just war, and laid down the following rules for it: 1. It must be declared by the constitutional Government; 2. It must be waged in a just cause; 3. It must be waged with pure intent, i.e. not with a view to harming the enemy as much as possible, etc.; 4. It must be waged by just means (*modus belli gerendi rectus*)."

Although we do not believe that the third condition can be or ever has been fulfilled, we would call attention to the fourth. What must we understand by the *modus rectus*? Bavinck points to the "rights of mankind which ought to be honoured". In

[1] *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond,* pp. 66, 67. [2] ibid., p. 19.

parenthesis we ask, Is this a humanitarian or a Christian demand? But let Bavinck continue. Calvin, he says, declared "devastation, extortion, unnecessary bloodshed and all kinds of cruelty and savagery" illicit. "And so the Christian ethic has to discuss all sorts of corollary questions: whether stratagems, ambushes, lies, etc., may be employed, whether private property may be touched, fields laid waste, non-combatants attacked, heathen troops brought up to help, etc."[1] The reader will bethink him, as we did, that with the enumeration of these wrongs, which must *not* happen in a just war, it is as if war itself, especially modern warfare, were accurately described. All these things *do* happen, they will all happen, in every war which is still to be, in ever increasing measure; Bavinck cannot really deny it. "Actually", he sighs, "the recognition and realization of these principles has all too often failed."[2] We have heard already his further bitter remark: Men have "trampled on the high principles of Christian morality . . . have scrupled at nothing; . . . war passes beyond all regulation and humanizing", the soldiers "regard themselves as slaughterers, indefatigable slaughterers; . . . war-making more and more becomes murder".[3]

Bavinck is too clear-sighted and honest a man not to see and openly declare the realities of war. But he has not been able to take the step from the traditional Christian conception of war to that conception of it which *demands reality* from a Christian. If he had set himself earnestly to consider whether all these violations of the rights of humanity are accidents, excesses, or whether they are inherent in the character of actual warfare, we think he could not have refrained from utterly condemning war. For he could have returned no answer but "No" to the question whether the fourth condition of a "just war", viz. just methods of fighting, can be fulfilled. Bavinck has not lived long enough to think these things through. His two books on war too plainly reveal the violent oscillations of a spirit which, in the midst of the problems it wrestles with, has not yet found its true course.

Father Stratmann, in his treatment of "just war",[4] has been able to think out this problem further. He postulates the same four

[1] *Christendom, Oorlog, Volkenbond*, pp. 12, 13. [2] ibid., p. 14.
[3] ibid., pp. 31, 33, 68. [4] *Church and War*, pp. 52–80.

conditions, deriving the first three from Thomas, the last from Suarez and Bellarmine, but he goes much more deeply into the second, that of the "just cause". First he calls attention to the great difficulty of ascertaining, at the outbreak of the conflict, where the guilt lies—everybody at once attributes it to the other side, every time—and how great the guilt is. Again, is the guilt always a *moral* guilt, deserving of punishment? There is no impartial judge. The state which sets itself up as both judge and executioner by that very act loads itself with guilt and can no longer wage just war. But even if we assume for the moment that it is possible to be sure of the guilt of a state, i.e. of its moral guilt, are the *people* also guilty, the people who bear the brunt and for the most part do not know the true motives of the State? And if the people be guilty, is the punishment meted out to them for the crime proportionate? "Millions of innocent men are slaughtered, others are crippled and maimed for life, women and children are widowed and orphaned, immeasurable property is destroyed! . . . It seems simply the denial of human instincts of right, even though there were no shadow of doubt as to the moral guilt of the conquered state".[1]

Naturally, this disproportion between the supposed guilt and the penalty imposed is all the more violent and therefore all the more marked because of the means used in modern war. So Stratmann arrives at the fourth condition, which even the soldier who knows nothing of the causes of the war can judge: the fair means (*debitus modus*). Catholic moral theology intends by that, among other things, that unarmed people may not be killed, save *per accidens*. It may never happen *per se*, i.e. with intent to kill them. Yet "Poison Gas Warfare is specially directed [*per se*] against the civil population, which is a sufficient proof of its injustice and its criminal, murderous character".[2] We must clearly distinguish, says Stratmann, between the right of defence and the right of modern warfare, between theory and practice. "What is necessary at present is not to destroy belief in the justification of defensive warfare in itself, but in its use as a means for the preservation of the moral order."[3] The conference of the German Catholic Peace League in 1924 expressed

[1] *Church and War*, p. 66. [2] ibid., p. 73. [3] ibid., p. 155.

it similarly: "In theory, no doubt, a just war might happen, but in reality the conditions for the sanction of a war which Catholic ethics demands are wanting from the present state of civilization and technique."[1]

The criminal, unjust character of war would be plain to us, even apart from its obscuring the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, between "guilty" and "guiltless", which confusing of the issue grieves Stratmann more than us, though it certainly does accentuate the evil character of war. If once we postulate just and fair means as an indispensable condition of calling any war righteous, as we are obliged to do by the Christian ethic, in both its evangelical and ecclesiastical forms, it becomes, now more than ever, absolutely impossible to wage a righteous war; *the very conception of "righteous war" becomes an insoluble contradiction in terms, and inconceivable!*

4. *Force is force; police work is war.* There are theorists who hold that a difference of degree cannot result in a fundamental difference in valuation: "if you do not repudiate on principle the coercive work of the police, neither may you absolutely repudiate the coercion of war, for they are on a par". Now we notice to begin with that the power of the police has a character quite different from that of the violence of war, for behind the police justice and law may be assumed, while these are wanting from behind the activities of a nation, which seeks only *its* "rights". But the power is itself of a different kind. It belongs to the nature of justice, which is grounded in morality, to employ compulsion as little as possible, and since, unfortunately, compulsion is often unavoidable, to be extremely economical with force, particularly with *armed* force. A wholly different idea and method holds sway in war. "What an argument is this, bereft of all reason and morality: because the community cannot wholly dispense with the coercive means of police truncheon and of prison, over against the individual law-breaker, therefore the employment of all modern methods of war, with their odious cruelty and their butchery of millions, is justified".[2] So exclaims, with

[1] *Die Friedenswarte*, February 1927, p. 54.
[2] Dr. Rudolf Liechtenhan: *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* Berne, 1927, p. 67.

reason, the Basel preacher, Dr. Rudolf Liechtenhan. Those abstract logicians forget the truth which Hegel expresses in his *Logik*, viz. that all things have their measure and that, when the measure is passed, through quantitative alteration, "things cease to be what they were".[1]

Our attention will be called to the part of the police in street-fighting, and we shall be asked: Is not the measure overstepped here? We admit that once in a while instances may occur, in which the distinction between policing and the violence of war seems to be blotted out. This is only appearance, yet even were it so, such a borderline case would never be able to prove that no difference existed. Between meadow and dyke there are sometimes swampy patches, where it might be hard to say whether one were still in the meadow or already in the dyke, yet no one will maintain that therefore there is no sort of difference between a meadow and a dyke! The difference remains. Yes, when riots pass into formal civil war, as the word itself shows, it is no longer police method but war-method that prevails. Such a civil war is usually the continuation of an ordinary war, applying the means there employed and the methods there learnt. And yet, to put the brief and as far as possible sparing action of the police on a par with the vast and as much as possible deadly and destructive work of war ("force is force") is unreasonable and is in truth only attempted by doctrinaire Tolstoyans and by militarists, each of which parties calls the other its opponent, "fundamentally and logically," with which it is easy to settle up accounts.

The principle upon which the authority of the State rests is, we have said (see A, 1, of this chapter), a compromise between the necessities which this world imposes and the moral demands which the Christian conscience makes. But even this has its limits. For us the boundary-line is between police activities and war, and this distinction, for those who earnestly reflect, is not arbitrary but true. War is no longer a compromise but a thoroughgoing scorning and crushing of the moral demands of Christianity.

[1] Hegels *Kleine Logik*, mit einem Kommentar herausgegeben von G. J. P. J. Bolland; Leyden, 1899, Vol. 1, p. 126 (*note*).

5. *Refusal of military defence is a denial of love and solidarity.* "Conscientious objection and incitement to conscientious objection," writes Professor Greydanus,[1] "and the demand for a one-sided national disarmament, *may* prove to be derelictions of duty, in conflict with the requirements of love. . . ." And elsewhere: it is "simply a denial of love and a refusal to show love in duty, and as such is highly culpable".

Now I partly agree with Dr. Greydanus, so long as he lays the emphasis on the word "may", which I have italicized. Indeed, those who keep out of the fight because they are selfishly thinking only of their own safety are ethically wrong. I put the brave soldier, whatever his delusion, far above the cautious egoist and the coward. But we are speaking here solely of the ethical judgment of warfare. And could *this* lead to the denial of love? If it seems so, two facts are being overlooked: (i) that defence of a country is *not* parallel with personal protection of attacked men (this is dealt with in the next section), and (ii) that the so-called "protection" of house and hearth and people (which, however, in a future war will be protected less than ever) is a business which involves the very worst violation of the principle of love. It consists of a mechanical, demonic system of destruction, into which the youth of the land are driven, with the hope of destroying the "enemy", that is, the young men on the other side. So there is a task for the women here, in so far as they do not "join up" nor get absorbed into the army immediately—though this process of moral corruption is already going on—the task of calling to the men: "We cannot, we will not be defended in this way! We want to see you as knights, not executioners!"

Where the principles of common humanity and of Christianity are being "trampled underfoot" (Bavinck), through this "defence" of one's country, it seems to me that the solidarity of mankind and the solidarity of Christian believers must be maintained even above the solidarity of one's own people, which itself tends to the destruction of that people as well as of the enemy.

6. *Defence in need is admissible.* "If our country is attacked", it is objected, "it acts in self-defence, like any man who is attacked or who has to defend his wife and children, and then

[1] *Geref. Theol. Tijdschrift*, August 1928.

all reason is suspended; men fight for their lives and those of their kith and kin." It is a question, however, whether this is sound reasoning. No comparison goes on all fours, but this one is very lame. For one thing, it is easy to decide which is the attacking party and which the attacked, in a raid by bandits upon respectable travellers, but in a war, which has been preceded by so much political bargaining and manœuvring, so many provocations and incidents, there is usually no puzzle harder than this. In the last war, *every* nation acted in "self-defence", and so they would again in another war. A second flaw in the comparison lurks in the phrase "defence in need". This implies an unpremeditated, instinctive action taken to protect one's own life or others. But the "defence" of states has been thought out and prepared long before, and "thus arises the monstrosity of a two-sided 'defence' with premeditated plans, which at its best, i.e. excluding as illegitimate every aggressive or offensive design, at its best, can only serve to create the very need to be avoided".[1] "To create the very need to be avoided." Indeed, if people will maintain this parallel with individual self-defence, it may be asked—for here the parallel holds—where would the security be, if all men went about the streets armed to the teeth, "in case of need"? They would create the very need to be avoided!

A third flaw in the argument is its neglect of the great difference between the repulse of an evildoer and the wholesale extinction of innocent men on "the other side", who have been just as much compelled to play the rôle of bandit as the men on "our side". When conscientious objectors were examined before our Royal Commission, nothing made them so obstinate as the question that again and again was flung at them: "If you yourself were attacked . . . if your mother were assaulted . . . would you not defend your life, or your mother, then?" These youths, among whom were some who had wrestled with the problem of military service (upon which we shall speak further) as earnestly as any full-grown men could do, clearly felt better than did their judges that error lurked in this reasoning. But when they remarked "that there was a vast difference between individual self-defence, in which one tried to repel an

[1] Polak: *Oorlogsfilosofie*, p. 56.

evildoer without any wish to kill him, and an organized massacre like war", they received for answer, "That is only a question of degree: you are not consistent," etc.[1] And yet this crooked comparison has been brought out again and again, and it was one of the principle arguments used by Dr. de Visser in the Chamber in his moral apology for war. "If anyone came into my house, meddled with my wife and children and belongings, and I took a revolver, etc. etc. . . . Between that revolver in my hand and the weapons of war in the hands of the soldier there is a difference only of degree. . . ."[2] These leaders of ours ought to know how many of their earlier followers came to see the weakness of the position they have abandoned precisely in this sort of argument.

This weakness, however, comes to light even more clearly when one considers not merely the wholesale nature of the butchery of war, but also its diabolical character. I am still sticking to this parallel with personal self-defence, and say emphatically that if I can resist the murder of my child in no other way than by murdering the child of another, then I shrink from the very thought. I hope I should be incapable of doing that, for I feel that I ought not to do it. And if I am unable to defend myself against tormentors by other means than by myself inventing and refining instruments of torture, again, I feel I am not at liberty to do so. Anything but that! "There are things", said Professor Kohnstamm, referring to the character of modern warfare, "which I hope the Dutch nation would never do, even though it must go to pieces for declining them."[3]

7. "War is a natural phenomenon." "War issues from man's sin." The last position in which our opponents entrench themselves, apart from the so-called "claims" of the League of Nations (see pp. 225–232), is usually this: "Suppose it be true that war be

[1] Quoted from their own letters. See G. J. Heering: *Dienstplicht en gewetens bezwaren*; Haagsch Maandblad, December 1925.

[2] From the Minutes of the Second Chamber, March 4, 1927. Even Professor Eerdmans, in our discussion at the Conference of Modern Theologians (April 1929), referred to the fundamental question of the right to make war, in order to give it no other answer than this.

[3] *Nationale ontwapening als gewetenseisch en als offer*; Onze Eeuw, October 1924.

morally indefensible, what can you do against it? It is one with the nature of things, with the whole struggle for existence." Those who view the world by the light of God speak of the sin in which the world lies: "War results from sin, and will last along with this sin, to the end of the world." This idea has brought many to a fatalism which is disastrous, whether religiously coloured or no. Yet in both groups there are also those who shake off this fatalism and say: "No, though war should remain, we ought to oppose it, or it will become wholly our master. But one must begin at the beginning!" Yes, but where is that? Can we alter the nature of things? Biology has no answer. If it says, "Reform your own disposition, and that of the world," it concedes that war is connected with something other than the nature of things. Religion has an answer: "Begin with sin and not with its symptoms; sin indeed never rests, but a Christian also must not rest, but co-operate with God without ceasing, in his own sanctification and in the conversion of the world."

As regards the natural character of war. We deny that war belongs to the natural realm. Nature nowhere exhibits a destructive strife *within species*; that is only to be found with *homo sapiens*, who, moreover, with his morally misused intellect, has discovered how to charge hellish machines with natural fighting powers. The struggle for existence will not end, but if the human race will save itself, must go on through other means than war; this ignoble and wasting form of competition must cease. This form of the struggle for life (or is it for death?) is *not* natural, and, therefore, need not be maintained from the natural point of view. That war has always been is no proof that it always will be. Slavery had always been, along with many other inhuman practices, and yet with them has disappeared. The future is built up out of the past *and* from still unknown sources; it is more than repetition.

The idea of war as sin goes deeper, for it sees the realm of man reaching above and below the natural world. Neither the angel nor the fiend dwell in Nature, but both in man. Human "nature" is composed of both. War is bound up with the "Satan", the crafty selfishness, the sin of man—nay, even originates therefrom. So we are told. We regard this, however, as a half-truth. The other half of the truth is that war is a sinful *practice*

which hammers home the sin which is in man, doubles it, increases it tenfold. It was this consideration which brought Dr. Liechtenhan, after the war, to abandon the position he had firmly maintained, though with difficulty, up till then. This position, shared by many earnest Christians, was "a solidary sharing of the guilt of man; . . . with bleeding and revolting heart" one must take one's share of war. But, he says, "how easily this compromise with sad reality turns to despair of ever conquering it! If all men thought like this, everything would remain as it was of yore." So long as one does not, on principle, oppose the nations' force of arms, beginning with one's own land, "so long you are not only passively sharing the common guilt, but you are actively increasing it". Wherefore he broke, not with sin—that is not in our power—but with the sinful *practice*, the most sinful practice that the world maintains, with war, that gigantic opportunity for sinning, and therefore he joined issue with all war-preparation in his own land.[1] He does not imagine that he has now withdrawn himself from the collective guilt of men, but he rightly says, "The solidary sharing of guilt is only inwardly true and justified, when it is coupled with the strongest possible resistance to the evil, which is felt and borne as guilt". Also he will discover, when he refuses service to his nation at arms in the event of war, that even then a sense of guilt not to be reasoned away comes over him—we men never escape guilt here on earth—but he will be able to ask forgiveness for this guilt because he has set aside the guilt which for him was by far the heavier: his supporting the practice of war; he has broken solidarity with war.

"Wars will last until the end of this world." Then we may expect no very long continuance of this world, for if the world goes on in her old way, as hitherto, war will speedily recur, but in a form which makes an end to her civilization, to the spiritual, perhaps even to the material, life of man. It again testifies to an unreal sense of war and its modern development, when people can visualize for the future one war following another, just as in the past, with seasons of rest, welfare and culture in between, and still a future after that. I consider that Dr. Woker, who knows the perspectives of chemical warfare

[1] *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* pp. 28, 45–48.

better than most, is nearer to the truth when she writes, "The next war, the scientific war . . . will be the last war—we all know that. World-history will then be at an end."[1] If anyone thinks this is exaggerated or too dogmatic, we would remind him of the saying of General von Deimling, when paying tribute to the Nobel prize winner, Professor Quidde, at Freiburg: "In Freiburg gunpowder was discovered; that was the end of the age of chivalry. Now mechanics and chemistry have gained the upper hand. That betokens the end of wars. For war in the future betokens not the destruction of the army but destruction of the nation." And likewise of the warning of the Austrian statesman and jurist, the late Professor Lammasch, that he expected as the result of the next war, "the devastation and depopulation of Europe, the brutalization of nations, the downfall of European civilization". He shared the conviction "that a new war, which would be waged by means of the alarmingly progressive technique of destruction, would reduce at least the whole of Europe, perhaps the whole world, to a condition of the worst physical barbarity . . . without any possibility of building up again what this war lays waste".[2]

But what weighs on us more heavily than these terrible results, more heavily even than the appalling suffering is the guilt, the crime long planned and prepared and wilfully committed. The suffering is only a symptom of the guilt.

Das Leben ist der Güter Höchstes nicht,
Der Übel Grösstes aber ist die Schuld.

And the worst of all guilt on earth is war, the great generator and accumulator of all imaginable sins. "Truly we oppose war not only because it is an unspeakable disaster, but also (*especially*, we should say) because it is a crying evil, because it wipes out all ideas of morality, because it establishes the reign of hate and of all evil demons over body and soul, because it poisons all human relationships, because it calls breaches of faith and word political necessity, calls cruelty courage, because it chokes the manhood in a man and lets loose the beast. . . ."[3]

[1] *Der kommende Giftgaskrieg*, p. 8.
[2] Dr. Heinrich Lammasch: *Völkermord oder Völkerbund*, The Hague, 1920, pp. 8, 119.
[3] *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* p. 27.

Conclusion

We have seen, (A) that war causes the State to fail in the fulfilment of its duties, (B) that it has become intolerable to the moral sense of many Christians and (C) that the attempts to justify war cannot stand their ground in the face of moral and rational judgment.

War, barbaric from of old, has indeed become "root evil", as we heard the Marburg philosopher, Paul Natorp, call it at the end of last chapter, and this it will become ever more plainly in the future. Modern war is the absolute end of justice, except in so far as one may say justice overtakes systematically destructive humanity, which is systematically destroyed. But where justice fades, life has lost its worth for the earnest man. "If righteousness fails, it is no longer of any worth that men live on earth" (Kant).

Primitive Christianity felt instinctively that war is in complete conflict with the living values of the Gospel, with the spirit of Christ, in short, with Christian principle. After long centuries, which have not been without their heroic attempts to bring to light this ancient opposition, after much mischief and especially after much shame, the Christianity of our own days, alarmed by the development of war technique, begins to notice that its alliance with the State—an alliance necessary but too close—and its consequent compromise with war have led Christianity itself, and State and people, along the highroad to destruction. Christianity begins to realize that war lets loose all the demons that Christ came to fight, that there can be no greater hindrance to the coming of God's Kingdom than war, and that the man who takes part in war is brought into a condition in which he cannot possibly pray, "Our Father". The Christianity of our day is beginning to realize (still very weakly, but at least it is beginning) that it is called to take up its stand with all the power of its faith and with absolute condemnation of the whole practice and preparation of war.

By what ways it may set about the task we shall consider in our final chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE TASK OF CHRISTIANITY TO-DAY

The Stand must be on Principle

If the relationship of Christianity, State and war is such as is sketched in the first three chapters, if Christianity, by virtue of its moral principle, must, as the preceding chapter shows, utterly condemn war, and modern war in particular, it follows that awakened Christianity is called to define its principles clearly in relation to the question of war. That empirical Christianity (i.e. Christians, the Christian Church, its preaching and its theology) has done this very little or not at all, and that even now the protest and opposition from this quarter cannot be regarded as nearly vigorous enough, we must, as we have seen, ascribe:

1. To a too close alliance with the State.
2. To the dominance of political expediency and the nationalist idea.
3. To the suppression of primitive Christian values and the false exegesis of the New Testament concurrent with it.
4. To the lack of a critical and reformatory Christian sociology for to-day.
5. To the power of age-long tradition, maintained both naturally and artificially.[1]

For all these reasons the Christian Churches (at least in Europe; it is otherwise in the New World, owing to less discord and more co-operation) have long since forgotten how to make their voices heard in the world's affairs except to praise what the State points out for praise. The Church's attention is occupied exclusively with her own domestic affairs, the government of the world she leaves to "politics", mainly to her own more or less ecclesiastical parties, which on the whole, however, display very

[1] The French General Percin, one of the many generals converted to true pacifism, with Verraux, von Schönaich, von Deimling, Koolemans Beijnen, etc., asks, "Why do people call brute-force barbarism when individuals use it, and glory and honour when nations are guilty of it? Because tradition holds tyrannical sway over their minds."

little true Christian politics. What are the present-day requirements of Christian politics? asked the leader of our Anti-Revolutionary Party, and answered: (1) loosening of the financial bond between Church and State; (2) freedom from compulsory vaccination; (3) setting free the theological faculty from the State university; (4) Sunday observance; (5) abolition of State lotteries; (6) reintroduction of the death penalty. I shall not deny that some of these six points may be brought into alliance with the Gospel (others of them have little or nothing to do with it), but this is certainly not the true scale of Christian politics. The unchristian structure of our social life, where one man enriches himself at the expense of another, and where the greatest affluence exists unfeelingly beside the greatest poverty, is as little attacked as is war, which negates all Christian values. This "politics" coincides with the "Christian movement" for Sunday observance and for blasphemy laws, a movement that were to be praised in many respects, did it not leave undisturbed the greatest of all blasphemies, one which desecrates the Names of God and Christ a thousand times more than all breaches of the Sabbath: War and the preparation for war. Posterity shall bear witness of this politics: It was great in little things and little in things great.

This social and political abstinence and irresponsibility on the part of the Church was encouraged during the nineteenth century by liberalism, which, thoroughly individualistic and inheriting the old-time fear of the rulers lest mingling religion and politics should have dire results, tried to sunder the religious life sharply from the great problems of society. In these problems the State and the statesman alone had something to say, not the Church. Her field was "religion", viewed as piety and philanthropy, "No politics in the pulpit" was the watchword, and it meant that the Church had nothing to do with social questions and therefore nothing to do with political problems either. This liberal type of religiosity, which, with its "spirituality", gave an uncontrolled civilization ample opportunity to get shallow and worldly, so crippling and impoverishing itself and becoming regarded in society as negligible: this liberal religiosity has had its day, though it dies hard in many circles, especially among the elders of the Churches. Yet it is declining even there.

For a long time, the more socially sensitive elements in these circles have realized that this antithesis is untenable, and they are coming to recognize the justice of Roessingh's remark: "In the whole course of history the idea that Christianity and the Christian Church, on the one hand, and questions of politics and social life, on the other, ought to be held rigidly apart has been defended only by the liberal movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."[1] It is more and more recognized in modern religious circles that the Church, just because of her spiritual life and her disinterestedness, is qualified to function as the conscience of society, and fearlessly to give the main direction along which the experts must find roads or make them.

The alarum of the Great War roused many. Even the Churches, wakened from their sleep, gazed round and began to realize that the world was still much more "pagan" than they had supposed, and that if Christianity did not succeed in forming the community life of men and nations in a Christian way, from within, the world would succeed, from without, in making empirical Christianity wholly pagan. Man has but one life, and is incapable of living inwardly Christian and outwardly pagan. And it avails very little for men to cultivate Christian principles in the limited spheres of Church and family life, if the wider spheres, bereft of those principles, presently begin to close in, so that Church and home and person are held tightly in their grip, as is the case for example in wartime.

In the same way that the states which perceived how badly *Realpolitik* had served the true interests of the peoples joined to form the League of Nations, to prevent utter ruin, the Christian Church—at least, the Protestant and Greek Churches —came together at Stockholm, in 1925, with an awakened sense of responsibility and with a view to restoring their shaken credit in the world. They acknowledged having seen that "burning social questions and the tension between the nations show how grave and urgent is the need for us Christians and the Christian community to make plain the duty of the Church in national life and international affairs". Capital and labour, Christianity

[1] Verzamelde Werken van Dr. K. H. Roessingh; Arnhem, 1926–27; Vol. IV, p. 485.

and war, the treatment of crime, international relations, were named as burning questions. Especially in regard to Christianity and war it was felt by many that a crisis had been reached. The compromise between Christian principle and statecraft had resulted, in wartime, in a complete surrender of the former. This post-war period is a time of crisis, in which Christendom is invited to revise its ideas both of State sovereignty and of the morality of war. In distinction from present-day Christianity, the Christianity of the first days rose before the minds of many at Stockholm, the non-violent, war-hating, primitive Christianity, in which Christ lived with infinitely more power than in the Christianity of to-day.

Yet it speedily appeared at Stockholm that the Church, having the holy task of conserving eternal truth, had acquired, through this bounden duty, a conservative character, even in regard to things which must be changed, and was no longer able to pronounce the word, "forward". The unwontedness of her concern for world-affairs and the unworldly nature of the Christian religion both played their parts. In spite of a deep experience of Christian unity, the Stockholm Conference failed to make any positive pronouncement of importance, and up to the present the same may be said of the continuation of that conference in smaller representative gatherings. To be sure, the problems are many and hard, and the greatest common factor between radical and conservative elements is seldom startlingly advanced. For this reason, up to the present, neither Stockholm nor the "World Alliance for Promoting Friendship through the Churches", however much good they have achieved, have dared to attack and condemn militarism through and through. Yet the world awaits from Christ's Church a pronouncement based on bed-rock principle, one on which the credit of the Church will enduringly depend, though the time of endurance may not now be very long, one dictated by Christian principle and confirmed by history: *war is a crime against humanity and sin against God.*

Thanks be to God, Christ is greater, infinitely greater, than all Christian Churches put together, and in this respect too can find entrance to hearts inside and outside the Church. As regards the immorality of war, as with many other moral and social

matters, the churches have for the most part been shamed and stirred, fortunately, by tendencies and movements outside, which stimulate the Church not to be behind in attempts to make this world more like a dwelling for the Christian and for Christian society—though, indeed, the likeness be but remote, the dwelling but a wayside hostelry—in attempts to make an environment which at least shall not clash too violently with the best that God has given us. Truth compels us to say that this growing resistance on the part of extra-ecclesiastical Christianity, in spite of some less admirable features, contains more real moral opposition to the institution of war, springing awares or unawares from Christian conviction, than does the Christianity of the Churches. This state of things must needs change, if only because the Church should be giving a basis of moral principle to the growing resistance to militarism, helping to maintain it without violence, and offering it spiritual leadership: the Governments would be much more likely to listen then. But there is more at stake than this.

Both in its organized form and in the individual attitude it inculcates, the Christianity of our day has a great imperative vocation to fulfil in regard to the question of war. We shall have something to say presently (B) about the personal attitude demanded by the Christian faith; meantime, let us first ask (A) what organized Christianity, which still wields a powerful influence, ought to do about it. We purposely say "organized Christianity" rather than "the Christian Church"—although, *passim*, we employ this phrase too—first, in order to include every organization or association in more or less close alliance with the Church, and secondly, to avoid the misapprehension that church-people and local congregations or societies must wait until their church as a whole has spoken. One may indeed wait long and let the hour in which God calls slip by.

A. Organized Christianity

1. *First and foremost, organized Christianity must make downright protest against all war and all preparations therefor, as completely opposed to Christian principle.*

"When the Great War broke," wrote the well-known New

York minister, Harry Emerson Fosdick,[1] expressing wholly our own view, "the churches were unprepared to take a well-considered *Christian* attitude. We too were hypnotized by nationalism. We had made ourselves part and parcel of social attitudes from whose inevitable consequence we felt it immoral to withdraw. For my part, I never will be caught that way again. I hope the churches never will be caught that way. If, however, when the next crisis comes, we are going to protest effectively against war, we must win the right to make that protest, and we must win it now. To-day we must make unmistakably clear our position against war, against competitive preparation for war, against reliance on war. . . . War is utterly and irremediably unchristian . . . it is a more blatant denial of every Christian doctrine about God and man than all the theoretical atheists on earth could devise. What I do see is that the quarrels between fundamentalists and liberals, high churchmen, broad churchmen, and low churchmen are tithing, mint, anise and cummin if the church does not deal with this supreme moral issue of our time: Christ against war."

The Church is the human and fallible organization of the common life in Christ, but even so it should be an instrument of His will and word, the earthly mouth of Christ. What must become of the world, if this mouth be silent? And it is silent to-day, silent in all lands, silent where it *must* speak, even where the greatest need of all exists for speaking, forgetful of Christ's word: "I tell you, if these be silent, the very stones would cry out" (Luke xix. 40). It seems, sometimes, as if the time for those stones to cry out had really come. The worst may happen in war, the worst may be prepared in peace . . . the churches are dumb. Or they speak as did Professor Slotemaker at Assen in 1925, in his debate with the writer of this book: "I call war accursed, and always have done so," but at the same time remarked that if anyone should make war against us, of course we should have to fight. Such "cursing" means just as much as if one said to a boy, "Stealing is mean, cursedly mean," and added, "unless someone steals from you, and then it becomes your holy duty to steal, or else you are the victim". The boy

[1] In his Introduction to Kirby Page's *War, its Causes, Consequences, and Cure*, pp. vii, viii, vi.

goes out thinking that stealing is not so mean, after all, and next day he does good business!

The Christian Churches should bethink themselves that they may sin quite as much by omission and silence as by commission and speech. "The voice of Christianity", writes Max Huber, "will be but weakly and in many cases only indirectly audible in the Governments, the Parliaments, and the Press; at present it seems to be well-nigh dumb."[1] It seems, especially, as if Christianity had forgotten the holy "No" which early Christianity in its first great age repeatedly cried out against every form of paganism and idolatry, ratifying it with her sufferings. Let the dictum be remembered, that Rudolf Eucken, the philosopher of Jena, once uttered in Holland: "There is no such holy 'Yes' as that which follows a holy 'No'." Which may be a reminder that this "No" in its turn is born of "Yes", i.e. of *positive conviction.*

And where the Church as a whole remains silent, as it will yet do for a long time in regard to war, those members of the Church whose eyes are open to the moral intolerability and sinfulness of war must speak. The impetus is given always by the individual conscience. Out of that, mainly, God forms collective conscience, the mind of the Church and public opinion. The awakened forerunners have the holy task of testifying, and if they do it in the right time and place, while exercising all needful self-control, not forgetting the main content of the Gospel for this great and most urgent application of the Gospel ethic, none has the right to reproach them with anything. The reproach would rather be deserved if they knew God's judgment, yet were still silent. The glory of the Christian Church, at any rate the Protestant Church, is its "free prophecy" in the New Testament sense: this is its closest contact with the living God. Calvin and Beza claimed for the ministry the right, not only to defend the people before the judicial bench, should the Government require what God did not allow, but also to issue a call to the people (*le cri au peuple*), whenever the Government went against God's will.

Those for whom war is a crime against humanity and sin against God are sometimes asked to moderate themselves, and

[1] Max Huber: *Internationale Politiek en Evangelie*, p. 61.

not use such "strong words" as "crime" and "sin". But if these words express exactly what the speaker means, and what is laid upon him irresistibly by his moral and spiritual judgment, whose is the right to reproach him? All that appears from such reproach is that there are men who think differently and who would wish that everyone else thought as they did, which is very easy to understand. As for the appeal to "be moderate", we are reminded of the answer which that passionate opponent of slavery, William Lloyd Garrison, gave to the same appeal, an answer which would apply word for word, in the present war on war: "I will be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish to think, to speak, to write, with moderation. No! No! Tell a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm; tell him to moderately rescue his wife from the hands of the ravisher; tell the mother to gradually extricate her babe from the fire into which it has fallen—but urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard. The apathy of the people is enough to make every statue leap from its pedestal and to hasten the resurrection of the dead."[1]

2. *Organized Christianity must support the League of Nations, but must take heed wherein true support consists*

Many Christians think the Church may content herself with commending the League of Nations to the sympathy of its members and of public opinion. Now for some Church circles it is certainly a wonderful self-conquest, when they qualify their historic, militarist worship of the Lord of Hosts, who has revealed Himself in times of crises as the national God, with anything so modern as a reference to a power of the human reason like the League of Nations. But by this alone they do not further the cause of peace to any vast extent, and they have not thereby done their Christian duty once and for all. For however much good the League of Nations has achieved in all sorts of directions, when we remember that the banishment of war is its chief aim, that disarmament is an indispen-

[1] Quoted by Kirby Page, op. cit., p. 185.

sable condition thereto, and that limitation of armaments must be regarded as only a very little step upon the way, there is ample reason for avoiding complacency about the League of Nations, especially when it is noted with what great energy the powers arm themselves for the next war. The Hungarian statesman, Count Apponyi, was right when he said, "But then it were better, instead of being busy ostensibly with limiting armaments and actually with the opposite, to say frankly that the solution of the problem must be left for a more favourable opportunity".[1] That is, we would add, supposing this "favourable opportunity" ever had opportunity to come. For Mussolini, that *enfant terrible* among rulers, who actually *says* what all of them *do*, said truly in the Italian Chamber, on December 8, 1928: "While the whole world prates of peace, every nation arms to the uttermost. Every time you open a paper you read of new submarines, new cruisers, and other armaments." And Lloyd George, speaking at Manchester next day, added, just as truly, "As matters now stand, the world is heading straight for a new war".

One disarmament conference after another fails or realizes next to no result, and war-preparations go on unchecked. Anyone who thinks that the League of Nations will ultimately attain its goal along these lines, in my opinion, stands to be disillusioned. Along this way, war will overtake the League of Nations, sweep it from the earth, and prove that the most cautious way is often the most dangerous. In this way the League of Nations itself becomes a danger, because it deludes men into thinking that peace is being ensured. There is far more ensuring war, working for war, paying for war, than for peace. Did not the chief of the disarmaments section, Signor Madariaga, tell the Women's Congress for Peace, held in Amsterdam in autumn 1927, that there is in existence a type of cruiser the maintenance costs of which are as great as those of the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice at The Hague put together? And did not Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson give an insight into what has to be expended on munitions when he recently stated that the artillery bombardments alone before the infantry attacks on Arras, Messines and Ypres had respec-

[1] A speech at The Hague, April 6, 1927.

tively cost 16 million, 17½ million and upwards of 22 million pounds sterling? Governments can spare that for war. Try getting a tenth of it for peace! And if your attempt is in vain, then try to go on believing that in consequence of the League of Nations and its work the way is clear for peace!

Why do the nations associated together in the League of Nations go on without intermission with their armaments? The answer must be given, because they distrust the power of the League of Nations and have more faith in their own armies and navies. And why does the League of Nations remain powerless? Because the nations give it no trust, having more faith in war, and in their own strength in war, than in peace and in the League of Nations. And with this fatal, vicious circle, the League threatens to glide, helped on its way by fruitless conferences, spiral-wise into the abyss, which waits. Unless . . .

Unless—but mark, this is to our mind the *only* possibility of rescue—the peoples rise and show their governments that they will otherwise. As early as 1916, our Liberal statesman, De Beaufort, declared that "the destruction of all militarism" was only to be hoped for from a mighty impulse of the people. After the fruitless Genoa conference, Lloyd George and the Japanese minister on their return home both made urgent appeals to the peoples and especially to their Churches, to support the work of peace, as otherwise the work of the League would be wasted pains. And many politicians vie with each other in repeating that so long as the people remain unconcerned about what goes on at Geneva, nothing will go on there. The driving power must come up from below: without it, the national representatives at Geneva will for the most part remain diplomats of the old school, unable to do much to better things. Only when the peoples rise up and make it plain to their governments—as Christianity, from its own special motives, should stimulate their doing: "Do not count on us, if you make war; we will not go again!" only then, no sooner, will the governments show the needful compliancy and willingness to sacrifice; only then, no sooner, will they hurry themselves to take effective measures for the preservation of peace; only then, no sooner, will the League of Nations be put in a position to fulfil its destiny. This is the support which the League of Nations most needs.

3. *Organized Christianity must support the League of Nations, but critically*

When we speak as we have done above, we are told: if you condemn war so utterly, you are undermining the League of Nations, which has to maintain its authority, when once this is established, by means of an international military force, and you forget the obligation of the member-states to raise their contingent. As regards this last, the relevant Article XVI of the Covenant does indeed speak of the obligation of all members of the League to take part in *economic* pressure against the defaulting state, and also accepts the principle of military sanctions, but does not establish that every nation is *obliged* to take part therein (Clause 5). This article can be interpreted in various ways: the Covenant was so wisely worded as to leave some room for variety in the interpretation of the articles and some freedom to the nations in this respect. In spite of this uncertainty of interpretation, the nationalistic and militaristic groups in Holland, which have till now remained cold and sceptical towards the international idea and the League of Nations, and warmed up only over national "prestige" and national defence, have exploited Article XVI of the Covenant, to protect the army and navy against the demand for disarmament. They have overlooked the fact that, even if the military obligation of the League of Nations incontestably holds good, in the opinion of many, including General von Deimling, the armed force of the League could be very well gathered together, in the event of international disarmament, from the various national police forces. As has been well said, "National forces of war and the League of Nations police force, for me, belong to two wholly different spheres, and therefore the League of Nations idea can never be, for me, an argument against national disarmament".[1]

But now, as to this military action of the League of Nations. The Covenant does not speak of "making war" upon the defaulting state. The Protocol of 1924 seemed to find it better to describe this action not merely as "force", but also as "war". That seems to me more honest. So long as general disarmament

[1] Professor J. H. van Meurs, in *De Volkenbond*, February 1928, pp. 155–156.

has not been effected—and there is no indication that we may expect this to happen within measurable time—a military League of Nations force must consist of a fully equipped army and navy and air-force, and its appearance would mean formal war, a modern war in *optima forma*, with all the terrible accompaniments of modern technique. True a punitive expedition against a small country would not present very great difficulties, and perhaps would terminate "satisfactorily". But a state that dares bid defiance to the League of Nations and its international force, will probably not be a weak nation, but a very strong one, and if it persists in armed conflict, the war will develop, partly through the instrumentality of the League of Nations, in all its horror. "Let no one deceive himself," the Catholic Professor Veraart has rightly written, "such a war . . . will be just as terrible in nature as wars between nations." He also utters this warning against delusions: "If anyone supposes that the nations will ever be found ready to offer up their manhood to the cruel modern way of waging war . . . in a police fight of all against one, he has forsaken the solid ground of reality." In his speech in the Chamber, of March 2, 1927, Veraart repeated this view, and referred, as before, to his deceased co-religionist, Professor Struycken, who "has said so impressively that the League of Nations must be nothing else but a body which functions mediatorially . . . and that if men make of it an institution which ultimately has to take the field with the war-methods of our modern age, they mistake the nature of the League of Nations". Professor van Vollenhoven, that unwearied champion of arbitration, who for a long time gave the impression, by his various pleas for Grotius' conception of à "fighting peace", that he did not regard the age of the "righteous war" as having yet gone by, to our great joy gave it to be known, in 1928, that times have changed. "If *defence* by honest powers against some crime of war . . . still *bears the character of war, which character we know*, the world is still unchanged. . . . Whether men call this resistance by other, nobler, names than war—'the execution of justice', 'armed pressure', 'military sanctions'—alters the matter not one jot." Elsewhere he elucidates the matter: "But in such international maintenance of justice, that alone can be allowed which an honourable police force would be able to do, at home,

to quell refractory conduct and broils." He clearly sees, however, that such police action would only be possible if all lands were disarmed. Which is still some little way ahead!

We are grateful for this further explanation. For though we care as little as Van Vollenhoven for "a passive peace", although, in our opinion, there is a future only for "a striving peace", we shudder at the very thought of "a warring peace"! A peace-institution like the League of Nations arming for ultimate war! Not only sentiment, but one's sense of reality revolts at the idea. War can never be overcome by war, the Devil be driven out by Beelzebub, and besides, "the war-system, by its very nature, does not lend itself to so disinterested and idealistic a service as the preservation of peace. The genius of war is inseparably bound up with nationalism. War can never be an international function."[1] Thus the American, Clayton Morrison. Though Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson had an eye to national preparedness, his statement of November 1927—a statement from his mouth sensational—is also worth repeating. "We are no longer unconditionally one with the view that the best way of preventing a war is to prepare for it. War-preparations hasten war."

Apart from the temptation for a state to regard its own "contingent" of the League force as primarily its own instrument, this other danger is not mere fancy, viz. that the League of Nations, instead of the "defaulting" state, should be worsted. For "from the moment that war is loosed from the spell and power of patriotism", says Morrison, with truth, "it becomes slack, bereft of splendour and powerless". It would be very different with the state which was trying conclusions with the League: there the nation would be fighting for its life, the citizens for their land. Should the League lose, international law would be ruined, perhaps never to recover. No League of Nations dare risk that. *Non tali auxilio*, not with such help may the work be furthered. Dr. Verzijl, professor of international law at Utrecht, was to my mind quite right when he wrote, after the publication of the Geneva Protocol, that for him it was a question whether, if "this so often idealized institution of an international police force" were once brought into action, "the remedy would not seem worse than the disease".

[1] *The Christian Century*, February 23, 1928, p. 264.

Worse than the disease, because the highest court of justice in the world would be employing a means which, as we saw in the last chapter, is in itself unjust, through and through. The possibility of a *bellum justum* no longer exists. As Professor Veraart said: "Every other injustice sinks into insignificance beside the modern and ever increasing horror of war." No moral order can be fully maintained by immoral means. Let all who, like ourselves, wish the League of Nations well be very careful how they handle this idea of military sanctions. There is no better way of bringing discredit on the League, even of making it hated, among ardent and thoroughgoing pacifists. They see in it a hindrance to branding war, as it deserves to be branded, with the stigma "criminal", which stigma, driven in ever sharper and deeper, may prove to be the strongest protector of peace. Thus, Bart de Ligt, with whom we are not always in agreement, but whose fanatical opposition to war we very truly admire and whose voice is listened to by hundreds, said recently, "Warfare in the service of the League of Nations will now be as much regarded as full of glory, and praised, as was formerly warfare for the Fatherland. So the mind of men in general is still confused. The disease is not rooted out, but simply transferred. If war is crime, as is said and written at Geneva nowadays, the League of Nations is well on the way to becoming a great criminal. Unabashed, it is busy preparing, with malice prepense."[1] Fortunately uneasiness about it is beginning, even at Geneva. The threefold programme, security (= sanctions), disarmament, arbitration, in that order, advanced chiefly by France, is losing its following. People are feeling more and more that if the League is not careful it will choke itself with these sanctions, and that disarmament must come to the fore, if there is to be any real talk of security. The anvil on which Germany has been hammering: "Now we are disarmed, what about you?" will more and more prove to be the anvil on which the weapons of European peace must be forged. If men will not learn to use this anvil while there is time, Germany will presently be sure to find another, and then, farewell to peace!

No, we are not working against the League of Nations when,

[1] B. de Ligt: *Nieuwe vormen van oorlog en hoe die te bestrijden*, pp. 20, 21. We reviewed this book in *Kerk en Vrede*, January 1928.

as behoves Christians, *we set ourselves resolutely against the war-idea in its every form, even in its League of Nations form.* On the contrary, we are offering the League the criticism of which it stands in need, we are contributing to the reshaping of the League in a form which has a future, we are helping to form that public opinion, that atmosphere, in which alone the League can really live and work as an actual power for peace.

4. *Organized Christianity must support the Kellogg Pact, yet critically*

The American Outlawry movement, from which has issued the Kellogg Pact, has afforded the League some healthy criticism. It reproached the Covenant with systematizing war instead of peace, because it was drawn up by men who believed in war, but not in peace. We must enter into no accord with war, but flatly condemn it and refuse all recognition to it.

In contrast to the earlier state of affairs, which is not so far behind us even now, when countries treated each other as high-handed plunderers, this Pact marks a great advance: it is a milestone on the road of progress. Indeed, "the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare . . . that they condemn recourse to war for the settlement of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another" (Art. I).

On the surface it appears as if all danger of war were thereby banished. This however is by no means so. There are too many reservations. First, notice the last phrase, "in their relations with one another". The non-contracting peoples, the subject, colonial peoples, remain without rights, delivered over to the will and military power of their masters. Great Britain there and then insisted on full freedom to protect her "interests", wherever this might be necessary, and forthwith made it plain, in Egypt, what she meant by this. And the United States, which had been "protecting" their capitalist interests in a very high-handed way in little Nicaragua, could hardly object. In respect to the slow but sure rising of Asia and Africa to free themselves from the domination of Europe, for which they have lost respect, through the war, the Kellogg Pact offers little security.

But there is still another war-danger left unchecked. Before

the signing of the Pact, it was expressly demanded and allowed, that all states remain free to defend themselves, if attacked. Defensive war is left quite unchecked. Now we know, from the last war, how hard it is to distinguish between attacker and attacked. Generally, so much has preceded the first attack, on both sides, that it is almost impossible to make out which is the attacking party and which the defending. This hiatus in the Pact means that all countries maintain their heavy armaments (with an eye to defence!) and that this constant threat to the world's peace continues unabated.

The Kellogg Pact, we have remarked, is intended to be an attempt "to outlaw war". But one thing has been forgotten: careful consideration what law was meant. It was desired to attack war as an *institution*, and war has been compared with the duel, which was formerly permitted everywhere, and to-day is forbidden in many civilized lands. The duel was forbidden by statute, however, after it had already been condemned by the moral law of public opinion. We cannot as yet see anything like this with war, nor will the Kellogg Pact create it; the compelling power is absent; rightly, the Outlawry movement will hear nothing of "military sanctions" or anything like them, because these recognize war as an "institution".

An international law, therefore, cannot be meant; internationally, as yet, we live by agreements, like the one about poison-gas, which we know and prove beforehand we shall not keep. If a country has an army and is fighting for its life, it will ignore every single contract previously made. A *national* law then? No; still less is this possible. Not one of the subscribing states, least of all America, dreams of erasing from its constitution the right to make war and the duty to be armed, let alone putting a definite prohibition there. By "outlawry" nothing else can be meant but putting war outside the *moral* law. This is how many American pacifists at first meant it. But the political leaders knew very well that we could not in this way persuade the majority of the American people to abandon the whole military system.

Here we come to the cause of the weakness in the Kellogg Pact: it tries to condemn war on moral grounds ("they condemn . . . war . . . as an instrument of national policy"), but refuses

to do this on thoroughgoing principle. As if it were possible to act really morally, yet not on principle. War is indignantly shown out of the front door, but the back door is intentionally left open, and above it is inscribed, "Entrance for *defensive* war"! And inside, the "fighting services" are maintained and perfected.

Wherefore, even since the Kellogg Pact, the danger of war is in nowise banished. Even the Pact ends up by making a bargain with war. The circumstances under which it was made are typical. Scarcely had it been recognized in principle, when the secret Franco-British war-treaty came to light, to which America replied by expanding her fleet.

The pacifism of the League of Nations and Kellogg Pact more and more proves itself to be too weak really to guarantee peace. We would not abandon the League and the Pact in consequence; they are still young, weakly plants, finding it hard to grow in our old, blood-drenched earth. But we feel the strong necessity and urgent duty of impressing upon ourselves and others, again and again, that there is only *one* thoroughly moral and therefore effective pacifism, the pacifism which *really and on principle* outlaws war, the pacifism that *really and on principle* condemns war ethically, and therefore will never regard it as anywhere admissible. Only when war thus comes to stand outside the moral law is there any chance that national laws will be enacted making war impossible, and national disarmament first in one country, then in another, an accomplished fact. And only when the disarmament of the world is thus brought to pass, will the possibility slowly but surely arise that international contracts forbidding war shall be honoured. In the measure to which the nations actually disarm, they display a real will to peace. In the peace of an *armed* world we never will believe, though hundreds of Leagues and American Pacts surround us.

5. *Organized Christianity must withdraw absolutely the help it has so long given war, and demand disarmament.*

We have seen in the preceding chapters how great a share nationalist Christianity has had in the outbreak of war. Man-

kind could not have prepared wars on so great a scale, could not have waged and sustained them so long, without spiritual support, i.e. without the religious sanction and inspiration which nationalism, militarism and, ultimately, war have received from the Christian Churches. Here a heavy burden of guilt rests on empirical, fallen Christianity, for so great a part of the shame and misery of man. It is the imperative duty of an awakened and arisen Christianity to withdraw this support from war—absolutely withdraw it. Perhaps it may even yet discharge something of its debt.

Withdraw the support. Protest is not enough. If war is a crime against mankind and sin against God, we may play no part in it, and we must try to prevent others from playing a part therein. We sin even by tolerating sin. Now there is one land in the world where we can immediately make this Christian principle to avail: our own land, for there we have a voice. It is our duty to prevent our country from sinning by war. And so we must champion national disarmament. "Spiritual disarmament is for us a self-evident, holy task, but none will believe us to be in earnest so long as we shrink from immediate disarmament", so runs the manifesto which a hundred Swiss anti-militarist clergy issued in 1925. We too, like our Swiss brethren, would take our Christian anti-war principle seriously. Let the Christian Church in Holland and elsewhere insist on national disarmament, on the ground of the reverence she requires for the Gospel she preaches, with which war for any purpose whatsoever is in flagrant opposition. War-preparations are a mockery of the Gospel: a mockery she may no longer endure. Let her insist that the State shall not by its war-preparations bring our people into the position and temptation to sin by war for any reason whatsoever. Let her insist that the very possibility of mobilization cease, since it mobilizes men against Christianity. Let her insist that military training cease, since it militarizes just those who consecrate themselves heart and soul to her, i.e. it makes them unchristian and incapable of Christianity. Let her insist that our country shall make it plain, at home and abroad, that no one need guard against any war activity from us, for we have stripped ourselves of all the means to war.

We make no opposition to such an instrument of justice as

the police force.[1] If Germany, having been battered by war, defeat and revolution, can secure order at home after disarmament, and safeguard her frontiers with a constabulary of one hundred thousand men, Holland can do the same with a proportionately much smaller force. The contention that such a force could, if necessary, expand into an army is absurd in view of our limited resources, chemical and otherwise, and in view of the quick and decisive character of a modern war-attack. Our disarmament could not be taken as anything but a demonstration of peace, a national repudiation of war: and when men learnt that Christianity—may it also be possible to say, the Churches—had contributed to that end, it would be a demonstration to thousands of Christians abroad of something still higher than any earthly peace.

Those who reject the idea of "one-sided" disarmament point to the simultaneous general disarmament which, they say, will come. We shall have to wait long; at least until after the next war, which will have thoroughly side-tracked the movement for disarmament. We have never had much faith in this sort of disarmament; we have less than ever now, after all we have seen, and we notice that the faith of others about us has weakened too. No wonder. Even if some limitation of armaments is effected (perhaps because the immeasurable costs of war and high taxes compel it, after much suffering), peace has still achieved almost nothing—in modern warfare, even less than hitherto. We believe that general disarmament will only get a chance through the stimulus of national disarmament. We endorse the statement of the Swiss manifesto already quoted: "We believe that general disarmament will only become possible if a number of separate countries first give the lead." The ban of fear and suspicion, under which the peace movement lies, the vicious circle of mistrust and armaments, must be broken. It is an encouraging sign that the struggle for national disarmament is not an isolated phenomenon in any one land, but is becoming international. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland the movement grows. One country influences and strengthens another, and presently other and bigger lands will be infected. *Aussi le bien a sa contagion!*

[1] See Chapter IV, C, 4.

Again our attention is called to the League of Nations Covenant which, it is contended, prohibits one-sided disarmament, in view of the possibility of military action by the League. After what we have said regarding military sanctions we can be brief. We feel that those who so speak have not plunged very deeply into the spirit and purpose of the Covenant, which simply and entirely aims at disarmament, and which, in Act VIII for instance, requires the limitation of armaments to the minimum, and prohibits any overstepping of the armament limits laid down. To strain out of this the conclusion that therefore a minimum *must* be maintained, as even our own representative did at Geneva[1] on March 21, 1928, is like drawing the conclusion, from a request that the noise in a hospital be reduced to the least possible, that *some* noise is therefore actually enjoined. It is incomprehensible that people here at home dare use the League as an argument against disarmament. Why, then, did not the League point out to Germany, when she entered, that she must now arm again for war, just like the others, who honoured their League obligation, and therefore were at pains to be ready? Since, then, the Covenant obviously does not require the arming of a big country, how much less the arming of a little land like ours?

When the Danish disarmament proposal was originally introduced (the Lower House passed it, then, by a large majority, the Upper House rejected it), the minister, Count Moltke, explained, on November 18, 1924, "The Covenant of the League of Nations lays on signatories absolutely no obligations to maintain land or sea forces. On the contrary, it requires the opposite. The question must be considered in conjunction with present-day and future opportunities for a disarmament which will extend over the whole world. I hope that the Danish proposal will be regarded as a contribution to the realization of that dream, although it is a modest contribution, and that it will have much influence upon the international handling of this question, in the spirit in which Denmark offers it." A modest contribution certainly, but still, the greatest contribution a

[1] The Russian representative very truly declared that it would be difficult to find a better way of discrediting the League of Nations than to establish that the Covenant was an obstacle in the way of complete disarmament.

small country can at present make. Only a little first beginning of world-disarmament, but still a beginning—and we are still seeking it in the world, in vain. An act of faith in the awakened conscience of the world: and an act of faith in that growing sense of justice which without this faith can never realize itself. And also it would be an act of faith bringing the nation into truer association with Christianity.

6. *Organized Christianity on religious and moral grounds must choose the risk of disarmament rather than the risk of "defence"*

National disarmament, we are told, undermines the State. We answer, yes, if by the State you mean an entity of might; no, if you mean the instrument of justice, which refuses every use of force inconsistent with the service of justice (see Chapter III). To the question: What is the good of a state without fighting-forces, a state "which dare not do anything"? (Steinmetz) the true answer is: the State "has its own natural function, viz. dispensing justice, realizing and maintaining just laws. . . . We are for the State on the same grounds that we are against war."[1] The time has come when men's moral sense, guided and controlled by Christian principle (see Chapter IV), can no longer tolerate any form of the State save that which conduces to true justice. And since a righteous war is no longer a possibility for the moral sense, because the way of war carries in itself the greatest injustice, the just State can no longer have any trafficking with war, and should sever every connection with it.

After the great fiasco of *Realpolitik*, men recovered some insight into the real value of the moral idea in politics. For moral politics, however, faith is always needed, for it is politics with a view to the distant goal. Unbelievers will therefore always clutch at *Realpolitik*, which seems to promise quick success. Just because of this, the advocates of *Realpolitik* must fail, "because in their judgment of political activities they confine themselves to the tangible results of the moment, and have a blind eye for the deeper effects of their policy upon the national conscience, and so upon the psychic foundation of all political

[1] Polak: *Oorlogsfilosofie*, p. 30.

well-being".[1] It is humiliating for a Christian to notice that Kant, interpreting the Gospel from the point of view of political philosophy, which had the force of a religious confession for him, was nearer the truth than political Christians realized. We recall his counsel[2] to seek before all things, even in politics, "the kingdom of pure, practical reason, and its righteousness" that peace may really "be added unto" us: we recall that expression of his unshakable belief in the moral order, on which all well-being, even on earth, ultimately depends; we recall his splendid faith that "all politics must bow the knee before Morality, but may cherish the hope that one day, albeit slowly, she shall attain those heights whereon she shall nevermore lose her glory". "Albeit slowly." In truth God's mills grind slowly. Unbelieving *Realpolitik* works more quickly, but we know the results. Convinced of the "absolute untenability of present-day politics", Albert Schweitzer recently wrote: "We require of the State that it become more spiritual and more moral than ever a State has thought to be." We require of the modern State "that it shall strive to become an ethical and spiritual personality". Upon this requirement our ethical philosophy is "obstinately insistent. It will not be put off by any haughty laughter. The wisdom of to-morrow has a different sound from that of yesterday."[3] May those many politicians and historians who can conceive no future save one closely resembling the past take this last word to heart!

Moral politics, politics with a view to the distant goal. "It is quite possible", we are told, "that this is true; that not only the honest way, but every moral method, endures longest and gives the best lasting results, speaking generally, but if moral politics includes national disarmament, it is very probable that the special interests of our nation would be gravely injured thereby, and it might happen that our nation would quickly be made the victim of its own moral politics, and remain so to the distant goal. The risk is too great!" Before we answer this in principle, we would refer the reader to what we have written in Chapter IV about the possibility of a small country defending itself in modern warfare; we would call attention to the terrific

[1] Foerster: *Politische Ethik*, p. 204.
[2] See Chapter III, p. 157.
[3] *Kultur und Ethik*, II, pp. 275–276.

slaughter and devastation which a modern war—the next war even worse than the last—effects. Men will be wise not to underestimate *this* risk. Nowadays, the armed state, especially if it is a small country, runs at least as much risk as a genuinely just state (see Chapter III (i)) which, as such, will take no part in war. And it should not be forgotten that air-squadrons with their bombs and poison-gas will probably not attack harmless lands and towns. The reply that the young men of a disarmed people would be driven without chance of appeal into some foreign service has little in it. In the last war nobody dared follow this Napoleonic plan. And if a people disarm from conviction, and thereafter allow itself to be harnessed like a mule to the war-carriage of another people, well . . . let it perish in its worthlessness.

But now, our answer in matter of principle. Granted that our country runs a risk by disarming—for we do not deny it: every life, whether a man's or a country's, is dangerous in this world, and certainly life with moral purpose is. Let us grant, too, what we do not think is probable, but what is possible, viz. that this risk is even greater than that of "war-readiness". Still, we would say with Kant: "In a conflict between politics and morality, the latter hacks through the knot which the former cannot unravel." We still choose the former risk. Each, disarmament or "readiness", is a gamble; no one can deny it. But organized Christianity must recognize that "the one risk is a gamble of faith, of conscience, of submission to a great cause, the other is only a gamble of self-interest".[1] We must more and more impress this upon ourselves and others, so that we remain mindful of it, even if our people should sometime be trodden underfoot, and perhaps for a time lose something of their independence, as a result of disarming—though this is much more likely to result from "readiness". Then voices will not be wanting, they will steadily increase, that will say, "This is the result of your disarmament! If only we had armed for our defence!" Then, in that time of great affliction, this faith must prove its strength, and hold us fast: we could not be answerable to God for any other attitude; we have staked all on His will. The issue is with Him; with us is faith and courage to endure. Then that

[1] Liechtenhan: *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* p. 55.

word of Luther will avail to the full: "Wer hier am meisten glaubt, der schütz't am meisten." It is better, says Father Stratmann, even for nations, to suffer wrong rather than inflict it. "Wrong suffered for God's sake and for the sake of peace will never bring dishonour".[1] But, Stratmann continues, "this exalted Christian ideal . . . is so completely opposed to the standard of modern statecraft that it is not surprising that in no other book on Moral Theology do we find such teaching".[2]

Every earnest-minded man, and therefore every Christian, allows all life's problems to be dominated by the one question, *what is the highest good?* The answer to that question determines his attitude to life. If there be men who can conscientiously answer, "The highest good, for me, is my country", let them subordinate all else to this, their highest good, and let them go on imagining they are the best citizens, and serve their country best. A Christian, however, is different. However much he loves and means to serve his country, he knows a higher good, the kingdom of eternal values, which Plato and all great thinkers have recognized, and which the Gospel has endowed with another form and a new name: the Kingdom of God. This is the Christian's eternal Fatherland. It really seems foolish, to declare with such emphasis these simple things that were self-evident to primitive Christianity. But this fallen Christianity of ours is in bitter need of hearing the A B C of Christian morality again and yet again. For many Christians of his own land, Dr. Liechtenhan uttered a bewildering truth, when he said, "We are justified in considering—nay obligation is laid on us to consider, a question which touches the welfare of humanity and of God's Kingdom, from another standpoint than the merely Swiss". However dear is Switzerland to the heart, "the triumph of peace is a higher and holier goal for us than the preservation of our land. If victory over war can only be secured by the sacrifice of our independence, then we as Christians must be ready for it, however much grief it may cost our Swiss hearts". Not that Liechtenhan really fears that this loss is likely: with this inquiry into the highest good he wants to clear the way for a purely Christian train of thought, which is otherwise so easily disturbed by anxious questions of secondary rank, questions which concern

[1] Hirscher, quoted by Stratmann, op. cit., p. 74. [2] p. 74.

land and property, flesh and blood, but not the Kingdom of God. Who loves land or goods more than me, says Christ, is not worthy of me. "And whoso will not take up his cross and follow me, is not worthy of me" (Matt. x. 37, 38). Liechtenhan does well, to point to the cross. The sorest problems of man and humanity cannot be solved, save by pointing out the way of sacrifice, the way of the Cross.

Certainly, a Christian must bear the Cross, someone replies, but he must not lay it on other people. Thus the executive of the Dutch "Fellowship for Morality in Politics" was reproached with "imposing martyrdom", over its opposition to the Naval Bill of 1923. The executive answered, "Imposing martyrdom? Possibly. But it would be martyrdom for the world's moral salvation. And is not a declaration of war, with all its consequences, also imposed unasked? And where is the moral good that comes to light as the result of a modern war?"[1] We have simply to choose between suffering laid on a nation for the sake of "defence", whether that "defence" be desired or not, possible or not, and suffering imposed for the sake of the Kingdom of God, sought or unsought. For our part we cannot visualize it otherwise, and there is no doubt which choice we must make. If, says Liechtenhan, we urge disarmament upon our nation, as a moral imperative, and move it to take upon itself the risk of the suffering that might ensue, "we are well aware how heavy a demand we make. If, however, we may not try to make the times ripe for awakening within our nation the realization of this task, we may as well also give up Good Friday, with its proclamation of the power of sacrifice".[2]

7. *Organized Christianity must face the colonial question fearlessly, in the light of Christian Truth*

We can, of course, only deal with this vast and involved problem in broad outline, but at least we will not omit to do that. For many of our opponents think they have the upper hand here. "You forget", they say, "our obligations towards the Indies, which we could not discharge without an army and navy. We will not speak of our possessions, or our profits, though

[1] *Het Gemeene Best*, October 1923, p. 8.
[2] *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* p. 55.

you might at least think of our children's careers. We will not even speak of the economic necessity to make the fruitful Indies as productive as possible, though you might think of the critical position into which our people would come if they lost the Indies. We will only speak of our responsibilities towards the colonies which were allotted us in the past. The Indian races cannot dispense with our leadership, for a time, at any rate, and we may not give up our work of civilization. We have to protect these lands against enemies—there are plenty of covetous eyes—and against internal disturbances which hinder our government and the orderly development of the native population. You may say there can be police action without war, but do not forget that behind the Indian movement is a racial movement and in part, a religious one. A revolution might result in racial warfare, and then we should have to defend the white race and Christianity itself. Even for these reasons, we must have a fighting force in the Indies."

This is, in brief, what is generally advanced against disarmament from the Dutch-Indian point of view. It is well that possessions, profits and economic interests are for the moment left out. We will assume that these motives will not intrude themselves upon the ensuing reasoning, at any rate not consciously. And we in our turn for the moment will put on one side the question whether Holland really believes herself capable of "defending" her far-flung colonies, if by any chance it came to blows. We will confine ourselves to the purely ethical point of view: "our responsibility towards the colonies which were allotted to us in the past". Many Christians add, "through the Providence of God". The returned missionary, D. Crommelin, in a notable treatise on this subject, remarks that it is better to say "we came to the Indies under God's *sufferance*, for "we have no other *right* to the Indies than that of conqueror; we come into the Indies from quite selfish motives, although our forefathers believed in good faith that this colonial exploitation was to be justified before God, because it meant the introduction of Christianity".[1] "God's sufferance" has here exclusively a cosmic reference, not an ethical, for *how* did we conquer the Indies, and by what means did we assert our

[1] *Stemmen des Tijds*, April 1927, p. 355.

authority? (Although our rule will very well stand comparison with Portuguese, English and other rules.) Crommelin wisely does not pursue this subject further.[1] From J. P. Coen to Van Heutsz, it is one long story of greed and violence, in which both in former and in recent days thousands and thousands of Indians lost their lives.[2] Beside all the mischief, Holland has brought to the Indies, "not from altruism, but from frank self-interest" (Crommelin), many good things as well, which the population partly can, partly cannot value. *Beneficia non obtruduntur* generally holds good in this sphere. Western civilization is so utterly different from Eastern, and has often treated it with great contempt. Crommelin complains that it still does so. He complains of "the way the laws have sometimes been administered", of "the tone and behaviour of European society in the Indies", of "the unboundedly contemptuous tone that is sounded in many European papers, towards all that is Indian", all which go a long way to explain the "inferiority complex" of the native population. It is made very difficult for them to respect Dutch rule, quite apart from the resentment which any people experiences that is dominated and used by some other people, a resentment which has increased, of course, with the enormously increased self-consciousness of the Indian. Crommelin tells how, "on the departure of a group of political exiles from Bandoeng to the Upper Digoel, all who regarded themselves as belonging to the native intelligentsia were at the station to see them off. These things set one thinking".

Indeed they do. It makes us speak more softly of our benefactions and of "the work of civilization which we must not give up". Certainly, we agree with Crommelin that Holland would be acting irresponsibly if she suddenly withdrew from the Indies, even supposing the vested interests allowed this! We should create chaos and expose the Indies to conquest by other powers. But is that to say that we must therefore hold the Indies with the forces of war against those other powers? To what purpose should we do that? Let us be honest; if ever we came into armed conflict with another power, fulfilling the time-honoured rôle of little ally beside its mighty "helper", would

[1] For this "tragedy", see Professor Snouck Hurgronje: *Colijn over Indië* pp. 32–34.

[2] See Chapter II, para. 6.

we dare pretend that we were fighting for the sake of our responsibility for the well-being of the natives? Hundreds of natives would be slain, simply for the sake of our Dutch interests, in so far as these were not lost in the interests of our great ally.

There remains to be considered the race danger which threatens our moral task in the Indies. This moral task, in brief, is the education of the Indian race for independence. The two Dutch ideas, wrote Professor Paul Scholten recently, in an article on "The Peril in the Indies",[1] the two ideas which cross and fight each other constantly are expressed in the question, "Must the decisive factor for the Government in the Indies be the interest of the Indies, or that of Holland? Briefly: guardianship or possession". For Scholten, guardianship, temporary guardianship, is the only true *raison d'être* for our government in India. "A right to rule over another people simply to fill our purse—this is not only thoroughly undemocratic, it is thoroughly unchristian." For guardianship, he says rightly enough, there must be authority, and that authority must make use of force when necessary. He utters a warning, however. "Yet that authority is not ultimately based on force. If it must be so, a day will come when it must fail. Ultimately it rests on the regard the subjects have for it, the *trust* that it inspires." We agree, though we had preferred another word to the rather humiliating "guardianship", but ask further: suppose the trust were lost, and the protected people, taken as a whole, no longer wanted its guardian, might the guardian retain its guardianship by violent means, and, if need be, destroy its wards by fire and the sword? Should this last happen, and Holland plunge into a thorough war with the Indies, would not what Scholten satirizes then come to light? "With many the idea of guardianship was simply a thin cloak in which their greed of gain was clad; in their fear they flung it away."

Gradually to give the Indies independence, so that they can be free peoples in a free land, able to govern themselves, and to contribute something needful to the world's economy—if this is the honest intention of the whites who rule the Indies, the Christian conscience can make its peace with it. *If* only this were intended; if only this did come to pass, in economic and

[1] *Alg. Weekblad van Christendom en Cultuur*, January 27, 1928.

cultural fields as well as political! Our great enemy here is not Communism; that can only sow hate where others have prepared the ground. Our great enemy is that capitalistically sinewed fraction of Europe which, in its sturdy *Real-politik*, cares not a rap for any ethical consideration, which laughs at it or scorns it in proportion to the strength or weakness of its appearance. And it is especially in these white circles which have as much regard for the native population as for their shoe-blacks, that there is most clamour for a fleet and a larger army. And then it becomes a moral question, they tell us, to furnish these. Fortunately missionary societies are beginning to realize that, so long as the Dutch authority in the Indies is so closely bound up with Dutch interests, it is dangerous to be in too close relation with this authority. We must not, says Crommelin, "ask first, what is most in the interests of Holland, but what will most further the Kingdom of God. And the main question is not whether the native Christians are good subjects, but much rather, whether the behaviour of the Dutch people, in the eyes of Indo-Asiatics a Christian power, is a recommendation of the Gospel". "I believe", Crommelin boldly continues, "that the Gospel, liberated from the West, will infuse the best forces of the Indies with new life. I therefore believe more and more that God's Kingdom cannot be better served than by setting it free from specifically Dutch colonial interests."

Any one who so speaks—and it behoves a Christian so to speak—will never, it seems to me, want Holland to launch into war for the protection of the Indian realm against the Indian people, or of the white race against the brown. We have already seen, indeed, that if anything is the reverse of a "recommendation of the Gospel", if there is anything in flagrant strife with the Gospel, it is war, especially war such as present-day "Christians" have perfected, and such as the "heathen" are busy learning from "Christendom". Any one who speaks as Crommelin does will be quite unable to suppose that true Christianity can be "protected" by war, any more than we can imagine water protected by fire. He will shrink with indignation and shame from such an utterance as that of the missionary Dr. Samuel Zwemer, a distinguished figure in the missionary world, who said, at the outbreak of war against the Riffs, "I hope the Spanish-

French war against them will be crowned with success, for although the Riffs are fighting for their independence, their victory would have a disastrous effect, and stimulate Mohammedanism over great tracts of the earth".[1] The fall of Christianity is very evident here; the glory and holiness of Christ's mission, above that of Mohammed, is here blotted out. Must the conflict between these two religions be waged, then, not in the region of the spirit, but with barbaric weapons? One must realize how this African war was waged! Two hundred thousand Christian soldiers stood in the field with vastly superior modern armaments, and at one point as many bombs were flung at the Berber tribesmen as there were Berbers. American air squadrons voluntarily joined in, as if they had been invited to a big game hunt. Now and then they mistook their instructions and bombed the villages where the women and children had been lodged for shelter.

What the Berbers met with on the coast of Africa, the Druzes underwent in Syria. One of our leading papers[2] recently published a series of letters from a soldier in the French Foreign Legion, which described with cynical frankness, how the towns and villages were treated by the French fliers; how the captured Druzes, young men and old, were first made to clear away the dead bodies of horses, then divided into groups, put against a wall and shot; how the town of Soeeida was mined and blown up, after it "had been nicely cleared by our aeroplanes and artillery, with bombs and shells. The citadel, the Sultan's palace and the chief buildings were destroyed". After that, "we took nine of the chief villages and burnt them, drove away the cattle, and laid the rebellious districts waste with fire and sword". The bloodshed ordered by the English General Dyer, at Amritsar in the Punjab, where six hundred unarmed Hindus, caged-up in an enclosed square, were shot down by machine-guns, is still fresh in the memory of us all. Thus Christian nations conceive their task of civilization. We Dutch, sons of Coen and cousins of Van Heutsz, have no right to make reproach. Moreover we know that war and war-preparedness choke all idea of humanity.

[1] Quoted by Sven Hedin, in the *Frankfürter Nachrichten* of December 25, 1925.

[2] *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, January 16, 1928, Avondblad.

But it is doubly painful for us, when the non-Christian world thus makes acquaintance with Christianity, as was lamentably the case when—beside all the other barbarities of the Great War—the coloured races had to learn the refinements of "Christian" war in the service of France or Britain. Said Gandhi, with truth, "Europe is clad only in her ghastly nakedness, and calls aloud to Africans and Asiatics to come and see that nakedness". And now, after the war, in the midst of "peace", the process goes on. "On the whole, what can we expect of the future", asks Sven Hedin, "when even the peace which the mighty ones of the earth have given us is stained with blood? One need only follow with some attention the movements which are sweeping like fevers through the masses of Asia and Islam, in order to calculate what may be expected of the future".

If we Christians would retain our hope for this future, we must pay heed to such facts as Dr. Stanley Jones points out in his *The Christ of the Indian Road*, viz. that the Gospel only makes headway nowadays in India, when the idea wins through that Christianity and Western civilization are not identical. So too, ran the Message of the World Missionary Conference, held at Jerusalem in 1928. If there be one Christian organization that is beyond others interested in the penetration of that idea, it is the missionary enterprise. In and through the Great War the East lost its respect not only for the white race, whose superiority proved to be chiefly in manufactures and guns, but also, in many regards, for Christianity. The "heathen" looked away over the shoulders of the Christian missionaries, to the behaviour of Christian nations, and called to the missionaries, "Physicians, heal yourselves; begin your preaching where there is most need for it, at home". Nowadays, not so many non-Christians will swallow the tale Dr. Kruyt told to a number of headhunters: "Our Germanic forefathers did even worse things than you; they even drank palm-wine from the skulls of their slain foemen. But now things are greatly changed. All killing of enemies is forbidden. . . ." It has been asked, with reason, "Have the missionaries any right to talk like this? Is not headhunting among the Toradjas innocent child's-play compared with our "new "inventions"?[1] A negro in South Africa showed a right under-

[1] Rev. T. Leendertz in *Kerk en Vrede*, March 1927.

standing when he said to a missionary, "The things you *do* speak so loudly that I cannot understand the things you *say*".[1]

Christianity and Western civilization are not identical! The Gospel set free from the West! Thus Crommelin and Stanley Jones. "Work for a new order. . . . Unqualified acceptance of the way of love which Christ pointed out. . . . Be not conformable to the world! . . . Practise the Gospel with more courageous faith." Thus the Message from Jerusalem.

If the missionary enterprise will be really in earnest about this, being mindful of primitive Christianity and the present-day challenge, it will indeed do much to set free the Gospel from the war-idea in its every form, and to free Christianity from the whole business of militarism, and it will stand four-square against all preparation and practice of war. This endeavour, to which it is bidden, and will in the future be bidden more and more insistently, will not come easy. For the largest part, certainly the strongest and most substantial part, of empirical Christianity, that part to which nine out of ten of the official leaders of Church and Christian politics belong, is bound up closely with that form of Western civilization which has taken war into its bosom. The so-called "Christian" parties in our country, and in others, form the very basis of the army and navy. As we listen to the spokesmen of this Christianity we are reminded of Erasmus' lament: "Things have come to such a pass that to open one's mouth against war is actually regarded as immoral and unchristian."[2] Missions are largely dependent upon this section of Christianity, at least financially. And yet it will more and more become a matter of life and death for them to free themselves from it, above all, in their convictions regarding war and militarism. Christian missions have something to do very different from "protecting" the white race against the brown. If they know any history, they know that of all dangers in the world the *white* danger is by far the greatest. Europe has vastly more threatened Africa and Asia than vice versa, and still does so. Christians may indeed pray God that the day of reckoning shall never come, the day when the non-Christian peoples, having learnt from the Christian the way to wage war with success, shall come over to avenge themselves upon the Christians, for

[1] See Crommelin: op. cit., p. 361.

[2] See p. 86.

what these have done. On that *dies irae* a cry of horror would rise up from Christian lands, but the heavens would know that judgment was done. May God's mercy come before judgment! But the first thing He may demand of us is that Christianity forswear the practice of war, and openly show that it has nothing further to do therewith. Maybe atonement is still possible, but if so the word of Christ must be ever plainly before us: "Without Me ye can do nothing" (John xv. 5).

No. The colonial problem, clearly understood, need not be a hindrance to disarmament. The opposite is true.

8. *Organized Christianity must not be side-tracked by "the Red peril"*

Here too but a word, simply serving to indicate our attitude towards those who see another argument against disarmament. When they have finished talking of the yellow and brown perils, perhaps at the same time, they point to the red peril, especially the Communist danger, threatening both from the East (Russia) and at home.

Western Europe, we consider, has adopted a Pharisaic attitude towards Russia. From fear of the anti-capitalist phantom, as soon as the Soviet Republic arose, it backed up the White Russian generals and the surrounding lands with money, arms and officers. The new republic, which had its hands full at home, saw itself threatened from all quarters, and formed its Red Army. While this army was still so weak that one of our best-known writers in the Press, Dr. Blankenstein, declared that it was scarcely strong enough to control home affairs, the Western Powers already saw in it a reason for strengthening their defences, crying "Beware the Red Army"! Yet they left the adjacent Germany unarmed! Ever since, this motive has been gratefully seized on and used for the progressing militarization of the West. We are certainly no friends of the Soviets, which leave little to choose between themselves, with their reign of terror, imprisonments and executions, and the Tsarist régime which nurtured them. But it seems to us unjust and hypocritical to heap on them all the blame for the conflict above and below the surface between the Communist and the capitalist world.

Also it seems to us unfair not to recognize that in the Communist striving after a human life not governed by gold but by the community, however faulty and confused it be, there is an element which is related to the Christian idea, and which also has a future, in one form or another. Equally unfair was it, to laugh Stalin to scorn, when, having banished Trotzsky because he feared dictatorship by the Red Army, he came before the League of Nations with his thorough-going disarmament plan. The future will show who were most in good faith, and who really laid their cards on the table: the Russians or the chorus of the Western Powers and Press. In any case, here, as in face of every other peril of war, men must choose between the old way, competition in armaments—and we know where that leads —or a new way, along which disarming faith may walk. Of all catchwords, the most deceitful has been: *si vis pacem, para bellum* ("If you want peace, prepare for war").

The "Red peril" at home: that Communism which does not shun ways of violence and calls to its adherents to arm. Herein is to be found the real reason for the opposition of many fierce resisters of disarmament, especially among the wealthier classes. They speak of national honour and safety, and mean the Red peril at home—or even socialists, for you can never be sure! There is a strong alliance between capital and the army. "Demos" must be kept in his place—away with disarmament! And yet democracy, especially Christian democracy, which recognizes man's higher worth, is the only bulwark against fermenting and disruptive elements. Here again that same distinction comes to light which we saw before, between "nation" and "people". Many nationalists trouble their heads little about the people. If taxes are high, and they can manage it, they leave the "home-country". They make very little protest against a society which allows one citizen to live in wealth and another in abject poverty. Nor against war, which brings glory to the nation, however many it may slay. And this is just the spirit which sows the dragon's-teeth in life, and reaps violent anarchism. But it is also the spirit that is in direct opposition to Christianity. It is not true that an army is necessary to subdue revolutionary elements in the event of armed rising. Nor is the civic guard necessary, that is kept going, in spirit, by generals and the clergy,

and with material supplies, by "big" finance, simply irritating working people, as a result. Our police force can do without that. But it is very certain that war and preparation for a possible war breeds anarchism and revolution. For, first, a Government which has two moralities, one for peace and another for war, systematically undermines its own authority. Moreover, a state at war demands far more from poor men than it ever gives them. For if the slum-dwellers of the great cities, who can set little store by life and therefore by their "country", are sent to war, to endure hell and to create hell, and perhaps to come back maimed for life, who are they that make hell in their hearts but the powers that drive them to war, and against whom but those same powers will that hell be directed? These people know now what war is; they are warned and determined: anything, rather than that! Let those who love their wealth and well-being and ease, beware of false tactics! When and why have bloody revolutions taken place in modern times? After war, and as its result. When and why have princes and established powers been deposed? After war, and as its result. For those who are afraid of revolution, there is nothing to fear so much as war, and the militarism associated with it.

9. *When militarism disappears, a psychological void results. Organized Christianity must plant there a more rigorous ethic and a more rigorous faith in God*

A large part of the nation does not know what it must do. It has sympathy with national disarmament, even from ethical considerations, but because it is not driven by strong conviction, it wavers. To be frank, it feels uneasy at the idea of being deprived of military defence. This is to be readily understood, for nothing is harder, as we know from personal experience, than to unlearn. The strength of tradition is much greater than we often think. Although we realize that our defences avail little in modern war, being perhaps as much a danger as a protection, and—what is more important—although we know that to take part in crime or to make others take part is itself a crime, it is so unwonted, so strange, to have to think of the future without the forces of war. The idea of disarmament means facing our

people with a psychological vacuum; the void must be filled up, completely, by a new training in these regards at home and in school, and a new public opinion. This end is already being worked for by many—though by how small a proportion—but here as in everything else they find it hard to begin. "During the last centuries the world's conscience has been so darkened and confused by nationalism and militarism that it can no longer grasp any national moral idea."[1] On the other hand, however, it remains true what the old Church Father said: "The human soul is by nature Christian,"[2] and true original Christianity springs up again and again in hearts and consciences. It will be harder for us and our people to learn that "spiritual preparedness" (De Ligt) which must supersede armed defence, and which must be capable of that passive resistance of which Gandhi and his followers have given the world a shining example this long while now. For this, however, a mental and moral training is necessary wherein the Hindus are far ahead of us, who have been brought up to ideas of force and to faith in it. The attitude of the German population of the Ruhr towards the military occupation of that district, however, has given us courage. There is here a great field for personal cultivation of spirit, wherein we Westerns, who live such outwardly busy lives, still fall lamentably short. To suffer wrong with dignity and strength is a difficult art, even though men know there is no other alternative but either to suffer wrong or to commit it. A more rigorous ethic, which will inure us to hardship and suffering, by a more ascetic attitude to life, a real Christian ethic—that is our bitter need.

To both, to the framing of higher ideals than those of the nationalist, militarist tradition, and to the cultivation of that inward alertness, that "soul-force" so largely characteristic of early Christianity, whose martyrs created the Church, may that Church lend her mighty support. With God's help, she can do it. For above all, in the long run it is religious ideas and upright lives of faith that dominate public opinion, education in the schools, and all national conduct. The two thoughts, "God *wills* this" and "God *forbids* that" must continually inspire and support us, especially in days of need and despair. To the anxious

[1] Stratmann, p. 75.

[2] Tertullian: *Apology*, XVII.

questionings of traditionalists and them of little faith: "What will become of us and our children, what will become of our country and Church, if we disarm?" Christianity aroused, must fling back another question as answer, "What will become of your sons, if you send them to war? What will become of the world, and so of our country, in war—war, which will rage over the world, destroying all, material and moral, unless disarmament check it? What moral right has the Church to exist, if it allows preparation for that war to go on, even in its own land, without the most obstinate protest and opposition? What right is left to her, to go on calling herself 'the Church of Christ', if she yet again makes common cause with the forces of war and tacitly gives them her sanction?"

How one longs that Christianity would win back her old faith and her old high spirit! Her old faith, whereby she would say, We must go God's ways, fearing not the Cross, and the future we must leave to Him. The old high spirit which would give will and power to the Church to hold the State at arm's length and say: I only recognize you if you remain a *just* state and plainly renounce all war. How grand it would be, if Christianity to-day came to understand once more the old *militia Christi*, which so confronted the might of war that Tertullian saw it as the camp of light over against the camp of darkness. How it would warm the heart of the Dutch Christian who is also a good patriot, if Dutch Christianity led the way and induced the Dutch nation to refuse the service of war, because it would enter the service of God. And if the Churches are laggard in taking up the challenge in this high cause, and so fall presently under the judgment of God, then let those people in the Church who hold another conviction band themselves together unitedly to raise their voice against war and preparation for war, so that the Church shall not remain dumb, so that the Church, continually disturbed in her sleep by this alliance, may perhaps be really roused by and by, before it is too late. Such organizations are springing up already. We shall return to this matter presently.

The best citizens of a country are the believers, who have a sense of eternity, and therefore work to save their nation from neglecting the God-given opportunity, the opportunity to assert

itself for the high cause of God. "Whoso commits idolatry with his country calls down a curse upon it," says Tagore. We add, "But whoso has a vision of his country in a higher service, and helps to set it there, calls down a blessing on it". Perhaps Keir Hardie was thinking of this when he said: "The nation which has the courage to throw away its weapons first will win for itself one of the greatest names in history." But we think of something quite different from a name in history when we speak of "God's blessing". We think of that word of Scripture which so thoroughly applies to our theme: "Righteousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to the peoples" (Prov. xiv. 34.) On the strength of that truth, we declare our faith that a nation which refuses to bear any longer the reproach of war, seeking righteousness with steadfast purpose, perishing rather than lose sight of righteousness and fall back again into the old sin of war, that nation is not humbled but exalted by God, and continues in honour, whatever oppression it may suffer in the meantime. In this sense, Foerster is right with his paradox: "Only those states shall live which are determined for this cause [i.e. for righteousness] to die". For what he adds is true: "Providence will not let those nations die which try to live with moral and spiritual power like this, by the deepest revelations and proclamations of truth which man has received, for out of them may be built up something higher than the life and society of the beasts."[1] But the people that does not on principle reject the war-way, which lets the beast loose in a man, but persists in war-preparation—can that people call on Providence and trust thereto? Let everyone answer the question for himself. For us it is a problem no more.

In the last resort, the disarmament question too, like every one of life's serious problems, is a matter of faith. Nobody can require that we shall give full answer to all questions of the outcome and future of things. Anyone who has reflected on the riddle of life and history is shy of perfect solutions. And anyone who knows anything of the might and majesty of God, and of His creative power, whereby the future is always different from the past, will guard himself against calling *this* possible and *that* impossible, and thus playing Providence. We believe that if we

[1] *Politische Ethik*, p. 221.

are faithful the Creator will bring forth powers of which as yet we can see nothing. And finally we *know* only this, but this we know very well: we have to go the way God directs, without asking what comes of it; along *that* way we may indeed trust Him; that trust will never be put to shame. "Faithful is He that calleth you, who will also do it" (1 Thess. v. 24).

B. The Personal Stand of the Christian

The task of Christianity is thus to protest against war and war-preparation, to declare its criminal and sinful character, and in line with this protest actively to oppose armaments in one's own land pressing for national disarmament, in order that general disarmament too may become possible. Must it be content with this? May it be? And if the nation remains armed, because the majority wish it, and presently goes to war, must Christianity submit—under protest?

Before we give our own answer we will hear and investigate two other, notable, answers, which we can quite appreciate, but cannot approve. The first answer is: "No, you may not go further. In a democratic land one must acquiesce in the will of the majority. And anyone who believes in the State—as you do—must respect the will of the State, established in law." The second answer comes from advocates of disarmament. "Besides our agitation for disarmament there is nothing to do, unless, as the S.D.A.P.[1] says, it is a general strike and with it a wholesale refusal to mobilize for war. But not individual action; that weakens our effectiveness and makes for internal confusion."

In the face of so great a moral evil as war, we deny that either of these attitudes is satisfying. The problem of war is morally so serious just because it is a matter of conscience. And there is no more than one sort of conscience in the world, viz. personal conscience. All collective convictions and public opinions receive their moral worth from the consciences of individuals, and every ethical movement gets its power from the attitude of persons. Therefore war as a moral problem is not only a national or a party concern, but also, indeed primarily, personal. If the personal attitude is not clearly defined, the whole anti-war

[1] The Dutch Social Democratic Labour Party.

movement remains vague. And here and now is something with which personal conscience has to do, even in peace-time, and with which it may come into conflict, viz. conscription. How should the man who believes in the State, and how should the party behave in face of this problem? We shall try to answer both questions.

1. *Personal attitude to the State:*[1] *conscription*

We have already had something to say about the introduction of compulsory service and its ethical character.[2] Gradually, under the influence of reviving Christianity and the growing idea of humanity, something like a common conviction is forming over the whole world, among those who think of these things, one expression of which is to be found in the international "Anti-Conscription Manifesto", which was published at the end of August 1926 in every land, which bore among its seventy signatures the names of C. F. Andrews (India), Norman Angell, Henri Barbusse, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Annie Besant, the Generals von Deimling, von Schönaich, Verraux, and Koolemans Beijnen, Edward Carpenter, Georges Duhamel, Einstein, Gandhi, Ellen Key (since deceased), Chr. Lange (Norway), Arthur Ponsonby, Ragaz, K. H. Roessingh (since deceased), Romain Rolland, Bertrand Russell, Dr. Seipel (Austria), Philip Snowden, Father Stratmann, Rabindranath Tagore, Fritz von Unruh, H. G. Wells and Mathilde Wrede. In that manifesto we read: "Conscription brings with it degradation of the human personality and destruction of freedom. The barrack life, the military drilling, the blind obedience to commands however unjust and wrong they may be, and the deliberate training for slaughter undermine respect for the person, for democracy and for the human life. It is humiliating to human dignity to compel men against their will, or without conviction of the rightness of their deeds, to sacrifice their lives or to kill others. The State that thinks itself justified in compelling its citizens to go to war will never be able to possess in peace-time the respect essential to the worth and success of its life. Besides, by conscription, the military, aggressive spirit

[1] For personal and political morality, see Chapters II and III.
[2] See Chapter IV, A, 2.

is implanted in the masculine population at the period of life which is most susceptible to impressions."

Although doubts had previously arisen regarding conscription, the devilry of war having been made plain in its nature and effects through the last war, moral condemnation became sharper and more decisive. In wide circles opposition arose. "It is clear", wrote the Swedish Alliance for Christian Social life, in a respectful address to the King of Sweden, signed by Dr. Beskow and Dr. Lindskog, "that conscription is no longer tolerable to the moral sense of the nation."[1] And at home, Dr. C. E. Hooykaas expressed what was in the minds of thousands. "A firm conviction has formed in the minds of many good and thoughtful citizens of our land; we ourselves can and will never take part in it [i.e. in war], nor may we ever force others into this business."[2] The same writer said, regarding the cleavage between Church and society: "What can the most spiritual teaching of one catechism class and one religious service a week avail in a world which preaches greed of gain and self-seeking in the most obstinate way? What is left of our brotherhood when men at their work only believe in the power of jealousy? What becomes of love, if to-morrow a war may break out, and your sons be driven to something which we regard in our ordinary life as so great an evil that we speak of it as rarely as possible: murder? . . . We have too little realism in our Churches." Indeed what remains of Christian education, the main factor in the anti-revolutionary programme, if that education is at once upset by the training and business, both theoretical and practical, of war? And what of the second factor, the authority of Government, if that Government forces conduct which is condemned by conscience out and out?

The State has the right to demand its citizens' services. But military service is not right at all. Whether the State may require the sacrifice of life is an open question. But the State certainly has no right to treat men as social units without regard for their moral personalities, without question of their personal convictions. A state that does so begets injustice, i.e. is an unjust

[1] *Die Eiche*, 13te Jahrgang (1925), No. 1, p. 42.
[2] *Voor Eigen Kring*, May 2, 1925.

state. We recall the view of Augustine that if a state does not practise towards God that justice which gives to each his due, and withholds from Him His due, viz. human souls, it is no true state, no just state.[1] This state will be unable to maintain its authority for long. For authority is different from force; it is moral by nature. No one can deny the grave words of the Swedish address already quoted: "The faith of the individual citizen in the voice of conscience is the deep and solid ground whereon the constitution must be built. A state which wounds conscience undermines its own safety."[2]

One must therefore not be surprised if sometimes mutinies occur among soldiers, as has happened more than once in the last few years, nor give all the blame to party propaganda, agitators' speeches and the influence of drink. To do so would be to overlook the deepest cause. Of course we condemn such disturbances; if service is undertaken, it should be carried out as well as possible. Sabotage is morally without sanction, and is deceit. Nor have we meant for a moment that the disturbers would be the people most troubled in conscience; they must rather be sought among the coarser elements. But we do believe that even they feel there is no moral right by which they are put through their military drill and training; the authority which drives them into war has no moral grounds. This thought which gets everywhere, without any propaganda, since men are not dense or blind, takes the restraint away just from those who need it most.

If conscription be thus viewed, must one be subservient to it, as to a *moral* duty, should it be imposed? Or, in the event of serious conflict between the bidding of the State and the demands of conscience, is the citizen justified in following the latter?

Serious conflict. We hate that individualism, deficient in social sense and without understanding of the authority and necessity of the State, which finds its own person and purpose so important that these outweigh all else, and which is unprepared for any sacrifice or concession. Also we are aware that conscience may err, and that therefore men must be careful with its dictates. For this reason the Christian will not fail to test and sharpen

[1] Augustine: *de civitate Dei*, XIX, 21.

[2] *Die Eiche*, p. 44.

his conscience on the truth of the Gospel and in prayer. But if he has done this, if he is sure that God speaks to him, may he then refuse obedience to the State?

It is only to be expected that those who do not honour God above the State will say "No". We saw, however, in Chapter III, that some religiously minded people, influenced by the idea of the deified Government and State, have made the individual in all things an obedient object of the State. They too have answered with a denial. If there be any question of guilt in following the State's commands, the State alone bears the guilt, not the individual; he has simply to obey. So even the great theologian, Schleiermacher, said: "It is clear that the subject lays no guilt on himself if he takes up arms at the State's behest." If he feels the war to be unjust, he can and must "remonstrate", but if he has done so and it has not availed, he is then "free from all responsibility", for he acts "simply as a subject" who, "like all subjects, obeys the behest of the Government". If he thinks he must refuse, "conscientiousness loses its sense of proportion. To exclude oneself from participating in war because it does not seem just is sheer revolution."[1]

Thus spake the nineteenth century, especially on Lutheran soil, though in our country too. But nowadays the growing feeling for international law is at work, breaking through absolute political authority. Well-known statesmen and jurists like Politis and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy give their view that since the Kellogg Pact, the individual citizens of a treaty-breaking country have the moral duty of refusing service to their own Government and State.[2] It is still more important however that religion, especially in Calvinist lands, is struggling to recover her independence, and to bridle State idolatry. It declares with Max Huber: *"The eternal is to be found in God and the human soul alone; all else is temporal.* Country, State, mankind—none has an independent existence; they all live only in the consciousness of a man. It is the man that is judged, saved, given grace; he can transfer none of this to an intermediary being between God and himself;

[1] Schleiermacher: *Die Christliche Sitte*, Sämmtliche Werke, Ausg. L. Jonas, 1843, p. 284.

[2] Quoted in *Die Friedenswarte*, December 1928: *Kriegsachtung und Kriegsdienstverweigerung*, p. 362.

the State cannot take a single responsibility off his shoulders."[1] A man has no right to be evil towards anyone. Evil is always evil and separates the soul from God. . . . *A Christian may never lend himself to what he condemns on moral grounds.* . . . This alone can be accepted as the general principle: *moral duty comes before a duty imposed by law; the eternal before that of the world.* Even a bond so sacred as that between children and parents must, if need be, be sacrificed unconditionally. How then should the State be able to make claim to a different treatment?" As might be expected, Huber so speaking, recalls early Christianity: Paul admonished the Christian community to obedience, certainly, "even to the State, which was indifferent to their interests. . . . *These Christians*, however, who fulfilled all their duties towards the State, *broke with the State without hesitation, so soon as the latter*, by ordering recognition of the divinity of Caesar, *demanded their souls*".[2]

Max Huber here completely expresses our own point of view. How *can* the State have the last word over conscience, when the conscience alone has capacity for direct perception of what is truly valid, while the State never perceives it except second-hand, through various intermediaries, and can only reproduce it imperfectly? The eternal law is above the temporal. "I am fully aware", wrote Gandhi, who has shown himself as much as possible and as long as possible a loyal subject of the British régime, "I am fully aware of the danger to good government, if an honourable citizen advises resistance to the law of the land. But I refuse to believe in the infallibility of law-givers. . . . It is not the duty of a citizen to show blind obedience to the laws which are imposed upon him".[3] So too, Alexandre Vinet has written: As members of the State we must willingly accept limitation of our personal freedom. "But in no circumstances

[1] *Internationale politiek en Evangelie*, p. 29. The italics are ours.

[2] ibid., pp. 32, 59, 27. If Huber had paid closer regard to the demands which war, the "demonic" and "soul-wasting" character of which he recognized (pp. 9, 24), imposes on men, he would have seen more clearly that war and coercive measures by the police are not "on a par" (p. 47), and have understood better how many young men get the feeling that the State is "demanding their souls", when they are called up to discharge their military service. See also the end of Chapter I, above.

[3] Quoted by Dr. Case in *Non-Violent Coercion*, London, 1923, pp. 365, 366.

can we make it the sacrifice of our conscience." That is not at our disposal; "conscience has us at its disposal". If this is called rebellion, Vinet answers, "Yes, rebellion against him who has imposed the law, rebellion in the eyes of the law. *But consider well, how the laws themselves are often rebellious against the eternal law of righteousness, against the highest law of God.* We assume, for this choice between the two laws, that the citizen remembers he is a man and a believer in God. When compelled to choose between his fellows beside him, and his Master above him, he puts himself on the side of Him through whom alone kings rule, and lawgivers utter laws, and rulers practise justice. . . ."[1] In various ways, all great believers have repeated the answer the Apostles gave to the Sanhedrin when it bade them be silent: "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts v. 29).

Even Luther, in the midst of urging his hearers to be subject to the Government in all things, makes this exception; how could the man who confronted the Diet of Worms do otherwise. But Calvin did it more sternly and high-spiritedly in the last chapter of his Institutions, and it is his spirit which lives again in Reformed lands. We cannot refrain from quoting Calvin's words, which are so wholly applicable to the position of many present-day anti-militarists, in relation to the State which they wish to obey so far as possible: "But to that obedience which, as we have learnt, is due to the powers-that-be, one exception must always be in force, or rather, a rule, which may well be observed and followed, before all things: to wit, that the aforesaid obedience shall not withdraw us from obedience to God, to Whose will all desires of kings must be subject, before Whose ordinances all their commands must give way, before whose majesty all their sceptres must bend and do homage. And, in truth, what error it would be, if, for the sake of pleasing men, one should make no scruple of falling under the wrath of God, by Whose will one may be obedient even to men! Yet the Lord is King of Kings, Who alone when He opens His mouth must be heard before all and above all. Thereafter, we must subject ourselves to the men who are set over us, yet never otherwise than under Him, the highest and most glorious God. If they

[1] Quoted by Liechtenhan: *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* pp. 59, 60. The italics are ours.

command anything against Him, it must be rejected as null and void."[1]

This sacred right of the Christian personality has been too little heeded in the last century. The State has claimed too many rights, has crushed personality, and thereby lost spiritual value as a civilized State. As one of the reasons for the decline of our civilization, Albert Schweitzer says that personality has been stifled in collectivity. "Where collectivity affects the individual more than he affects it, decline sets in." It is disastrous that men have "continually sacrificed their moral personalities on the altar of the Fatherland, instead of remaining intent upon the collective idea, and so becoming a *power* to realize that idea in perfection. . . . The bankruptcy of the civilized State, which becomes more obvious every year, is ruining the modern man. . . . The demoralization of the individual by the crowd is in full swing. . . . Since we are in such a condition, we must more sharply define our own attitude as individuals. . . . Only if many do this, can we be saved. Civilization can only come to a halt in its decline if a new purpose arises in many *individuals*, independent of the prevailing disposition of the crowd, and in opposition to it. . . ."[2]

Now this is just what is happening to-day. Among many of us, as individuals, a new anti-militarist purpose has sprung up, as the result of a sharper definition of our own attitude in alert obedience to the moral idea, a purpose that is working to introduce a new ethic into society, to create a new public opinion, and to contribute to a new civilization. It is not that flabby pacifism which shrinks from war, but accommodates itself to every wartime duty which the State imposes. No, since it is a purpose in vital contact with absolute values, it cannot possibly bow before the will of the State and its military lawgiving, but it opposes that law which, it is convinced, "is itself rebellious against the eternal law of righteousness, against the highest law of God".

There is sometimes no other choice for the serious-minded citizen than either to work for the existing State against that of the future, or for that of the future against that which exists.

[1] *Institutions*, IV, 32.
[2] *Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur*, pp. 20, 46., 47.

And history has more than once shown that those who opposed the old State were building a new and a better one.

In various lands after the war, it was felt that this new purpose should no longer meet with coercion and penalty. Exemptions *must* be granted. Denmark passed its Conscientious Objection Act in 1917, Sweden in 1920, whereupon upwards of four hundred were exempted each year, Norway in 1922, only here even *before* passing the Act, in the period from 1911 to 1921 no fewer than 776 conscientious objectors were exempted. Even Holland followed reluctantly, carried a Conscientious Objection Act on July 13, 1923, as required by the Constitution, began to apply it in October 1924, and granted nine exemptions in the first half year. Article 183 of our Constitution runs: "Conditions shall be laid down by law, whereby exemption from military service shall be granted on account of bona fide conscientious objection". I have shown elsewhere[1] the way in which this law is a limitation of the Constitution, how narrowly it has been interpreted and how narrow-mindedly applied, without any real understanding of what it is that can drive earnest young men to refuse. The Royal Commission of Enquiry was far too little aware that the growing resistance to conscription can only be attributed in very small measure to the Tolstoyan principle of utter defencelessness —even the law of 1923 witnesses to this lack of insight—but that nine-tenths of it issue from reverence for humanity, which in war is only "regarded as so much *materia delenda*" (Max Huber), from a "sense of responsibility for the lot of mankind", above all, from moral condemnation of that activity which "reveals in the most terrible way the nature of war, that works havoc with the whole moral order". For these reasons, they "feel obliged to make use of the strongest means at their disposal to protest against the whole system". (From the Swedish address to the Crown, of the Alliance for Christian Social-life, which leaves the impression that the ruling factor for present-day objectors is not concern for their own souls and their own peace of mind, but a feeling of responsibility for the community.) "Enlarging" of the law is certainly very desirable, but quite inadequate, for at least two reasons.

[1] *Dienstplicht en gewetensbezwaren*, Haagsch Maandblad, December 1925.

(*a*) Because those who have the good fortune to be "exempted",[1] not imprisoned, as so many are, for their conscientious objections, are punished with an extension of from eight to twelve months on their term of national service; being set to some other form of it. (The extension is one of eight months if the objector is willing to join the Red Cross, and twelve months if he refuses this and *every* form of service connected with the army.) Most of them can ill afford this extension on account of their studies or careers. In Sweden the extension has been two to four months, and there are signs that the latter period will be shortened.

(*b*) Because the law, however altered, issues from the erroneous belief that the State has the moral right to require military service. Thus it lays upon all who do not render their "service" the odium of "anarchist", of "rebel", which terribly hampers them later on, in the community, especially in times of unemployment.

For these reasons many young men decide to compromise with their consciences, and to be more "sensible", "not so fanatical", as the older members of their families mostly put it. Hundreds of young objectors are in this way screwed down by the State every year. It is of course ethically weak, but who dares blame these youths, whose characters and outlook on life for the most part are yet to be formed? Much more severely to be condemned is the attitude of the State, which thus puts the still tender consciences of adolescents to the test, and practically compels them, with all the oppressive means at its disposal, to choose the side of this so profoundly immoral business of war. Even Christian pastors are employed—some *allow* themselves to be so employed—in showing that "a good Christian is a good soldier".[2]

No. I dare not take very sore offence at these young men if they yield; later on they themselves will often feel ashamed. But I want to pay homage here to those, however young they might be, who have such character and conviction that they have remained steadfast and made sacrifice for their conviction.

[1] For the support and guidance of objectors, there exists a "Commission for enlightenment in the law of conscientious objection", Address: Ds. F. Kuiper, Krommenie, Holland.

[2] See, however, Chapters I and IV.

From 1915 till now more than 1,000 conscientious objectors have been imprisoned in Holland. I know very well there is chaff among the wheat, in my country as everywhere else, but do not let us be in too much hurry to pass sentence on this "chaff".

Those who refuse service because they feel no responsibility towards the community, or because they do not care a rap for the State, I do not defend, though I admit that the State demands far more from many poor young men than it gives them.

Those who say, "I want to be able to tell what I am fighting for, and a soldier, when he is called up, cannot tell", I cannot condemn. At least nine out of ten soldiers in the Great War were three-parts deceived in this regard.

And those too who are of opinion that "in such serious circumstances as war beings about, I will think for myself and judge for myself, and not be used as an unthinking instrument", I believe are quite right. For, as Max Huber says, "the State cannot take a single responsibility off their shoulders".

But my heart goes out especially to those whose whole consciences rise in revolt when they see what war does, making men into beasts and the earth into a hell of sin and misery, and who therefore refuse to surrender their consciences for military service.

It was they who are rousing anew the conscience of our fallen Christianity. It is they who call out aloud to us: "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free"!

2. *Personal stand and party*

If anti-militarist activity is to be confined to the disarmament agitation of political parties, and if the only hope beyond that is fixed on a general strike and general refusal to render service when war is threatened, the position is weak ethically and psychologically, and therefore tactically weak. In the disarmament parties there are many who themselves feel this very much.

Ethically weak, because it forgets that the true ethic begins with personal conscience and personal behaviour, and this ethic must permeate communal morality, not vice versa. The pacifism

whereby the disarmament parties as such *must* live is morally strong only because it is pacifism on principle, for there is no real driving power in opportunism, and *this* pacifism never feels the conflict with militarism to be merely a matter for the people as a whole or for a party, but always and primarily as a *personal* matter, a matter of conscience. And if one's conscience—for the Christian, if *God* in his conscience—has uttered a veto: "Ye shall not take part herein! it is morally and religiously illicit to do anything else, for *any* party or cause, but obey. The party which resists this truth, and points to the possible effect (*infra*), sins against the conscience of those whom it thus resists, and opposes the Christian ethic, which always seeks the motive that binds man to a power far above mankind.

Psychologically weak, because it imagines that a collective readiness for great *personal* sacrifice is to be counted on for the cause, in the hour of danger, though readiness for that sacrifice and practice of that sacrificial spirit has been systematically crushed beforehand. So long as men pay heed and let heed be paid to the call to military service; so long as men obediently drill and shoot as if no war-problem existed at all; so long as people get their living by making submarines and turning shells—and mind, we are not blaming *them*, but we respect those who refuse—so long there is no sort of certainty that if it came to the point, there would be no repetition of the events of 1914.

And therefore *tactically* weak. Personal conscientious objection fulfils somewhat the same rôle in the movement for national disarmament as the latter plays in the fight for general disarmament: that of indispensable stimulus, because of its thoroughgoing principle and character. People say the effect is trivial, pointing to the comparatively small number of objectors. (For the other effect, "the risky result of it", see below.) Let them not underestimate, however, the moral influence of those convictions for which personal sacrifices are made, even though those convictions are rare, in these morally degenerate days. Without this personal pacifism on principle the whole of our disarmament movement would be in danger of declining into that opportunist pacifism which knows no other motives than the cost of armaments and our military weakness (which motives

certainly have their due place) or which seeks its ground in that sentimentality which sees only the cruelties of war, not the crime of it, not the sin. Men may and must sometimes take part in the infliction of pain; in crime and sin, never. Yet again: the worst of war is not its cruelty, however great this is;[1] the worst is its criminality, its guilt, its sin.

3. *Incitement to refuse military service?*

Incitement to refuse is punishable, and it is very likely that many of our opponents, if they have read thus far, will demand whether we would incite people to refuse. We reply, if we ourselves were liable to service and could set the example, if, too, we were facing, not youths of nineteen and twenty, but full-grown men of mature character, we would not hesitate an instant to stir them up. For a man who is firmly assured that he acts in the name of a higher law against a lower that is rebellious toward the higher, it is no disgrace but honour, if he goes to prison for this! What redoubled power his testimony would gain instantly! What a beneficent rest in the midst of wearing toil! That we still refrain from inciting refusal of military service, indoors and out, is only to be accounted for by the two reasons we have named. We would not have young men take a step, at our incitement or moral pressure, the full meaning of which they did not grasp and the consequences of which they could not bear. If any should point to the indirect incitement of our testimony, we accept the blame. It is not to be shirked. We should load heavier blame on ourselves were we silent. This silence, along with her militarist, imperialist speech is a burden of guilt heavy as lead on the Church. If this suggestion comes from us, even indirectly, men should rejoice—on the grounds of mere fairness—that in the face of so many strong suggestions and urgings to fulfil one's military service obediently, there should be at least some suggestion tending in the opposite direction. Those who meet it are at least put into the position

[1] "However great this is." George Duhamel's *Vie des Martyrs* should be read (45me ed., Paris 1912), or Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front.* Says the latter, "A hospital alone shows what war is. . . . How senseless is everything that can ever be written, done, or thought, when such things are possible" (p. 287).

to think whether the obligation to render military service is an obligation at all from the moral point of view. And if such a young man comes to us after careful consideration and inner wrestling, and with mind fully made up, declares: "I *cannot* . . . I *may* not . . . I *will* not do it", what would we, once sure of his genuine earnestness, but reply, as in a similar case a certain father, himself an "orthodox" Christian, recently answered his son: "Young man, God bless you!" The world has need of this sort of young man, if it is to press on to a worthier future. And Christ knows his own. Yes, we indeed have all respect for such a bearing. Have I not heard one of our chief social-democratic leaders, who himself utters warnings against refusal of service, say with emotion in his voice: "I cannot ask or expect it of any such young fellow, but if my son came to me, presently, to tell me that he had decided to refuse, I should be right proud of him."

We may not demand or expect it of such a light-hearted period of life. Mevrouw Bakker-Nort was right when she remarked in the Chamber during the discussion of the Conscientious Objection Bill, "These young men bear the brunt of the fight which is going on throughout our whole nation: the fight over the moral rightness of armaments; the fight may not, must not, be waged in this way, by youths at that stage of life!" True indeed. This may not be! Besides the compulsion to train in ways of war, this is the second immoral aspect of military service. Our young men are simply the pawns in the game. Although everywhere else minors must be represented and acted for, in law, by their elders, in this most important matter that obligation is denied and that right refused. Our young men are simply the pawns in the game, and, for that matter, so are their elders. "States", says Schweitzer, bitterly but truly, "make free with their subjects at their own sweet will, without any respect for moral feeling."[1] But it may yet come about, especially in times when the monster of war threatens, that we shall suddenly bestir ourselves and feel called, in spite of all considerations which have hitherto held us back, to exhort and adjure the youth of our country: "Let be this cursed work; think of Christ's realm and Holland's vocation!" We leave this in God's hands.

[1] *Kultur und Ethik*, II, p. xviii.

4. Abolition of compulsory service. A voluntary army?

More and more it is felt that conscription cannot last. Ethical considerations and others work hand in hand here, though the combination is not always fortunate. Sooner or later conscription must disappear, and a great wrong will have gone from the earth. In order to prepare for this happening without injury or loss to the army, and to rid the army of undesirable (i.e. unmilitary) elements straightway, a group of military officers and employers of labour induced our War Minister in 1928 ("The Posthuma-Boele Petition") to introduce a Bill whereby volunteers might strengthen the army. Many leading employers had already promised attractive privileges and facilities to these volunteers. Fortunately the Chamber made it clear to the Minister that so long as there is an army at all, it must involve the whole nation.

But at this point "the dangerous consequence" faces us, which the disarmament parties never tire of pointing out. If the fight against conscription ends with its abolition, you run a risk of getting an army consisting of military-minded volunteers and of paid underlings, an army which would not only be a willing tool in the hands of reaction, should the workers ever call a general strike, but which would also arbitrarily and provocatively run us into peril of war. Even if the volunteers were not forthcoming in great numbers, a very small force, technically well equipped, could terrorize a whole nation, in modern warfare.

We fully recognize this danger, although in all fairness let it be said that the disarmament movement itself, quite as much as the fight against conscription, sets our opponents clamouring for a voluntary army, which is not "impaired" by the anti-militarist elements within it. There are difficulties here which will more and more increase. We recognize the danger referred to, however, and also, no less, the danger of a workers' army, preparing itself against this voluntary State army, its enemy; the danger of civil war, indeed, is not imaginary. Yet we may not—we cannot—shrink from our demand; conscription must go, for conscription is evil, and evil may not be tolerated under any consideration. Evil is something which has no right to be anywhere, ever. The only thing to do is to press for both together, for abolition of compulsory service, and for the greater, more

comprehensive, cause of national disarmament, in the hope that the latter may speedily triumph, or, failing that, that the abolition of compulsory service would give a moral odium to military service, which would do much to bring about disarmament. For only the latter gives the guarantee we want that our people will not be deluded into taking part in and becoming guilty of that devilish death-dance, called war. We may not rest till national disarmament is an accomplished fact.

But once more: if the agitation for disarmament is to succeed, nationally and internationally, it will not in any wise be able to dispense with the conscientious objector movement. If one would gain a true estimate of this movement, one must bear in mind that:

(*a*) It not only touches the youthful objectors, but all others, older as well, whose service is counted on in wartime. And maybe, even in peace-time, if our Government should presently give ear to plans already discussed by our military authorities, for organizing, after the example of France, the whole nation, men and women, in time of peace, with a view to the next war! Better keep one's weather-eye open and be ready for defence! There is a definite preventive of this, in the timely caveat sounded by a part of the nation: "Do not count on us for your activities of war, not even for preparation; we will never again take part, and you will not get our support."

(*b*) It has long since been international, and is becoming more and more so energetically. From time to time for years there has appeared *The War-Resister*, the news sheet of the International Union of War-Resisters, the editor of which, H. Runham Brown,[1] again and again presents the matter in a very inspiring way. Then there is the International Anti-Militarist Bureau, which issues bulletins. This is conducted on an anarchistic basis. The International Fellowship of Reconciliation, of which Oliver Dryer was the indefatigable secretary (now succeeded by Kaspar Mayr),[2] and which issues a monthly news sheet, works in an anti-militarist spirit, on a definitely Christian basis. In France

[1] 11, Abbey Road, Enfield, Middlesex. Here, too, may be obtained the report of the International Conference held at Sonntagsberg (Austria) in July 1928.

[2] 17, Red Lion Square, London, W.C.1. From this address, too, the British branch of the F.O.R. publishes the monthly *Reconciliation*.

appears *L'Universel*, the organ of the Mouvement Pacifique Chrètien under the editorship of Dr. M. Dumesnil. In *Die Friedenswarte*[1] ("for international understanding", founded by Alfred H. Fried, and now conducted by Hans Welberg), among other things, radical anti-militarism is to be heard. Along with *Die Friedenswarte*, we must certainly name the quarterly, *Die Eiche*, whose editor, Professor F. Siegmund Schultze, stood up for Christian pacifism even in wartime, and suffered in consequence. Finally we would mention the Dutch monthly, *De Nieuwe Koers*, organ of the peace movement generally in Holland, especially of the "No More War Movement".[2]

A noteworthy phenomenon of recent years has been the growth of the "Ponsonby Movement", both in England and abroad. In December 1927, Lord Ponsonby (then Mr. Arthur Ponsonby; an M.P. and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the first MacDonald Ministry) submitted to the British Prime Minister a "Peace Letter", signed by 128,770 British subjects, as follows:

"We, the undersigned, convinced that all disputes between nations are capable of settlement either by diplomatic negotiation or by some form of International Arbitration, hereby solemnly declare that we shall refuse to support or render war-services to any Government which resorts to arms."

After the letter had been presented, so many more signatures came in that Mr. Ponsonby decided, contrary to his original intention, to continue his effort. The movement gained ground, especially in Germany; in the Rhineland and Westphalia alone, 137,000 men and women had signed by the end of 1927.

5. *Through the personal stand of her members, the Church awakes*

It is not our intention to give a full survey of the pacifist movement. We would simply pay attention to the collective and individual attitude of Christians. The Christian pacifist movement has had its pioneers in our own land, as everywhere else. These pioneers were all more or less anarchistically inclined. They could not visualize the State as separated from war—in this they

[1] Hensel & Co. Verlag, Berlin W.30, Nollendorfstrasse 21a.
[2] Published by D. van Sijn en Zonen, Bierhaven 27–31, Rotterdam.

certainly had the support of history—and their faith in human nature enabled them to conceive quite another society than that held together by the compulsion of law.

Many who, lacking that faith, could not share their standpoint, and who regarded a purely just State as both possible and indispensable, were nevertheless stirred by their example, though they could not take the same way. Stirred, till they too could not keep silence, and could no longer tread the old imperialist, militarist paths. Stirred, till they too realized it: the State we would serve as true citizens (though our first allegiance is to Christ and his Kingdom) needs nothing for its purification and abiding future so much as Christians who steadfastly refuse to tread the way of war, Christians who on principle oppose all preparation for war, and all militarism. Then they arose, here and elsewhere, and thereafter the Church began slowly to awaken. The Church organizations as such still remain silent, but members of these have broken the guilty silence. Voices are being raised in Church circles and thus in the Church, and they are uniting in protest against the war-idea in every form. The volume of sound is still weak, but it swells perceptibly, and, thank God, it will no more be possible to say that war-preparations are going on everywhere, and the Church is everywhere silent.

We have already heard how the German Catholic Peace movement, at its conference in 1924, expressed the view that there might be a righteous war *in theory*, but that "actually the conditions are wanting which Catholic ethics lays down, for a war to be sanctioned".[1] In Switzerland, a "Union of Anti-Militarist Clergymen" was formed which issued, in 1925, the manifesto we have already referred to, on behalf of some hundred ministers, and in 1927 made a powerful plea for national disarmament through its President, Dr. Liechtenhan (*Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?*) Both manifesto and book defend refusal of military service, and state a determination to withhold all support from war. In 1926, 115 English Congregational ministers,[2] assembled at Leicester, made this solemn declaration, "We are

[1] In Holland, Catholics have little to say about it, though many of them are anti-militarists.

[2] The number of members of this "Congregational Pacifist Crusade" is now (summer 1930) 230; Secretary, Rev. J. R. Ackroyd, 74, Marlborough Hill, Harrow, Middlesex.

determined, by God's help, to take no part in and give no sanction to war. This pledge allows of no compromise; we no longer make any distinction between righteous and unrighteous, aggressive or defensive wars. Every war is sin." In 1928, 135 ministers of the Danish Evangelical-Lutheran Church—the established Church—declared their conviction, in a manifesto, that "every war, even the so-called war of defence, is in absolute opposition to the fundamental principles of Christianity, as these are revealed in the Gospel of Jesus Christ", and that they will "work for disarmament and so for peace". Their manifesto concludes: "We should deem it honour for our country, if it were the first that accepted disarmament." Germany, Sweden and Norway, too, each now possesses its group of pacifist ministers.[1]

Holland, too, is not lagging behind. In October 1924, about thirty clergymen, who could no longer endure that the Church should be silent, and that her silence should give sanction to the war-preparation going on all the time ("Silence gives consent"), came together at Utrecht, and joined in a resolution which became the basis of the association, "Kerk en Vrede" (a society of clergy and Church members opposed to war and war-preparation):

"The Society, convinced that only by the permeation of Christian principles may salvation be expected for men, nations and communities of nations;

that this permeation is not only retarded by the influence of sin, but also by the maintenance of sinful institutions, of which the most pernicious is war;

that not only does war mock at all justice, but the character

[1] A report has reached me from the U.S.A., that in March 1929 the second Christian conference on world-peace, held at Columbus (Ohio) and representative of twenty-one religious bodies, came to the conclusion: "The churches must form a strong power to blot out war. War denies the Fatherhood of God, besmirches the brotherhood of man, mocks at the sacredness of the human life, is merciless to women and children. It employs falsehood, denies justice, drives away compassion and stirs up hate. War stands for *everything* Jesus did not propose, and stands for *nothing* he did." And further, "We believe that Christians must be good citizens, obedient to the laws of the State up to the point where obedience to men would be disobedience to God". Finally, "The churches must condemn recourse to the war-system as sin, and henceforth refuse to sanction it, or to be used as an instrument in its support".

of modern warfare injures man's religious and moral sense to a degree no longer to be tolerated;

that to oppose this crime any sacrifice is worth making, in the realization of the truth that it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it:

joins issue with war, and war-preparation, and calls on all Christians, in and out of the Churches, to join in this struggle, that the names of Jesus Christ and his heavenly Father may no longer be assaulted by the peoples in the horrible way they have been in the years which lie behind us."

This association has chiefly directed its attentions, to begin with, towards the clergy, who have come in to the number of 260, from all churches except the Roman Catholic. Latterly the challenge has been thrown down to the laity, and 5,000 have joined. The monthly organ is likewise called *Kerk en Vrede*, and has a circulation of some 6,000. Through the initiative of this body, there was founded in 1926, in Geneva, the "International Committee of Anti-militarist Clergymen" which called together a preparatory conference from August 13 to 15, 1928, at Amsterdam. This conference, which was attended by nearly 100 clergy from ten different lands, carried, as its chief work, the resolution quoted below, beside resolutions on the economic problem, the race-problem and the relation between war and justice.

"This International Congress of Anti-Militarist Clergymen, judging,

1. that the moral principles of Christianity, as they are revealed by the Gospel of Jesus Christ, are in irreconcilable opposition to war;
2. that war, especially modern warfare, by its very character violates all Christian values;
3. that the State which makes preparation for war and forces its citizens to share in the business of war, de-christianizes the nation:

makes an urgent appeal to the Christian churches to consider it their duty,

I. to protest in a fundamentally anti-militaristic way, against the sin of war and war-preparation.

II. to declare the office of military chaplain inconsistent with the Gospel;[1]

III. to protect the conscientious objector as one maintaining the Christian attitude;

IV. to convince the Christian nation that it ought to disarm, and instead of the sinful risk of war, ought to accept, in reliance on the assistance of God, the risk of peace."

At the conclusion of the Congress, which was characterized by unity of purpose and the spirit of consecration, there was instituted "The International Union of Anti-Militarist Ministers and Clergymen",[2] with an executive committee. The relation of the Union to the so-called "World-Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches", was thus explained in *The British Weekly* of August 23, 1928, by the Chairman of the executive, Dr. Hector Macpherson, of Edinburgh: "The aim of the new International Union just founded is not to duplicate the good work of the World Alliance. The rôle of its members is rather, to use the expressive Dutch phrase, that of 'Voorgangers'—pioneers who are prepared to cut their path, at the cost of personal unpopularity and sacrifice, through the undergrowths of human fear and prejudice, and whose aim is to outlaw the very idea of war from the hearts of Christian people. The one weapon which the Voorgangers cling to is the sword of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. In His name and in no other have ministers of religion from Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, America and other lands banded themselves together as a 'Christian International'. . . . If the spirit of the 'voorgangers' spreads all over Europe, then the churches will do their share in outlawing war from the human heart, and, therefore, from the world."

These Christian pacifists of the churches realize that, as the

[1] A few members dissented from this second point, which was inserted later. They feared that it would be interpreted to mean something nobody in the assembly intended, viz. that soldiers, while they remained such, needed no spiritual care. The intention of the movers, however, was simply that a minister holding army-commission could not possibly do justice to the Gospel.

[2] Secretary: The Rev. J. B. Th. Hugenholtz, Ammerstol, Holland. Here too may be obtained the Congress report, in four languages (English, French, German, Esperanto).

last war would never have been waged without the support of the church, the first task of the Church, in view of its aroused Christian conscience, is to withdraw that help and to make it known to the governments where she stands: We will obey you as far as our principles permit, but further we will not and cannot go. If you prepare for war you cannot reckon on us. So far as we are concerned, the help of the Church is finished. If it comes to the test we shall feel obliged to continue in the way we are now taking and so to preach and declare the very opposite to what you want. For we shall persist, more than ever then, in the Gospel of Christ, which tolerates no injustice, and which refuses to take part when barbarity begins, refuses to be conformable to the world, and holds up the Cross; better to suffer wrong than to commit it.

We are well aware that no one comes through such a terrible time without guilt. Even if we in the various lands refuse "service" to the State, we shall still be unable to dismiss a sense of shortcomings; we too are children of tradition, and children of the earth, and comradeship, even in wrong-doing, seems often commanding. Yet we need only consider what Christianity is and what war is to know with certainty, at once, that any other attitude is forbidden. We may not "help" our country in this way, nor could our country, if it knew God's will, wish to be helped so. Above country stands the Kingdom of God, whose eternal laws are trampled in the dust in every war.

6. *The "militia Christi" lives again*

We can never *perfectly* vouch for the attitude we shall adopt in the future, in days of stress. If once the nationalistic war-mentality becomes master of a people, the individual and the small group is sore put to it to row against the tide. We can only hope and pray that we shall receive power to remain, then as now, true to our faith. However much we love our country, it will be very difficult for us to retain this love long, if the country goes on with its armaments, holds itself "ready", and presently joins in the criminal game, in the *radikale Böse*, to use Paul Natorp's term for modern war.[1] Maybe Fichte's words, which

[1] Chapter III, p. 161.

we have already heard,[1] will prove true of us; if a state grows hard in evil, "it openly stamps itself with the seal of reprobation . . . and then the enlightened man (*der Erleuchtete*) has no country upon earth, but seeks his citizenship in heaven, acquiring his right thereto by sowing, according to his power here and now, seeds from which, one day after him, shall spring a land for men of high intent".

We are well aware that we are not *Erleuchteten*. We are no whit better than our fellows, but one thing is certain: in this regard God has opened our eyes, and has released our spirits from a sinful delusion in which Christianity has been ensnared ever since its fall. And if our country remains ensnared in that delusion, prepared for that sinful work, and presently gives itself over to it, plunging into sin with the best intentions even, though we have, it is true, no *right* to the "heavenly Fatherland"—which of us could lay any claim to right?—we will nevertheless hope to set all our love on that eternal country, which our earthly land is profaning so, and to give our whole heart thereto.

We are no whit better than Christians who perhaps have given less thought to the conflict of Christianity and war, or who have less imaginative power to visualize this conflict. We know that in all respects we are sinful and guilty in the sight of God. But the Christian faith and conviction which by God's grace we have prevent our breathing contentedly in a world which calmly goes on preparing the most criminal work that men can conceive. They prevent us from esteeming life highly on this earth and in our own country, if these both are found at this diabolical work. And then if we had a more childlike faith than is ours we should pray, "Lord, let this world of men be utterly destroyed by thine almighty hand, in one vast deluge, before it perish through its own guilt, in shame intolerable"!

Perhaps there is still escape. God is mightily at work to-day. He is active to raise Christianity from its fall, to restore to Christianity something of its original spirit, its moral abhorrence of war and bloodshed, its passive resistance, or better put, its spiritual readiness (Eph. vi. 10–17) to withstand the pagan brute activities of this world, the "camp of darkness". Again,

[1] Chapter III, p. 143.

there is rising something of that protest on principle, which characterized primitive Christianity, whenever there was an attempt to compel worship of other gods than Christ and his heavenly Father, the protest which springs up everywhere where the categorical imperative of absolute validity is audible, the protest which Kant reproduced in his favourite citation from Virgil: *Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito ?*[1]

God is mightily at work to-day. Maybe He again holds martyrdom in readiness to seal the faith of Christians. We shall do well not to imagine that refusal of all support of war, cessation of the industries necessary to a war, and resistance of spirit to military coercion of every sort are going to demand but small sacrifices from us. We shall do well to think of the worst that may be before us and ours, and to put wife and child, goods and life into the hands of Him who commands us, and who will, if we obey, direct us. All the strength of our faith, all our trust, all our prayer will be needed. But the prayer will be heard, the trust fulfilled, the strength redoubled.

The old *militia Christi* revives. Christ calls up his soldiers of peace. They were not wanting in the last war. Many of them were put against the wall and shot. That fact only emerged afterwards, but it has done its work. Here again the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. They made their sacrifice to the Father of all men, without sacrificing their neighbour, indeed, *for the sake of* their neighbour; the sacrifice of their own life alone, the pure, Christian sacrifice. Many such sacrifices, says Liechtenhan[2] must still be made, before the time comes, which *will* surely come, when men shall honour the grave of that "Unknown Soldier" who has fallen in the cause of peace.

From whom may this sacrifice be expected sooner than from those who hold Christ to be the Way, the Truth, the Life? Who will be readier to stake all on Christian principle, in this as in other areas of life, than those "flaming souls" (*inwendig Brennenden*), of whom Rudolf Otto expects the real social reformation, those who believe? If the Church so acts, it stakes its very existence —at least, seemingly. But then she will prove her Master's words, "Who shall lose his life for my sake, the same shall find it".

[1] "Yield not to evil, but oppose it, stout of heart."
[2] *Ist Abrüstung Christenpflicht?* p. 42.

Should she fail to do so, the contrary threatens, now more than ever. "The impotence of the Church is an astounding fact in the modern world," an English preacher had to write, after the war.[1]

At a recent meeting of the "Stockholm" continuation committee at Winchester, Wilfred Monod complained, "Alas, that the modern world so rarely takes the trouble to fight us; we are not dangerous enough to be hated, Christians pass unnoticed, not worthy of opposition".[2] No wonder, when the Church has been silent so long over the worst of all sins! But if God wills and we obey, it will be different. It is God's will, says Max Huber, "that the Christian shall affect the world through just those qualities which distinguish him from the world and its ways".[3] The Church of the last hundred years has been too little able to do this; even in her social ideals, she has been too like the world. She has not been that salt with savour which purifies and protects from decay. She has not disturbed the world. If God wills and we obey, this shall be changed.

7. *We are more than pacifists. We are concerned first for God's glory and Christ's Name*

Our speaking and working has a twofold purpose. We want to fight war in all its forms, and to serve peace, convinced that without such thoroughgoing opposition, every attempt at peace must fail. But it would be wrong to suppose us mere pacifists. That would be to overlook the deepest reason for our stand. This is our burning passion, to cut the Gospel free from the idea of war, for the sake of God's glory to restore to Christianity its ancient readiness for Cross and sacrifice, and with it its ancient self-esteem and independence, that it may face up to the State—for the State's own good—and say to it: "We can recognize you fully only when you become a fully just State, and so forswear war plainly and certainly; if you will not do so, we go our own way, as Christian individuals and as a Christian organization, and may the Lord of time and of eternity judge between us. For what matters in the last resort is not you nor we, but God's

[1] Rev. S. Mellone in *The Hibbert Journal*, April 1922.
[2] *Life and Work Bulletin*, No. 2, November 1927, p. 78.
[3] *Internationale Politiek en Evangelie*, p. 58.

glory and His Kingdom, that Kingdom which is infinitely more than any worldly peace, and wholly different, yet which is scorned and shamed by nothing on earth so much as by the pursuit of war.

We know we are speaking and working not in our own names but in the Name of Christ, who again will raise Christianity from its fall, and who will cleanse his Name from war. In spite of all our weakness and sinfulness, he will use us for his work to-day. It is our glory that we may do it. We feel and know that our weakness is borne by his strength. And so we have the holy expectation that the day will come again when Christianity, in the matter of war, will be able to pray and testify without shame within or stain without:

Our Father, which art in heaven,
Hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done,
In earth, as it is in heaven. Amen.

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